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Abstract  
Sukuk are financial instruments similar to bonds that are compliant with Shari’ah 
(Islamic law). Since their inception in 2002, sukuk markets have experienced dramatic 
growth rates, attracting the attention of investors, analysts, and researchers alike. 
Despite Islamic bonds (thereafter termed sukuk) successfully holding their place in the 
international bond markets, this dissertation’s literature survey reveals that few 
empirical studies have undertaken a risk analysis of sukuk markets from the investors’ 
perspectives. Conventional bonds and sukuk as financial instruments are both exposed 
to various types of financial and market risks. This dissertation’s purpose is to engage 
in a risk analysis of sukuk markets compared with conventional bonds. Using a value 
at risk (VaR) approach, we examine whether sukuk are exposed to higher market risks 
than conventional bonds. In addition, we investigate whether the inclusion of sukuk in 
investment portfolios provides a diversification benefit to individual investors. We 
find that, for a given issuer, a conventional bonds’ VaR is significantly higher than 
that of sukuk, indicating that sukuk are less risky. We also find evidence of persistent 
sukuk illiquidity. We further show that introducing a sukuk allocation to a bond 
portfolio improves the risk–return trade-off. This dissertation’s findings have 
important policy implications for investors and Islamic bond issuers. Moreover, they 
are of particular importance to policy makers.  
Keywords: Islamic finance, conventional bonds, Islamic bonds, sukuk, VaR, hedging 
analysis.   
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 )cibarA ni( tcartsbA dna eltiT
أداء الصُّ ُكوك  الإسلامية مقارنة بالسندات التقليدية: أدلَّة جديدة؛ باستخدام طريقة القيمة 
 المعرضة للخطر
 الملخص
ذ تأسيسها فمن. الإسلاميةالصُّ ُكوك  هي أدوات ماليَّة، مماثلة للسندات، التي تتوافق و أحكام الشريعة 
، شهدت أسواُق الصُّ ُكوك  معدَّلات نمو  ٍّ كبيرة جذبت انتباه المستثمرين، والمحللين، 2002في عام 
وعلى الرغم من السندات الإسلامية التي حافظت بنجاح على مكانتها، . والباحثين على حد ٍّ سواء
ـ بالصُّ ُكوك  إلا أنَّ هناك دراساتٍّ تجريبية  في أسواق السندات الدوليَّة التي ُسم ِّ يَْت ــ فيما بعد
 إن السندات. محدودة، اقتصرت على تحليل مخاطر ُسوق الصُّ ُكوك ؛ من وجهة نظر المستثمرين
التقليدية، والصُّ ُكوك  الإسلامية ــ كأدوات ماليَّة ــ معرضة لأنواع مختلفة من المخاطر المالية، 
و استكشاف تحليل مخاطر ُسوق الصُّ ُكوك الإسلامية، والغرض من هذه الرسالة، ه. والسوقية
وباستخدام طريقة القيمة المعرضة للخطر، نقوم بدراسة ما إذا كانت . مقارنة بالسندات التقليدية
يما وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، فإننا نحقق ف. الصُّ ُكوك تتعرض لمخاطر سوق أعلى من السندات التقليدية
ونجد  .فظة الاستثمار سوف يوف ِّر منافع التنويع للمستثمرين الأفرادإذا كان إدراج الصُّ ُكوك  في مح
أنه بالنسبة لمصدر معين، فإن القيمة المعرضة للخطر للمخاطر التقليدية أعلى بكثير من القيمة 
كما نجد أدلة . المعرضة للخطر في الصُّ ُكوك ، الأمر الذي يشير إلى أن الصُّ ُكوك  أقلُّ ُخُطورة
كما نوضح أن إدخال مخصصات صكوك لمحفظة . دم السيولة في الصُّ ُكوك على استمرار ع
والنتائج التي تسعى إليها هذه الأُطروحة لها . السندات يُحس ِّ ن من العلاقة بين المخاطر، والعائد
وة على وعلا. تأثير مهم في الس ِّ ياسة العامة، بالنسبة للمستثمرين، ومصدري السندات الإسلامية
 .أهميَّة خاصَّة لصانعي السياسات الاقتصاديةذلك، فهي ذات 
: التمويل الإسلامي، سندات تقليدية، سندات إسلامية، صكوك، القيمة ةيمفاهيم البحث الرئيس
 المعرضة للخطر.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Orientation of the Thesis 
An analysis of markets worldwide shows that the financial markets of Islamic 
countries have been growing rapidly, by 15% annually, compared with the global 
financial market.1 This growth is believed to represent the fastest growing section of 
the global financial market; moreover, nothing indicates that the trend will slow down 
in the near future (Chong & Liu, 2009). Such growth may simply be because the region 
is an “emerging market” that has been developing slowly for the last five to six decades 
and is now able to catch up with more matured countries such as China, India, and 
Brazil. Further, over the last decade, investors have seen an unparalleled increase in 
financial institutions supporting Islamic markets and the widespread issuing of Islamic 
bonds called sukuk (Christophe, Turk-Ariss, & Weill, 2013). Sukuk are Islamic 
investment debt. Defining them in this way is vital since sukuk should not be seen 
merely as a substitute for conventional securities that are interest-based. Sukuk 
investments generally aim to introduce a new brand of monetary products that mimic 
fixed-rate debts, floating rate notes, and bonds that are similar to those used by 
traditional monetary markets worldwide (Cakir & Raei, 2007; Godlewski & Weill, 
2010). However, sukuk are firmly linked with Shari’ah (Islamic law) (Ayman & 
Christopher, 2007).  
The sukuk market has been growing tremendously since its inception. 
However, debate is continuing among scholars regarding the distinction between 
                                                 
1 The Global University of Islamic Finance (INCEIF) reports that the global Islamic finance industry 
was worth approximately US$2.1 trillion in 2014. The industry is predicted to reach US$6.5 trillion by 
2020 (http://www.inceif.org/industry-growth/). 
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sukuk and its conventional counterpart. This thesis aims to assess the difference 
between sukuk and conventional bonds by capturing any additional diversification 
benefits that can be gained by adding sukuk to conventional fixed income portfolios. 
Further, it evaluates the risks associated with sukuk and compares these with the risks 
of conventional bonds issued by the same issuer. I employed the value at risk (VaR) 
approach to achieve this goal. This study’s findings suggest that sukuk and 
conventional bond prices display different behaviors in the secondary market. They 
also confirm, in accordance with prior literature, the diversification gains achievable 
by adding sukuk to conventional bond portfolios.  
Fixed-income Islamic securities are potentially as useful to investors as 
conventional bonds. Moreover, for non-Muslim investors and who already own 
conventional bonds, the acquisition of sukuk presents an “applauded” new brand asset 
that gives them greater economic diversity and conceivably reduces their risks (Hesse, 
Jobst, & Sole, 2008). However, it is clear that investing in sukuk conveys numerous 
kinds of risks, including the risk of default, which affects interest rates that could 
change as reflected in the debit mechanism, and a risk to the investor’s credit rating. 
These risks could help investors to assess their future prospects of payments with 
regard to specific sukuk issues (Zakaria, Isa, & Abidin, 2012). Nevertheless, there are 
additional risks that could arise because of interest rate changes and the debt 
instrument being represented in a currency other than the investor’s own. These risks 
are collectively called market risk. They may occur with all kinds of commodities, 
ranging from oil to precious metals, or to equities and debt tools (Tariq & Dar, 2007). 
Recent literature on Islamic finance has focused mainly on the characteristics 
of these markets and on the relative performance of the Islamic finance industry 
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(banks) compared with the conventional counterpart (e.g., Abdullah, Hassan, & 
Mohamad, 2007; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013; Hayat & Kraussl, 2011; 
Hussein & Omran, 2005; Jawadi, Jawadi, & Louhichi, 2014; Karim, Lee, Karim, & 
Jais, 2012). However, very few studies have empirically focused on analyzing relative 
performance in terms of the market risk associated with sukuk compared with the 
conventional counterpart. For example, Cakir and Raei (2007) investigate sukuk price 
behavior and found a genuine difference. Using the case of sovereign sukuk and 
Eurobonds from a similar issuer, they estimated and compared the VaR for a portfolio 
that included both instruments with a portfolio that contained only Eurobonds. The 
results indicated a lower VaR when sukuk were added to the portfolio, demonstrating 
sukuk’s diversification benefits. Similarly, Ramasamy, Yan, and Schmidt (2011) find 
that sukuk are less risky than conventional bonds. Godlewski, Turk-Ariss, and Weill 
(2011), however, suggest no significant market reaction to conventional bond issues 
but a significantly negative stock market reaction to sukuk. 
This thesis seeks to extend the current literature on market risk in general and 
contribute to the literature on Islamic investments in particular. It examines the market 
risk associated with sukuk and compares it with the risk of the conventional 
counterpart. Specifically, the objectives of this research are to provide a broad, 
theoretical description of the risks and their characteristics, and estimate the market 
risk of sukuk. The thesis also assesses whether including sukuk in a bond portfolio 
investment provides diversification advantages for investors. 
1.2 Motivation for the Thesis  
This study was undertaken mainly because of the limited availability of 
empirical literature on Islamic sukuk. Research in this area has become essential 
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because of the recent attention received by this financial instrument. Investors are 
looking for safe, reliable, and Shari’ah-compliant investment vehicles, especially in 
Asia and the Gulf region. Additionally, sukuk have now become a preferred source of 
financing for many countries as opposed to conventional bonds (Ab Majid, Shahimi, 
Hafizuddin, & Hafizuddin-Syah, 2010; Al-Ajmi, Al-Saleh, & Hussain, 2011). Given 
such attention, sukuk transactions have shown solid growth from US$8 billion to more 
than US$251 billion over the last decade (DinarStandard, 2013). Further, various 
institutions, advisors, and experts have become interested in providing sukuk 
investment services to conventional investors as well as corporations and governments 
(Cakir & Raei, 2007). In the following chapters, we first compare sukuk to 
conventional bonds, then discuss in detail the risks associated with them.  
1.3 Research Significance and Contributions  
This research adds to the literature in the area of Islamic finance. It is perhaps 
the first comprehensive empirical research on the risks of Islamic sukuk. The research 
goes to the core of the controversy regarding the market risk associated with sukuk as 
a distinctive financing tool compared with other traditional tools. While there have 
been several empirical studies comparing the risk and profitability of Islamic and 
conventional bonds, the market risk performance of sukuk has remained largely 
unexplored. This study seeks to expand knowledge, clarify misconceptions, and 
provide guidance related to sukuk’s potential market risk compared with the risk 
associated with conventional bonds. In sum, this research delivers an abstract work 
that can be used as a benchmark for further research. 
This dissertation includes comprehensive theoretical definitions and aspects of 
sukuk-associated risks. Moreover, it uses the VaR approach to evaluate and measure 
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the market risk of sukuk. This study’s outcome has important policy implications for 
investors and Islamic bond issuers. With regard to investors, it provides evidence about 
whether sukuk offer less risk than conventional equivalents, whether adding sukuk to 
their portfolios provides diversification benefits, and whether they should invest in 
sukuk funds to improve their portfolios’ performance. 
Sukuk issuance is encouraged by governments in Muslim countries for at least 
two reasons. First, there is widespread evidence that efficient capital markets foster 
economic growth. A well-organized and liquid sukuk market can therefore boost 
economic growth while being consistent with Shari’ah. Although the link between 
capital markets and economic growth can apply to all instruments (sukuk as well as 
conventional bonds), sukuk have added features that make them particularly attractive 
from a public policy perspective: Shari’ah compliance, economic system stability, 
reduced moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and an economic system more 
conducive to poverty alleviation. Second, this study shows that sukuk carry less market 
risk than conventional bonds. 
International investors who do not specifically pursue Shari’ah-compliant 
investment objectives can also benefit from allocating part of their resources to sukuk. 
This study shows that sukuk are proving to be an excellent diversifier for a bond 
portfolio and improve significantly the risk–return tradeoff, as measured by the Sharpe 
ratio. 
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1.4 Research Objectives 
This study’s overall objective is to analyze and compare the market risk of 
sukuk and compare it to the risk of conventional bonds. The key objectives are as 
follows:  
1. To examine whether including Islamic sukuk in a bond portfolio will reduce 
market risk. 
2. To evaluate whether Value at Risk approach (VaR) is an appropriate method 
to measure the market risk of sukuk and conventional bonds. 
1.5 Research Questions 
This research aims to answer the following questions along with any other 
secondary questions that may arise throughout the study. 
1. Do sukuk expose investors to higher market risk than conventional bonds? 
2. Is the VaR approach a good method to measure and evaluate the market risk of 
sukuk and conventional bonds? 
3. Does investing in sukuk provide viable diversification benefits for investors?  
1.6 Research Hypotheses  
This dissertation empirically examines the following null hypotheses.  
H1: The market risk of sukuk is less than that of conventional bonds. 
H2: VaR is a proper measure for calculating the market risk of sukuk. 
H3: Including sukuk in investment portfolios provides additional diversification 
benefit to investors. 
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Because risk is a core concern in this study, a comparative analysis is carried 
out to investigate the risks of conventional bonds compared with sukuk. Thus, because 
of the nature of the study, a quadratic (econometric) paradigm will be followed. The 
empirical findings are compared with existing theories and the limited empirical 
studies available on this topic. Theoretically, we can argue that Islamic sukuk may be 
less risky than conventional bonds for the following reasons.  
1. Islamic sukuk offer investors cash flow products, often not closely related to 
the market’s interest rate, which tend toward a sustainable average; thus, they 
are less sensitive to the fluctuations in market’s interest rate.  
2. The sukuk market remains relatively isolated from most other financial markets 
and, thus, is less risky when compared with bonds.  
3. Shari’ah principles require certain ethical business practices, underlying 
productive assets, equitable risk sharing, and the avoidance of speculative 
trading, all of which may make sukuk subject to less market risk when 
compared with stock markets.  
4. Foreign exchange principles applicable to sukuk with an underlying asset are 
denominated in one currency and sukuk certificates issued in another currency. 
As suggested by Tariq & Dar (2007), exchange-rate fluctuations in this case 
can lead to losses for the investor or issuer. 
5. Sukuk may be exposed to a price risk of their underlying assets in a secondary 
market, which may result in decreased risk.  
1.7 Data and Research Methodology 
The management and evaluation of risks is a major issue for financial 
institutions. The total capital requirement for a financial institution in the context of 
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market risk is described as the total of the requirement for positions in foreign 
exchange, equities, interest rates, commodities, and gold. The most popular and 
traditional measure of risk is variance or the standard deviation (volatility) of a 
distribution. The main problem with this measure, however, is that it does not consider 
the direction of an investment's movement; a financial asset can be volatile because it 
suddenly jumps higher. Further, for investors, risk is about the odds of loss rather than 
gains. A much better approach is risk’s focus on the tail of distribution of portfolio 
returns; namely, Value at Risk approach (VaR).  Value at risk approach is the degree 
of loss on a portfolio that the investor expects to be maintained at the same level or 
beyond, while keeping a margin of small probability. Thus, this risk measure could be 
regarded as a forecast of a given percentile, mostly in the lower tail, of the probability 
distribution of portfolio returns. The significance of VaR as a measurement of financial 
market risk is highlighted by the fact that financial institutions have been obligated by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the Bank for International Settlements 
to meet capital requirements in accordance with this risk measure (Dowd, 1999). This 
method is used to analyze data and measure risks to achieve the study’s objectives. 
The analyzed sample of sukuk and conventional bonds came from Datastream. Despite 
the increasing interest in sukuk issuance globally, there is a lack of authentic data on 
various markets. The sample size was determined by the information available on all 
requested variables. The goal was to select data that had similar characteristics, such 
as the same issuer, duration, price, structure, coupon, and yields of Islamic Sukuk, with 
the conventional bonds focusing on corporate bonds and trade bonds that were already 
issued. We selected only the bonds (Islamic and conventional) on which we have 
complete data. With the selected data, we applied the methodology described earlier. 
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Moreover, Datastream was used to extract daily data from the Dow Jones Corporate 
Bond Index and the Dow Jones Sukuk Index.  
1.8 Thesis Organization  
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the background of 
Islamic finance. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on conventional and Islamic bonds. 
Chapter 4 describes the methodology. Chapter 5 focuses on descriptive statistics. 
Chapters 6 and 7 present the results and findings. A summary of the results, 
implications, contributions, recommendations for further research, limitations, and 
suggestions are presented in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 2: Islamic Finance/ Background 
2.1 Introduction  
Islamic finance has been growing rapidly in recent years. Motivated by a 
heightened interest in financial instruments emphasizing risk sharing, it is attracting 
greater attention in the wake of the recent global financial crisis. This class of 
instrument appears to have avoided many of the most severe consequences of the 
crisis. Several features underpin the expansion and performance of Islamic finance. 
For instance, Islamic finance is rapidly evolving and expanding, with banking assets 
estimated to exceed US$920 billion in 2015 (EYGM, 2015). Since the first experiment 
of the Mit Ghamr Bank (MGB) in Egypt in 1963, Islamic financial services have 
become increasingly attractive to over 1.6 billion Muslims across the world. Such 
dramatic growth has stretched well beyond Muslim countries in a way that suggests 
Islamic finance is becoming a global financial force that cannot be ignored(Jung,Yong-
Cheo,&Stulz,1996). The importance of Islamic finance stems from its ultimate 
objective of achieving socioeconomic development and social justice among different 
groups in society. However, the rise of Islamic finance has posed a dilemma for 
Muslim governments to either accept or restrain this new phenomenon. Despite the 
awareness that Islamic finance “could potentially contribute to capital formation and 
economic development” (Wilson, 2008), the dilemma has led to the slowdown of such 
finance in some Muslim countries. This slowdown has been accompanied by the 
emergence of arguments that perceive the state as the sole responsible agent of such a 
drawback because of retrogressive policies. 
Islamic finance is based on Shari’ah, which in essence requires that gains be 
derived from ethical and socially responsible investments and discourages interest-
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based banking and investments. Islamic finance is fundamentally different from 
conventional banking models because it is based on profit and loss sharing (PLS) and 
the prohibition of riba (interest). This structure requires that a financial institution 
invests with a client to finance the client’s transaction rather than lend money to the 
client. Because of the inherent risk involved in any investment, the financial institution 
is entitled to profit from the financial transaction. This is in stark contrast to modern 
finance in which interest is one of the key methods by which banks make money 
through their products, such as mortgages and personal loans. Another fundamental 
distinction of Islamic banking is the absence of insurance that protects clients’ 
deposits, which is found in conventional banks.  
While PLS permits the receipt of money by depositors when invested deposits 
have earned a profit, depositors must incur losses when deposit investments incur 
losses in order to comply with Shari’ah mandates. Deposit insurance, such as the 
protection provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, defeats the very 
purpose of the PLS model, because the depositor does not incur any risk. Deposit 
insurance is an integral part of Western banking regulations but is in direct conflict 
with the basic concepts of Islamic banking. The issue of deposit insurance has proven 
to be a major hurdle for Western, primarily European, banks that wanted and have 
chosen to provide Shari’ah-compliant products. European banks have overcome this 
hurdle of deposit insurance by informing clients that the insurance is not Shari’ah-
compliant.  
Because of a lack of uniformity in the application of Islamic principles, specific 
banking procedures may be accepted by some Muslims and rejected by others. Modern 
Islamic finance products generally address two major issues: riba and gharar. Riba is 
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the payment of charges for the use of money, including interest and usury, and is 
forbidden in the Qur’an in a number of places. An uncertain rate of return (a profit) is 
permissible, but a fixed rate of return (interest) is prohibited. Purely financial 
agreements that are Shari’ah-compliant do not exist because there must always be an 
asset underlying a contract.  
Gharar is the idea of risk or uncertainty, but can also imply deceit. Gharar in a 
form of “normal” risk or hazard is not forbidden; however, any deceit, fraud, or undue 
advantage that results in injustice to either party is prohibited. In addition to the 
Shari’ah principles pertaining to riba and gharar, any financial relationship following 
Islamic principles must also consider activities that may be impermissible (haram) 
under the Qur’an. For example, it is unacceptable for a bank to fund a business that is 
involved in the production of alcoholic beverages or a restaurant that serves alcohol, 
or for a mutual fund to invest in a casino or in a business that makes or sells either pork 
or pornography. 
Among the Islamic concepts commonly used in Islamic banking are profit 
sharing (mudharabah), safekeeping (wadiah), joint venture (musharakah), cost-plus 
(murabahah), and leasing (ijarah). There is a consensus among Muslim scholars that 
the Qur’an prohibits usury, which is the payment and/or collection of any type of 
interest. The payment and collection of interest is referred to as riba. In addition, 
Islamic law prohibits investing in businesses that are haram. In addition to prohibiting 
riba and investing in haram industries, the Qur’an clearly admonishes gharar, which 
can be interpreted to mean “contractual uncertainty and/or ambiguity,” and maisir, 
which is gambling. Despite differences from its Western counterparts, Islamic finance 
has the same purpose as conventional banking except that it operates in accordance 
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with the rules of Shari’ah, known as fiqh al-muamalat (Islamic rules on transactions). 
Unlike ordinary commercial banks whose operations are based on interest, Islamic 
banks operate an interest-free system and are guided by the common principle that 
depositors, instead of receiving a fixed return in the form of interest, share the risk of 
investment and take part of the resulting profits or bear part of the losses. 
Such an investment is a contractual agreement between a bank, financial 
institution, or capital investor and an entrepreneur. This agreement can be viewed as 
venture capital funding. Essentially, it is a contract that provides for profit sharing 
between a bank and an entrepreneur. In such a contract, the entrepreneur can mobilize 
the funds of the former for a business activity. While the bank provides the funding 
for the business venture, the entrepreneur provides expertise, labor, and management. 
Profits are shared between the bank and the entrepreneur in accordance with a 
predetermined ratio. In the event of a loss, the bank loses the capital, while the 
entrepreneur loses the provision of labor. It is this financial risk, according to Shari’ah, 
that justifies the bank’s claim to part of the profit. The profit sharing continues until 
the loan is repaid. Such participatory arrangements between capital and labor reflect 
the Islamic view that the borrower must not take on all the risk/cost of a failure, 
resulting in a balanced distribution of income and not allowing the lender to 
monopolize the economy. 
In this arrangement, the depositor and the bank enter into an agreement 
whereby the bank acts essentially as the keeper and trustee of the funds deposited. 
However, while serving as a trustee, the bank is entitled to use the funds on deposit for 
its business endeavors. The bank, however, guarantees a refund of the entire deposit 
or whatever balance remains when the depositor demands it. The bank at its discretion 
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may periodically reward the depositor with hibah (a gift) in appreciation for allowing 
it to use the depositor’s funds. Hibah, in most instances, is a cash payment equivalent 
to an interest payment. However, it is not considered riba because there is no guarantee 
of such payments and the amount is generally not fixed. The amount, frequency, and 
duration of hibah are entirely at the bank’s discretion. 
Musharakah can be likened to what is commonly known as joint ventures. In 
this scheme, two or more persons or entities combine either their capital or labor to 
share the profits, while enjoying similar rights and liabilities. This method of financing 
is often used in investment projects, letters of credit, and the purchase of real estate or 
property. While the investment by each partner may be unequal, each partner retains 
an equal right to manage and participate in the business. In essence, every partner is 
an agent for the other because all the partners benefit from the musharakah business. 
When a contract of musharakah is made, the condition of agency is automatically 
presumed to be in existence in the contract. Although each partner enjoys equal rights 
in all respects, any condition regarding participation in the administration of the 
musharakah and any variation in the share of profits is considered valid. Further, 
although every partner has the right to participate actively in the affairs of musharakah 
should they desire, they can choose to relinquish and waive that right without any 
repercussions. For example, when a bank enters a fast-food venture with an individual, 
it will most likely waive any and all rights regarding the day-to-day management of 
the enterprise. 
The basis for entitlement to the profits of musharakah is capital, active 
participation, the nature of the business, and responsibility. Profits are to be distributed 
among the partners in the business based on the proportions settled by them in advance. 
The share of every party in the profits must be determined as a proportion or 
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percentage. No fixed amount can be settled for any party. However, Muslim scholars 
are in unanimous agreement that, with this method of financing, losses shall be 
allocated to each partner in proportion to the capital invested. 
The foregoing concept refers to the sale of goods at a price that includes a profit 
margin agreed by both parties. The purchase and selling price, other costs, and the 
profit margin must be clearly stated at the time of the sales agreement. The bank is 
compensated for the time value of its money in the form of the profit margin. This is 
equivalent to a fixed-income loan for the purchase of a real asset (such as real estate 
or a vehicle), with a fixed rate of interest determined by the profit margin. The bank is 
not compensated for the time value of money outside the contracted term. Such a 
concept is widely used in Islamic mortgage transactions. In these transactions, instead 
of loaning the buyer money to purchase a property, the bank may buy the item itself 
from the seller and resell it to the buyer at a profit, while allowing the buyer to pay the 
bank in installments. However, because profit cannot be made explicit, there are no 
additional penalties for late payment. In order to protect itself against default, the bank 
requires strict collateral. However, the goods or land are registered in the name of the 
buyer from the start of the transaction; as such, the buyer is in fact able to benefit and 
receive tax credits, et cetera. 
Ijarah simply refers to leasing, renting, or wages. However, under the purview 
of Islamic finance, ijarah means selling the benefit or use of a service for a fixed price 
or wage. Under this concept, a bank makes available to the customer the use of a 
service of assets or equipment, such as plant, office automation, or a motor vehicle, 
for a fixed period and price. The benefits derived and the reasons behind this form of 
financing are very similar to those that drive major corporations to lease rather than 
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purchase equipment, tools, offices, and automobiles. Islamic banks provide a variation 
to the leasing model that is used by corporations. This method of financing is known 
as ijarah-wal-iqtina and involves a contract under which a bank provides equipment, a 
building, or other assets to the client against an agreed rental with a unilateral 
undertaking by the bank or the client that at the end of the lease period, ownership of 
the asset is transferred to the lessee. The undertaking or the promise does not become 
an integral part of the lease contract to make it conditional. The lease and the purchase 
price are fixed in such a manner that the bank receives back its principal sum together 
with a profit over the period of the lease. 
2.2 Islamic Banking and Economic Development 
The epistemology of Islamic finance and economics goes back to Shari’ah 
principles, which are deduced from the guidance of the Qur’an, Sunna, Ijma, and Qiyas 
(Maghrebi, Mirakhor, & Iqbal, 2016). In the particular context of Islamic finance, the 
primary sources of Shari’ah permit transactional exchange and prohibit dealings with 
interest, ambiguity, and gambling, among others. Thus, all forms of transactions are 
bound with inherent risk; however, deferred contracts involve a time interval that is 
liable to other risks and requires the parties involved to record the transaction (Aliyu, 
Hassan, Mohd Yusuf, & Naiimi, 2017). The risk element of financial transactions 
emerges because of the probability of outcomes in the contractual relations, which 
necessitate risk and profit sharing under the Islamic concept of financial transactions. 
Although Islamic finance is asset-backed, sharing risk and profit is one of the major 
tools used to achieve the targeted enhancement in social well-being. Thus, the 
empirical literature of Islamic financial activities has encompassed the practical 
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direction of Islamic financial transactions regarding convergence to or divergence 
from the risk and profit sharing principles (Hassan & Sirajo, 2017). 
An Islamic bank is an institution where the main activity, similar to a 
conventional bank, is the mobilization of funds from the savers to the agents with a 
deficit (companies and business owners). Moreover, all banking activities are 
conducted without invoking an interest rate. Thus, the role and the functions of Islamic 
banks, like all other banks, are extremely useful and socially desirable. Unfortunately, 
the role of conventional banks is tarnished by the practice of charging interest that 
limits their activities to operations of money trading. Conventional banks often finance 
these operations in terms of short-term and personal loans. This approach does not 
answer the need for venture capital; consequently, their effect on economic 
development is less than their real potential suggests.  
Islamic banks represent an improvement in two ways. Firstly, Islamic banks 
frequently offer capital lending to the process of production and, through the 
instruments of the process,  aim to contribute to companies’ capital. The disbursement 
of financial resources in accordance with the requirements of production is more 
efficient than allocation in accordance with pure lending principles. It is suggested that 
in this regard, Islamic banks’ impact on economic development is more important. 
Secondly, Islamic banks guarantee to Muslim people that their contracts will not 
include elements of interest, which are forbidden in Islam. Financial development is 
an important component of any overall development strategy. Seeing the success of 
Islamic banks, which is characterized by an annual growth rate of 16% as participation 
banking continues despite political and economic volatility in major regions, several 
international banking institutions have started to establish their own Islamic units, 
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windows, or branches to capture the opportunity. Some economists believe that this 
modern generation of banking will lead to better financial development and growth 
than conventional banking. 
The relationship between financial development and economic growth has 
remained one of the most debated issues in terms of whether the financial sector 
actually contributes to the process of economic development. Some authors consider 
finance an important element of growth (Goldsmith, 1969; King and Levine, 1993; 
McKinnon, 1973; Schumpeter, 1934; Shaw, 1973), while for others it is only a minor 
growth factor (Lucas, 1988; Robinson, 1952). Schumpeter (1934) sees the banking 
sector as an engine of economic growth through its funding of productive investment. 
In contrast, Lucas (1988) argues that the role of finance has been overstressed. Patrick 
(1966) also contributes to this literature by identifying two possible patterns in the 
causal relationship between financial development and economic growth.  
The first pattern is called “demand-following,” which means that the creation 
of modern financial institutions, with their financial assets and liabilities, and related 
financial services, is in response to the demand for these services by investors and 
savers in the real economy. This implies that the financial system can support and 
sustain leading sectors in the process of growth. Here, an expansion of the financial 
system is considered to be a consequence of real economic growth. 
 The second pattern is “supply-leading,” which means that the creation of 
financial institutions and the supply of their financial assets, liabilities, and related 
financial services are in demand, especially from entrepreneurs in modern, growth-
inducing sectors. Supply-leading has two functions: to transfer resources from 
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traditional (non-growth) sectors to modern sectors and to promote and stimulate an 
entrepreneurial response in modern sectors.  
In addition, Goldsmith (1969) and Gurley and Shaw (1955) argue that more 
developed financial markets promote economic growth by mobilizing savings and 
facilitating investment. Explicitly or implicitly, it is notable from all studies that an 
efficient financial system accelerates economic development. The main contribution 
of a financial system to the materialization of growth is that it ensures the functioning 
of an efficient and evolutionary payment system, mobilizes saving, and improves 
growth’s impact on investment. Thus, the existence of a reliable and sound financial 
exchange system is a prerequisite for growth. The financial sector plays a growth-
promoting role if it demonstrates the capacity to direct financial resources toward 
sectors that demand these the most. When a financial sector is more developed, greater 
financial resources can be allocated to productive use; hence, more physical capital is 
formed, which in turn leads to economic growth.  
However, Odedokun (1992) favors bidirectional causality between finance and 
growth. Both financial and economic developments are causally related: financial 
development causes an economy to grow; economic growth triggers the financial 
sector to develop the economy further. Masih and Masih (1996) support the demand-
following hypothesis whereby economic growth causes financial sectors to develop. 
The more rapid the growth of real national income, the greater will be the demand by 
enterprises for external funds (the savings of others). Thus, financial intermediation, 
as in most situations, will be less able to finance expansion from internally generated 
depreciation allowance and retained profits. Consequently, the financial system can 
support and sustain the leading sectors in the process of growth. In this case, an 
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expansion of the financial system is induced as a result of real economic growth or 
demand-following. 
 Levine and Zervos (1998) study the empirical relationship between stock 
market development, banking development, and long-term economic growth. They 
show that stock market liquidity and banking development are both positively and 
robustly correlated with contemporaneous and future rates of economic growth, capital 
accumulation, and productivity growth. Fase and Abma (2003) argue that an expansion 
of the financial system could have a positive repercussion on economic growth. The 
financial sectors in this case act as supply-leading institutions to transfer resources 
from traditional, low-growth sectors to modern high-growth sectors and to promote 
and stimulate an entrepreneurial response in these modern sectors.  
Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2005) examine the causal relationship between 
financial development and economic growth in Egypt from 1960 to 2001. They use 
Granger causality tests and conclude that financial development promotes economic 
growth either through increased investment efficiency or capital accumulation. Romeo 
(2007) also confirms the positive impact of finance on growth. He investigates the 
relationship between finance and growth with an emphasis on the effect of financial 
deregulation and banking law harmonization on economic growth in the European 
Union. The study establishes that financial intermediation positively impacts 
economic growth through three different channels. Kenourgios and Samitas (2007) 
examine the long-term relationship between finance and economic growth in Poland 
and conclude that credit to the private sector has been one of the main driving forces 
of such growth. Huang and Lin (2009) reexamine the dynamic relationship between 
financial development and economic growth using the data set employed in Levine, 
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Loayza, and Beck (2000). Using a novel threshold regression with the instrumental 
variables approach, they support a positive link between financial development and 
economic growth. They also find that financial development has an important effect 
on growth in low-income countries.  
Despite the availability of many studies investigating the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth, studies that examine the role of Islamic 
financial development in economic growth are scarce. Some limited articles have been 
written by scholars from countries in Southeast Asia. Furqani and Mulyany (2009) 
examine the dynamic interactions between Islamic banking and the economic growth 
of Malaysia by employing the co-integration test and vector error correction model 
(VECM) to assess whether the financial system influences growth and whether growth 
transforms the financial system’s operation in the long term. They find that, in the 
short term, only fixed investment caused Islamic banks to develop in the period 1997–
2005. In the long term, there is evidence of a bidirectional relationship between Islamic 
banking and fixed investment; further, there is evidence to support the demand-
following hypothesis of gross domestic product (GDP) and Islamic banks, whereby an 
increase in GDP causes Islamic banking to develop and not vice versa. Abduh and 
Chowdhury (2012) investigate the long-term and dynamic relationship between the 
development of Islamic banking and economic growth in Bangladesh. The quarterly 
time-series data of economic growth, total financing, and total deposits of Islamic 
banking from Q1 2004 to Q2 2011 are used in their study. Through co-integration and 
Granger’s causality method, Islamic banks’ financing is found to have a positive and 
significant relationship with economic growth both in the long and short term. This 
finding implies that the development of Islamic banking is one of the policies that 
should be considered by governments to improve their nations’ incomes.  
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The studies cited above have demonstrated that the development of the Islamic 
financial system has played a viable role in the economic growth of each country that 
is considered. However, the direction of the relationship between the flow of Islamic 
finance and economic growth has differed from one country to another, particularly in 
relation to the monetary policies of each country. Moreover, there have been some 
drawbacks in the studies showing the relationship between Islamic financial 
development and economic growth; for example, most studies have used short time 
periods and an analysis of just one Islamic bank in each country. Further, all the studies 
were conducted in Southeast Asian countries.  
Goaied and Sassi (2011) investigate total Islamic banks’ financing at all fully 
fledged Islamic banks in selected countries from the Middle East over a reasonable 
time so that adequate data can be collected. The study selects the most important 
countries from the Middle East in which Islamic finance has a footprint. Tabash and 
Dhankar (2014) examine the relationship between the development of the Islamic 
financial system and economic growth in the long term in selected countries of the 
Middle East. They empirically analyze the relationship between Islamic banks’ 
financing and economic growth using econometric analysis. Because the variables in 
their analysis are stationary, Johansen’s co-integration technique is applied. The co-
integration results provide evidence of a unique co-integrating vector. In other words, 
a long-term stable relationship between Islamic banks’ financing and economic growth 
is found in the three countries that are studied. This finding suggests that in the long 
term, Islamic banks’ financing and economic growth move forward together, at least 
for selected countries of the Middle East.  
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It has been shown that the Middle East has benefited from a strong banking 
system. Goaied and Sassi (2011) find a causal, bidirectional relationship between 
Islamic banks’ financing and economic growth for Bahrain and Qatar. They also 
discover that in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a causal relationship exists, from the 
development of the financial system to economic growth, but not in the opposite 
direction. Their results indicate that improvement of the Islamic financial institutions 
in the Middle East has contributed to economic development and has been critical in 
the long term for economic welfare and poverty reduction. The study’s results are quite 
significant; indeed, the study is one of the pioneering works on Islamic finance. 
2.3 Advantages of Islamic Banking 
Islamic banks provide the same contributions to the financial system and the 
economy as conventional banks. However, they present some relative advantages that 
can be summarized as follows: efficiency, economic system stability, the reduction of 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and greater conduciveness to poverty 
alleviation.  
Islamic banks are more efficient since they are not based on the volatile 
principle of interest rates. Friedman (1969) demonstrates that a zero nominal interest 
rate is a necessary condition for the optimal allowance of resources. With a zero 
interest rate, traders will have no reason to substitute real resources for money; thus, 
more resources will be channeled into investments. Consequently, when fixing a 
positive price for money, traders will economize money for a fixed return and reduce 
their transaction costs. It has been demonstrated empirically that a zero interest rate is 
both necessary and sufficient for efficient allocation in general equilibrium models 
(Cole & Kocherlakota, 1998; Wilson, 1979).  
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By excluding the principle of interest from its mechanism, Islamic banks 
exclude all speculative activities related to interest rate expectations. Changes in 
money flow directly reflect the real sphere by changes in the demand and supply of 
goods and services. Islamic banks adapt to the real economic sphere by using other 
rates where the time-money value is maintained: the rate of profit sharing in 
mousharaka, the markup rate in moudaraba, and the rental rate in leasing. Thus, 
Islamic banks operate more efficiently. In their 2008 report, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) considered that the Islamic financial system is steadier and less 
inflationary than the conventional system based on interest rates. Further, applying the 
“z-scores” analysis, Cihák and Hesse (2008) prove that the Islamic financial system is 
financially stronger and less risky than conventional banking. In the conventional 
system, a depreciation of assets due to an exogenous shock downgrades the banks’ 
equity capital. Since depositors have fixed value securities (the deposits), there are no 
risks provoking bankruptcy. In an Islamic system, the possessors of investment 
accounts do not have fixed value securities; thus, in macroeconomic or bank-specific 
crises, investment depositors automatically share the risk, which allows an adjustment 
of the liability in the case of asset reduction. 
In the same way, when borrowers cannot repay their debts on time, they are 
obliged to pay penalty rates of interest, which are higher than regular rates. In Islamic 
banks, the debt value and the profit rate, or the markup, are fixed in advance. As such, 
Islamic banks are more reliable than the conventional system, which is another 
argument supporting the stability of inflation. Thus, Islamic banking is relatively more 
stable. Since banks operate in an environment characterized by asymmetry of 
information, Islamic banks benefit from the risk reduction of moral hazard and adverse 
selection by simultaneously providing equity and debt finance.  
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In addition, by sitting on companies’ boards of directors, banks can influence 
corporate governance and are able to control the companies’ performance, financing 
them at a cost that is less than usually possible with conventional banking. Thus, 
Islamic banks are likely to be more efficient in terms of monitoring and surveillance 
by reducing the risks of adverse selection and moral hazard. Further, since the most 
important criteria for financing projects in the conventional system is the ability to 
repay loans, collateral, and guarantees, only the rich have the broadest access to the 
financial market. In contrast, Islamic finance provides funds based on the sharing profit 
and loss principle, which accords importance only to profitability and the rate of return. 
Thus, those who are not rich but have essential skills to succeed in projects, such as 
scientists, engineers, and craftsmen, have a better chance to acquire finance.  
2.4 The Main Developmental Characteristics of Islamic Modes of Financing 
The essential characteristic of Islamic modes of financing is their direct and 
undetachable links with the real economy or physical transactions. Mousharaka and 
moudharaba are possible only for productive companies, which contribute to real-life 
businesses that increase production and improve quality. A company must generate a 
profit and distribute it between the entrepreneur and the bank. Mourabaha and other 
sale-based modes must involve a physical transaction of commodities or provision of 
services. The same also applies to leasing, where the leased assets are the pivotal issues 
around which financing is built. As such, all Islamic financing must relate to 
production and/or the exchange of real goods and services. In contrast with 
conventional banks that focus only on the ability of the entrepreneur to repay loans, 
Islamic banks concentrate on the profitability of the project, which is the essential 
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condition. Consequently, Islamic banks lead to economic growth by promoting 
productive projects and supporting the trading of commodities and services.  
Another advantage for this foremost characteristic of Islamic modes of 
financing is that such financing is incompatible and unsuitable for debt rescheduling, 
debt swaps, speculative transfers, and other purely monetary-oriented activities that 
constitute a substantial part of the contemporary activities of conventional banks.  
The second developmental characteristic of Islamic banking is the 
incorporation of ethical and moral values in their modes of financing; for example, one 
cannot ignore ethical/moral considerations in the project selection process. Regardless 
of legality in a given country, Islamic banks do not finance harmful goods, such as 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco, or morally unacceptable services, such as casinos 
and pornography. Such products and activities are indeed profitable but they have high 
social and economic costs and harmful long-term effects on productivity in the 
economy. The ethical and moral loyalty of Islamic banks is also manifested in another 
form: Islamic banks grant zero-interest credits from social funds in cases of dire need 
or unexpected circumstances for the poor and needy. These funds are principally 
financed by yearly zakah, a form of alms-giving paid by Muslim people, and also by 
interest accumulated from deposits in conventional banks and money from other 
transactions judged to be suspicious by Shari’ah boards from the Islamic point of view.  
Donations from the public or countries are also an important source for the 
charitable funds of Islamic banks. An example is the Islamic Development Bank in 
Jeddah, which has US$100 million in its waqf account. The bank spends this money 
on research, training, developmental studies, research scholarships, technical 
assistance programs, and disaster relief services for Muslim countries. In other words, 
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although profit maximization is as essential to Islamic banks as to other businesses, 
the underlying philosophy of these institutions is conducive to promoting social 
commitment and activities that usually cannot be assured by the profit motive.  
The third developmental characteristic of Islamic banks is found in the nature 
of their relationship with depositors and employees. Since Islamic banks deal with 
their depositors on investment grounds, competition is higher among Islamic banks 
than among conventional banks, which receive current and timed deposits against 
fixed interest. Such competition among Islamic banks drives profitability to its 
maximum in both the short term, which concerns depositors, and the long term, which 
concerns shareholders. This situation makes all the banks more aware of, and attached 
to, the real market. Nevertheless, a bank’s financial performance is not the only criteria 
of competition; the ability of Islamic banks to keep, and to raise, deposits depends 
upon a good reputation.  
2.5 Financial Performance of Islamic Banks 
In addition to the theoretical arguments, there is empirical evidence that 
confirms the benefits of the Islamic system compared with the conventional system. 
Hassan and Bachir (2003) highlight the individual performance of the Islamic banking 
sector and show that Islamic banks, as a group, are much better than conventional 
banks. Iqbal, Ausaf, and Tariqullah (1998) test the performance of Islamic banks using 
a panel consisting of the 10 foremost banks in the world, the 10 foremost banks in 
Asia, the 10 foremost banks in the Middle East, and the 10 foremost Islamic banks. 
They prove that the performance of Islamic banks in a capitalistic environment, where 
the conventional system dominates, is higher. 
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 Kader, Asaporta, and Al-Maghaireh (2007) examine the performance of 
Islamic banks in terms of profitability, liquidity, risk, solvency, and efficiency from 
2000 to 2004 in the UAE, where Islamic funds are highly concentrated. The study 
finds that UAE Islamic banks are relatively more profitable, less liquid, less risky, and 
more efficient compared with the UAE’s conventional banks. The authors associate 
this performance to the PLS paradigm. The success of Islamic banks, as shown by a 
high growth rate, may be attributed to the productive characteristic of Islamic products 
more than borrowing based on the PLS principle.  
Jordan’s statistics, however, show that the emergence of Islamic banks in the 
country did not decrease the deposits that were already in conventional banks. Thus, 
the Islamic banks attracted reserve funds that led to growth. Indeed, economists have 
favored the emergence of Islamic banking such banks help to vary the financial 
product range and improve the institutional quality of the financial sector. A result is 
that this new banking alternative offers better fund distribution. 
2.6 Conventional Financing Compared with Islamic Financing 
The concept of Islamic or Shari’ah-compliant finance is based on the core 
tenets of Islam concerning property rights, social and economic justice, wealth 
distribution, and governance. One of the key features of the system is the prohibition 
of riba and gharar (El-Gamal, 2009; Kabir & Mahlkrecht, 2011). There is consensus 
among scholars that the prohibition of interest is not limited to usury but refers to 
interest on debt in any form (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2011). The prohibition of gharar1 is to 
discourage excessive uncertainty in contracts, enhance disclosure, and proscribe all 
forms of deception. In addition to the prohibition of riba and gharar, Islamic finance 
has seven key precepts. Thus, implemented fully, Islamic finance does the following. 
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1. Eliminates pure debt securities from the financial system, replacing interest by 
the rate of return earned ex post on contracts of exchange or risk sharing. 
2. Calls for bank deposits to be collected on a profit and loss basis rather than 
fixed predetermined liabilities. All profits and/or losses on the asset side are to 
be passed through to the investors (depositors) on the liability side (Ayub, 
2007; Dar & Presley, 2000). 
3. Promotes the financing of trade and the exchange of goods and services to 
ensure a close link between the real economy and the financial sector, because 
all financial contracts should be backed by assets or transactions/activities in 
the real economic sector.  
4. Upholds the property rights of the individual and society, and clarifies the 
sources of individual ownership.2  
5. Mandates the fulfillment and sanctity of contracts that deal with trade in goods 
and services, and the transfer of ownership and honoring of debt obligations 
(Ayub, 2007, Chapter 5). 
6. Emphasizes principles of morality and ethics in business conduct, proscribing 
illicit activities according to Shari’ah (El-Ghazali, 2002) and mandating that 
all economic activities be governed by rules of fair dealing and justice. 
7. Advocates the sharing of risk and reward between the rich and the poor through 
specific instruments of re-distribution. 
The difference between the two banking systems also lies in the governance 
structures. Islamic banks must comply with the rules of the Holy Qur’an and meet the 
expectations of the Muslim community by providing acceptable financing modes to 
Islam. Islamic finance is a financial system that operates according to Shari’ah 
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principles. Shari’ah, which is an Arabic term, means, “The way to the source of life.” 
Islamic finance has all the features of a conventional financial system such as capital 
markets, fund managers, investment companies, and insurance companies; however, 
these systems are governed by Islamic laws. A core concept of Islam is that Allah is 
the owner of all wealth in the world, and humans are only the trustees of the wealth. 
Thus, humans need to manage wealth according to Allah’s commands, which promote 
justice and prohibit certain activities. The law does not forbid Muslims from enjoying 
wealth: They have the right to enjoy whatever wealth they acquire and spend it in 
Shari’ah-compliant ways. They need not feel apologetic about being wealthy as long 
as their behavior aligns with Islam. 
 Conventional banking, however, is based on the debtor–creditor relationship 
between a bank and a customer’s interest. This relationship is just a consideration 
between the borrower and the banker, reflecting the opportunity cost of money.  
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Table 2.1: Differences between Islamic banking and conventional banking 
Business     
Framework 
Islamic Banking System Conventional Banking 
System 
Banking Practice Based on Shari’ah; Shari’ah 
scholars ensure adherence to 
Islamic laws and provide 
guidance. 
Based on secular banking 
laws and the financial 
practices of respective 
countries. 
Equity Financing  
with Capital Risk 
Islamic banks provide equity 
capital to a project or venture. 
Losses are shared in 
accordance with equity 
participation while profits are 
shared in accordance with a 
pre-agreed ratio. Management 
of the enterprise depends upon 
the type of financing provided. 
Examples: mudarabah and 
musharkah. 
Although venture capital 
companies and 
investment banks take 
equity stakes and 
management control of 
an enterprise in return for 
providing start-up 
finance, commercial 
banks, which are the 
primary lenders, do not 
have this facility. 
Prohibition of 
Gharar 
Transactions deemed gharar 
are prohibited; they denote 
varying degrees of deception 
regarding the price and quality 
of goods, for example 
derivatives, which are 
prohibited in Islamic Finance. 
Trading in all financial 
instruments, including 
derivatives, is allowed in 
conventional banking. 
Profit and Loss 
Sharing 
All transactions are based on 
this principle: Returns are 
variable depending upon bank 
performance, and consumers 
can participate in profit upsides 
in a more equitable way than 
receiving a predetermined 
return. 
Returns to customers are 
irrespective of bank 
performance and 
profitability. Customers 
are treated only as 
depositors and do not 
receive any other 
compensation other than 
interest. 
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Islamic finance does not restrict economic activity; instead, it directs it toward 
responsible activities that benefit other people and honor Allah. It allows a free market 
economy where supply and demand are decided in the market and not in accordance 
with governmental rules and regulations.  
2.7 Challenges to Islamic Banking 
While Islamic banking may provide a more conservative and stable approach 
to conventional banking models, it is not immune to the current economic crisis. 
Experts predict that, because of its heavy reliance on property investments and private 
equity, the booming US$1 trillion global industry could be hit if the turmoil worsens 
and real assets start to crumble. The key challenges that have been partly considered 
by some researchers are described in the following paragraphs.  
Recent regulatory changes concerning the structure of sukuk warrant careful 
consideration and may dampen some of the recent enthusiasm for Islamic capital 
market products. In February 2008, the Shari’ah committee of the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) issued new 
recommendations regarding the role of asset ownership, investment guarantees, and 
the Shari’ah advisory and approval process for sukuk origination and trading. The 
proposed rules attracted significant attention prior to their release, following a 
statement by the chairman of the Shari’ah committee in November 2007 indicating 
that 85% of sukuk issues in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) do not concur with 
Shari’ah principles. Most sukuk issued in the GCC have explicit repurchase 
agreements that guarantee the repayment of the principal but violate the PLS features 
of Shari’ah. 
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Currently, there are discussions underway between the various stakeholders 
and some market participants to gauge the potential of these recommendations to cause 
permanent damage to the sukuk market. The sukuk market is also still plagued by 
illiquidity due to limited depth and breadth, mainly because Middle Eastern banks, 
which are the most likely securitizers/sellers of risk, are flush with liquidity and 
capital; thus, there is no strong funding or balance sheet rationale for sukuk. Although 
the commoditization of illiquid asset exposures through securitization facilitates the 
disciplining effect of capital markets, there is a lack of information from private 
sources about securitized assets in many sukuk and the prevalence of “buy-and-hold” 
investments that inhibit efficient price discovery and information dissemination. 
Moreover, sukuk are available at maturities of 3, 5, and 10 years but not for short-term 
maturities, which significantly limits their application in money markets.  
Although Islamic banks are currently one of the largest buyers of Shari’ah-
compliant products (at long maturities), they would benefit most from issues with 
shorter tenors. There is some hope that the launch of different sukuk funds in the near 
future may potentially unlock liquidity constraints; however, this may only create new 
demand without sufficiently alleviating supply constraints. It is also difficult to 
establish sukuk funds with sufficient diversification. Notwithstanding the compelling 
value proposition of sukuk, without efficient and transparent capital markets and 
appropriate legal frameworks to operate within, Islamic capital markets will not 
continue to grow meaningfully in the near future.  
The liquidity risk management of Islamic banking is an important challenge 
and is constrained because of the limited availability of tradable Islamic money market 
instruments and a weak systemic liquidity infrastructure. At the moment, there is no 
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Shari’ah-compliant short-term Islamic money market (with less than one week’s 
maturity) in local currency or in US dollars, and Islamic repo markets have not yet 
developed. Islamic money markets with longer maturities, which are based on 
commodity murabaha transactions (markup financing), sometimes suffer from 
unreliable brokers with low creditworthiness. Islamic banks also have a competitive 
disadvantage over conventional banks because they deposit their overnight money 
with their domestic interest-free central bank. The lack of liquidity and viable 
alternatives, combined with competitive disadvantage, hamper local Islamic banks and 
can even create a liquidity crisis. Many investment banks are currently designing new 
complex products, compliant with Shari’ah, that attempt to overcome the 
shortcomings of the Islamic money market. It remains to be seen whether these new 
solutions will demonstrate widespread Shari’ah compliance in the Islamic finance 
community and generate enough demand for a functional Islamic money market to 
develop.  
Business models and products of Islamic banks are still rather homogenous, 
while Shari’ah compliance amplifies risks stemming from product configuration and 
process implementation. The success of Islamic banking in recent years has produced 
too many Islamic banks with the same business models. There is a lack of “bread-and-
butter” lending, and the current excess liquidity has led to too much complacency 
among the Islamic banks. In addition, there is a large and diverse set of accounting 
standard differences across the different jurisdictions. The development and setting of 
simple standard legal contracts is necessary in order to overcome the complexity and 
heterogeneity of current contracts.  
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Further, the deployment of IT systems that help monitor the fulfillment and 
visibility of processes on an end-to-end basis are crucial in facilitating the continuous 
monitoring of activities by Shari’ah scholars while eliminating the possibilities of non-
compliance, which in some cases may render transactions invalid. Financial innovation 
in Islamic finance is still hampered by the need for harmonized financial regulation.  
Governance issues, especially regarding the Shari’ah compliance of products 
and activities, constitute a major challenge for the Islamic finance industry. Although 
Shari’ah rulings (fatwas) by legal scholars are disclosed, there are currently no unified 
principles by which Shari’ah scholars decide on the Shari’ah compliance of new 
products. Fatwas are not consolidated, which inhibits the dissemination, adoption, and 
cross-fertilization of jurisprudence across different countries and schools of thought. 
Moreover, there is still considerable heterogeneity of scholarly opinion about Shari’ah 
compliance, which undermines the creation of a consistent regulatory framework and 
corporate governance principles. The fragmented opinions of Shari’ah boards, which 
act as quasi-regulatory bodies, remain a source of continued divergence of legal 
opinion. 
 Since Islamic law itself is divided between different juristic schools of thought 
(madhahib), which provide guidance on the analytical reasoning (ijtihaad) or 
interpretative analogy (Qiyas) of the general principles of Shari’ah, there is no 
consensus (Ijma) on the religious compliance of certain products and transactional 
structures. Given the rising global integration of the Islamic financial services industry, 
greater supervisory harmonization across national boundaries is essential. There is also 
regulatory disparity among national supervisors, with each regulator working 
independently and refusing to recognize the validity of judgments made by foreign 
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counterparts. A greater role for the AAOIFI, the General Council for Islamic Banking 
and Finance Institutions (GCIBFI), and the Islamic International Rating Agency 
(IIRA) in this regard has added consistency to Shari’ah rulings, while the retention of 
conventional financial market practice and the supremacy of a governing law as a 
matter of form remain essential to maintain investor confidence in the rapidly growing 
Islamic banking system and capital markets. Moreover, national solutions are gaining 
traction. Various Islamic countries have teamed up in a bid to create more liquidity 
and enhance market transparency with a view to becoming a center of Islamic finance, 
while more specific regional initiatives have provided a valuable platform for drawing 
further attention to structured finance as an important element of local capital market 
development.  
Additionally, institutions wanting to provide Shari’ah-compliant products face 
the challenge of increased and added costs that stem from the research, 
implementation, and development of such products. The costs associated with the 
implementation and development of such products is passed on by the institutions to 
clients seeking such products. This results in increased costs to the customers, often 
making the products unattractive. Regardless of the increased costs, institutions will 
probably have to examine and consider Shari’ah-compliant banking as a viable 
alternative in the current economic situation worldwide. Consumers who have suffered 
tremendous losses are now looking for a more conservative and stable banking system. 
Shari’ah-compliant products may provide them with such stability. 
2.8 Development of Islamic Finance and Islamic Capital Markets 
As modern Islamic finance moves through the second decade of the period of 
“transformation and innovation,” we are witnessing the first stages of the realization 
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of the long-articulated admonition to develop capital markets, including secondary 
markets, for securities and investments that comply with the principles and precepts of 
Shari’ah. Before considering these factors, and by way of background, this section first 
considers the nature of Islamic finance. In other words: What is Islamic finance? The 
answer requires more than definitional recitation; it needs an examination (at least in 
summary) of the nature, composition, and role of Shari’ah supervisory boards that 
oversee the explication of Shari’ah as it applies to the field of Islamic finance, 
including the issuance of fatwas or authoritative opinions as to the permissibility, 
under Shari’ah, of structures and products. The final background discussion is a survey 
of a few rudimentary principles of Shari’ah that are of particular importance when 
considering Islamic capital markets. 
 A fundamental function of a capital market is to provide medium- to long-term 
funds to finance capital-intensive projects. In order to attract funds into the market to carry 
out this important function, innovative financial products that meet the specific needs of 
investors and fund-seekers are introduced (Alam, Hassan, & Haque, 2013; Etudaiye-
Muhtar, Bashir, & Abdulkadir, 2012). The Islamic capital market serves as an alternative 
to the conventional capital market, where corporate and sovereign entities seek access to 
long-term funds (Kusuma & Silva, 2014). One such product in the Islamic capital market 
that enables the market to fulfill this function is the sukuk financial debt instrument. 
This section now turns to the consideration of the primary factors influencing 
the development and growth of Islamic capital markets. Historical trends in the 
development of modern Islamic finance provide context, in terms of constraints and 
opportunities, based upon existing knowledge, available resources, and methodology. 
Next, this section summarizes some of the major multilateral organizations that have 
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focused on the development of the Islamic capital markets, including their initiatives 
and capabilities. Then, it provides an overview of the expectations of transactional 
participants in order to increase sensitivity to issues that will need to be addressed to 
effectuate capital market products in the Islamic finance field. 
Turning to more specific factors, this section examines a range of factors that 
affect risk assessment by transactional participants, particularly those pertaining to the 
certainty, predictability, and transparency of risk factors. The first such factors 
considered are systemic legal matters: the role of legal opinions and governing law 
choices. Special attention is paid to the variations in the nature and composition of 
legal systems in which necessary legal opinions must be rendered. Some jurisdictions, 
particularly those within the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 
incorporate Shari’ah to a greater or lesser extent in the secular law of their jurisdictions 
(these are referred to as “incorporated jurisdictions,” which are jurisdictions that desire 
to use Shari’ah-compliant financing techniques as their primary economic form and 
are referred to as the “Islamic economic sphere”; jurisdictions that use primarily 
interest-based financing techniques are referred to as the “Western economic sphere”). 
Other jurisdictions do not incorporate Shari’ah to any extent in their secular law (these 
are referred to as “secular jurisdictions”). 
 Financial transactions conducted in Islamic capital markets worldwide have 
grown from relatively small-sized to large-sized transactions. The driving force behind 
this growth may be traced to the issuance of sukuk financial debt instruments by both 
sovereign and corporate entities (Alam et al., 2013). For instance, the financial report 
of the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) for 2014 reports that global sukuk 
issuance grew from US$1,172 billion in January 2001 to US$68,197 billion as of July 
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2014. The total value of sukuk issued over the same period was reported as 
US$668,058 billion. Similarly, Kusuma and Silva (2014) report the size of worldwide 
Shari’ah financial assets as $1.8 trillion as of 2014. These assets consist of banking 
assets, sukuk and other funds, with sukuk representing 15% of the total value. 
Capital market transactions involve both types of jurisdictions. Further, the 
legal opinions and choice of governing law for transactional documentation in each 
type of jurisdiction are critical factors in effectuating these transactions and the growth 
of the markets. 
These factors, in turn, are dependent upon whether contractual arrangements, 
which embody risk allocations as agreed by the transactional participants, will be 
enforced in secular and incorporated jurisdictions. Case law and contractual drafting 
in secular jurisdictions will be summarized first. Systemic issues and transactional 
practices in incorporated jurisdictions will then be examined. Sukuk issuance 
transactions, and related enforceability issues, will be considered as a capital markets 
case study. 
As previously explained, Islamic finance is the conduct of commercial and 
financial activities in accordance with Shari’ah. For present purposes, Shari’ah is 
Islamic religious law as applied to commercial and financial activities.2 It is a 
combination of theology, religion, and law. Shari’ah is a guide to how a Muslim leads 
life (it means, literally, “the way” or “the right path”). Thus, it is considered the perfect, 
immutable, divine law as revealed in the Qur’an and the Sunna. 
Fiqh, literally “understanding,” is the sum of human comprehension of divine 
law and forms the practical rules of Shari’ah as determined by Shari’ah scholars. The 
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primary methodology used in this determinative and interpretive endeavor is ijtihad 
(literally, “effort’”), or legal reasoning, using the “roots of the law” (usul al-fiqh). The 
roots (usul) upon which Islamic jurisprudence is based are: (i) the Qur’an, being the 
holy book of Islam and the revealed word of Allah (notably, less than 3 percent of the 
Qur’an is legal in nature); (ii) the Sunna of the Prophet Mohammed, which are the 
binding authority of his dicta and decisions; (iii) the Ijma or “consensus” of the 
community of scholars; and (iv) the Qiyas or analogical deductions and reasoning. 
Shari’ah is comprised of principles and precepts. In its explication and 
application, it is largely oral (there is a limited number of written compilations, such 
as the 1839 compilation for the Ottoman empire, the Majelle or Majalat al-Ahkam al-
Adliyah).4 Further, there exist several schools of Islamic jurisprudence (the four main 
Sunni schools, which have the greatest impact on modern Islamic finance: Hanafi, 
Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi). Historically, the different schools are frequently in 
conflict regarding the application of Shari’ah to different factual or structural 
situations. Even within a school, there are varying interpretations with respect to any 
given matter. There is also considerable divergence between Southeast Asia 
(particularly Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei) and the Middle East and Western Asia 
(particularly Pakistan). 
As explicated by Shari’ah scholars over the last 1400 years, and as applied to 
Islamic finance, Shari’ah is a fulsome body of law. It covers virtually most aspects of 
commerce and finance that are addressed by a mature body of secular law. Thus, for 
example, it addresses contracts, concepts of consideration, legal capacity, mutuality, 
sales, leasing, construction activities, partnerships and joint ventures of various types, 
41 
 
 
 
guarantees, estates, equity and trust, litigation, and many other activities and legal 
structures. 
2.8.1 Forces influencing the development of Islamic capital markets 
The development of Shari’ah-compliant capital market instruments, in their 
modern incarnation, began in approximately 2002 and has continuously accelerated 
since. This process is the result of a confluence of factors, some of which are as 
follows: 
1. The evolution of modern Islamic finance, particularly since the mid-1990s; 
2. The efforts of multilateral institutions, such as the AAOIFI, the Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB), and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB); 
and 
3. Transactional developments since the mid-1990s. 
2.9 Conclusion  
Among the common Islamic concepts used in Islamic banking are profit 
sharing, safekeeping, joint venture, cost-plus, and leasing. The epistemology of 
Islamic finance and economics goes back to Shari’ah principles, which are deduced 
from the guidance of the Qur’an, Sunna, Ijma, and Qiyas. 
Empirical literature on Islamic financial activities encompasses the practical 
direction of Islamic financial transactions regarding convergence to or divergence 
from the risk and profit-sharing principle.  
The main activity of an Islamic bank, as with a conventional bank, is the 
mobilization of funds from savers and the offer of these funds to agents that have a 
deficit; moreover all banking activities must be undertaken without the use of interest 
42 
 
 
 
rates. Over the long term, there is evidence of a bidirectional relationship between 
Islamic banks and fixed investments; further, there is evidence supporting the demand-
following hypothesis of GDP and Islamic banks, whereby an increase in GDP causes 
Islamic banking to develop and not vice versa. 
Islamic banks provide the same contributions to the financial system and the 
economy as conventional banks and also present some relative advantages: efficiency, 
economic system stability, the reduction of moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems, and greater conduciveness to poverty alleviation. Another argument 
favoring the stability of the Islamic system is that Islamic banking does create money; 
thus, it is not inflationary. 
In addition to the theoretical arguments, there is empirical evidence confirming 
the good done by the Islamic system relative to the conventional system. 
Islamic banking may provide a more conservative and stable approach to conventional 
banking models, even though Islamic banking is not immune from the current 
economic crisis. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical and Literature Review of Sukuk and Bonds 
3.1 Introduction  
Sukuk have a unique structure and features that differ from one type to another. 
However, the structure of sukuk as a security is based on the main fundamentals of 
Islamic finance. In order to accurately interpret a risk–return analysis of sukuk, it is 
necessary to understand the concept of Islamic finance and its contracts and the 
different types and structures of sukuk.  
Sukuk has emerged as an alternative financial instrument over the last decade 
to fill the need for secure and bond-like investments (Alam et al., 2013). Both 
conventional bonds and sukuk carry fixed maturity terms, can bear losses or benefits, 
and are tradable in qualified markets with a standard yield rate. However, Al-Bashir 
and Al-Amine (2008) state that, unlike traditional bonds, sukuk represent undivided 
full or partial ownership of other tangible assets such as properties, ventures, or even 
services. They are, as such, secured against real assets (SARA) and support entitlement 
to actual ownership of the underlying assets. Thus, SARA bonds are more secure than 
conventional bonds. In contrast, Islamic joint venture (IJV) bonds have more 
similarities with equity than debt (Vishwanath & Azmi, 2009). Sukuk also have legal 
partnership contracts binding the issuers to the investors. In contrast, traditional bonds 
are essentially forms of debt contracts that may be secured with specific assets or can 
even remain unsecured through the obligation of payment promises. 
Investors residing in Islamic countries or those who want to invest in Islamic 
financial markets prompted the need for the creation of bond-like instruments; hence, 
the introduction of sukuk. As such, investing in sukuk gives investors the opportunity 
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to balance their portfolios with investments in asset-based securities, not debt 
instruments, since sukuk equate to tangible assets, usufruct of assets, services, projects, 
businesses, or joint ventures (Vishwanath & Azmi, 2009).  
Notwithstanding the growth in sukuk financial transactions, several authors 
have questioned whether sukuk is another variation of the conventional bond (Afshar, 
2013; Alam et al., 2013; Ariff, Safari, & Mohamed, 2013; Godlewski et al., 2011; 
Hassan, 2012). This question arises because of the similarities observed in the two debt 
instruments, although different approaches are used in examining the 
similarities/differences between them.  
3.2 Global Sukuk Issuances 
Total international sukuk issuances stood at US$31.56 billion in 2016, which 
translates into an increase of US$10.68 billion from the 2015 level of US$20.88 
billion. This increase is the highest value of issuance recorded since the inception of 
the sukuk market. Total sukuk market size has now reached US$856M globally (IIFM, 
2016).  
3.3 Securitization of Sukuk 
The processes and procedures applied for sukuk issuance are similar to those 
for securitization with conventional bonds, except for dissuading attempts to avoid the 
basic prohibitions of Islamic finance. Various factors are involved in sukuk 
transactions. The most important are listed below. 
1. The originator or issuer of sukuk sells assets to special purpose vehicles (SPVs) 
and uses the realized funds. Although the originators are mostly governments 
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or large corporations, they could also be banking or nonbanking Islamic 
institutions. The user may delegate the process of arranging the issue for a 
consideration or a commission. 
2. An SPV is an entity established specifically for the securitization process and 
for managing the issue. It purchases assets from the originator and funds the 
purchase price with the sukuk. Sometimes the SPV also refers to the issuer. 
3. Investment banks act like issuing agents in term of underwriting, lead 
managing, and book-making services for sukuk. These services are provided 
by syndicates of Islamic banks or conventional banks that are operating Islamic 
finance windows. 
4. Sukuk subscribers are mostly central banks, Islamic banks, and individuals 
who subscribe to securities issued by SPVs. 
5. The obligator can be a contractual debtor to the originator who pays cash flows 
that are securitized. 
6. The lead manager oversees the design and execution of the transaction and acts 
as an arranger for the securities. A company/trust/mutual fund could provide 
services for managing the sukuk issues. 
7. The cash administrator, or receiving and paying agent, is the banker for the 
deal who manages inflows and outflows and invests interim funds and accesses 
cash collateral. 
8. The credit enhancement provider provides credit enhancements by either 
guarantees or takaful ( Islamic Insurance). 
9. The credit rating agency provides a rating for the deal based on the structure 
and rates of the parties involved, and legal and tax aspects. 
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3.4 Main Types of Sukuk 
3.4.1 Pure Ijarah Sukuk 
The authorities issue pure ijarah certificates on stand-alone assets that can be 
seen from the balance sheet. Examples of such assets include real estate fixed assets, 
aircraft, and ships that a company intends to lease. The rental charges and rates of 
return vary depending upon the originator and could be either floating or fixed. 
3.4.2 Variable Rate Redeemable Sukuk 
Musharakah finance certificates (MTFCs) are viewed as an alternative to sukuk 
because of the MTFCs’ seniority in terms of their redeemable nature, issuers’ equity, 
and relative stability compared with their dividend payouts. The certificates are 
superior and advantageous because the jurists prefer employing musharakah returns 
on the basis that such a move strengthens the principles of PLS, which are considered 
core ideals and embodied in the paradigm of Islamic banking. Besides, the floating 
rates are contingent on a company's balance actualities, a situation that is contrary to 
others that depend upon benchmarking references; for instance, the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR). 
3.4.3 Fixed-rate Zero-coupon Sukuk 
Organizations use fixed-rate zero coupon sukuk only when assets that need to 
be mobilized are not yet available. As a result, fund mobilization attains the objective 
of increasing a company's assets through istisna'a contracts. Nonetheless, the 
certificates are not immediately ready for trading because of the restrictions of 
Shari’ah. Thus, by nature, istina'a contracts and installment sales and purchases that 
fulfill debt obligations warrant the primary pools that the certificates generate.  
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3.4.4 Hybrid/Pooled Sukuk 
These sukuk enable greater mobilization of funds because they work in a way 
that, in their structure, combines multiple Islamic finance contracts such as Mudarabah 
and Ijarah. 
3.5 Main Structures of Sukuk 
3.5.1 Pure Sukuk al-Ijarah 
These sukuk are ideal when mobilizing funds for funding long-term projects, 
especially infrastructure projects. Thus, the sukuk are extended to a large number of 
individual and institutional investors to ensure that the objective is satisfied. In order 
to achieve this, the sukuk securitize physical and tangible assets such as airports, 
buildings, roads, and land. Importantly, these sukuk involve three parties, who are (i) 
the issuer, who doubles up as issuer and as trustee; (ii) the originator, who also acts as 
seller, obligator, and lessee (both in a sales undertaking and a purchase commitment); 
and (iii) the servicing agent, who is the investors in the sukuk.    
3.5.2 Sukuk al-Mudarabah 
These sukuk are certificates that represent all the activities and projects whose 
management is by the principles of a mudarabah contract. Such an approach is 
achieved by choosing any of the partners in the deal to take responsibility to act as the 
mudarib in managing the business. Thus, the mudarabah has three factors involved, 
which are (i) the mudarib, who is also the issuer; (ii) investors of the Sukuk, who are 
subscribers; and (iii) mudarabah capital, which is the amount of money mobilized. 
Importantly, the mudarabah sukuk holders are the owners of mudarab assets; further, 
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the owners of the capital share profits and suffer losses that occur in accordance with 
the agreed terms and agreement. 
3.5.3 Sukuk al-Musharakah 
These are certificated sukuk issued to each of the members of a partnership. 
They represent the equal value that the individuals issued as they mobilized funds for 
the partnership. Notably, the partners or the owners become owners of the project or 
the asset in equal shares to the value of the amount indicated in the certificate. The 
sukuk may be redeemable, meaning that the holder can give them to individuals and 
corporations, for general purchasing, obtaining commercial vehicles, starting factories 
and hospitals, and rehabilitating the owner whenever necessary. Organizations can also 
use musharakah sukuk to secure assets for large projects that require significant 
finance as capital. Notably, several parties take part in a sukuk al-musharakah. The 
first party is the issuer, who is the initiator of the project or activity and who invites 
others to fund the project. The second party is the subscribers, who are the investors 
who contribute their funds to the musharakah contract and are known as sukuk 
partners. Finally, the total amount mobilized consists of a summation of each member's 
contribution or share, whereby a certificate is issued to represent the proportion that 
each member contributed when they became subscribers. Subscribers or the owners of 
such certificates own the project or the asset. Each subscriber is entitled to a share of 
the profit that the project or asset realizes.  
3.5.4 Sukuk al-Salam 
This sukuk works on the basis that goods paid for will be delivered at a later 
date. As such, the sukuk work on a salam principle whereby the purchaser makes an 
advance payment to a property that will be given later. Thus, the purchaser will receive 
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a certificate representing the amount issued for the sale of the capital mobilized. 
Notably, the salam can afterward enter into another contractual relationship and 
forward the sale to someone else, using a contract that is parallel to the initial contract. 
Importantly, the sukuk al-salam has several factors: the issuer, who is the seller of the 
asset under salam; the subscriber, or certificate holder, who is the person buying the 
asset; and the funds collected, or salam capital, which represent the asset purchase 
price. The salam holder and the salam capital can also claim the salam asset because 
they are entitled to do so.  The final factor is the salam price, or the price the salam is 
sold as part of a parallel agreement, if any occurs.  
3.6 Differences between Sukuk and Bonds 
Differences between sukuk and conventional bonds in Islamic finance 
empirical literature are usually examined in terms of issuance structure, 
regulatory/legal requirements, diversification/alternative investment opportunities, 
and the effect on returns. For example, while some studies such as Cakir and Raei 
(2007) and Godlewski et al. (2011) show that sukuk are alternative investment outlets, 
Ariff et al. (2013) and Fathurahman and Fitriati (2013) demonstrate that sukuk have 
significantly higher risks than conventional bonds and hence higher returns. 
Nonetheless, Alam et al. (2013) report a negative relationship between sukuk issuance 
and returns.  
Arguing for the similarity between the two debt instruments, Nagano (2017) 
contends that sukuk issuance follows conventional corporate finance theory. This was 
observed in the reduction of information gathering costs between issuers and investors 
following an increase in the number of sukuk issuers due to sukuk market 
development. Likewise, Mohamed, Masih, and Bacha (2015) utilize a partial 
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adjustment model of debt and conclude that sukuk issuance follows conventional 
corporate finance theory. Specifically, the authors argue that sukuk issuance follows 
trade-off theory through optimization of company behavior. They also observe support 
for the pecking order theory of capital structure in some partnership-based sukuk when 
companies are faced with higher costs arising from information asymmetry. Further 
evidence supporting the assertion that sukuk follow corporate finance theory is 
observed in Godlewski, Turk-Ariss, and Weill (2013) and Klein and Weill (2016), 
where information asymmetries via moral hazard and adverse selection are found to 
enhance companies’ choice to issue sukuk.  
Other empirical research highlighting similarities between sukuk and 
conventional bonds includes examinations of the execution of contracts under sukuk 
that are structured in a similar way to conventional bonds (Cakir & Raei, 2007) and 
sukuk returns that mirror conventional bond returns (Miller, Challoner, & Atta, 2007).  
In terms of issuance and regulatory structure, Zulkhibri (2015) argues that in 
order to integrate Islamic finance into the global financial market and harness the 
advantages of sukuk issuance, there is a need for Shari’ah-compliant transactions in 
secular Western economies. This integration may be achieved by incorporating 
Shari’ah into the laws of the country concerned, such that Shari’ah governs Islamic 
financial transactions. This clearly marks another major difference, as observed in 
Table 2.1, since the laws applicable in a secular country already cover bondholders. 
Zulkhibri (2015) further notes that the existence of sound accounting and reporting 
standards ensures a well-regulated Islamic financial system. This is of particular 
importance since the main essence of Islamic finance is to ensure equity and fairness 
in financial transactions (maqasid al-shari’ah). Nonetheless, the problem of sukuk 
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default has been traced to sukuk structures that mirror conventional bond structures, 
especially in terms of mismatching relevant jurisdictions, ill-defined property rights, 
and the choice of legal rights (Majid, Shahimi, & Abdullah, 2010; Wijnbergen & 
Zaheer, 2013; Zulkhibri, 2015).  
Empirical literature also suggests that macroeconomic factors influence Sukuk 
market development, as occurs in the conventional bond market. For example, GDP 
per capita, population, and trade-openness in Said and Grassa (2013) are observed to 
have a significant and positive economic impact on sukuk market development in a 
similar way to the effect on the conventional bond market. Nonetheless, the bond 
market in the same study is also noted to have a positive effect on sukuk market 
development, suggesting that the two financial debt instruments (conventional bonds 
and sukuk) complement each other and are not substitutes. In a similar study, Ahmad, 
Daud, and Kefelia (2012) employ a series of econometric techniques and find that a 
country’s business cycle, inflation rate, and GDP are all important determinants of 
sukuk market development. Specifically, sukuk is found to Granger cause GDP, while 
GDP Granger causes both the business cycle and inflation; moreover, in the short term, 
the sukuk market is driven by its own dynamics. Sukuk, like most other assets, carry 
face values that are typically proportional or based on the assets’ market values and 
can be bought at a discount or premium by investors (Usmani, 2008). However, 
conventional bonds are long-term debt instruments issued by companies or the 
government. Sukuk and traditional bonds generate two streams of cash flows for their 
holders as follows.  
1. Face Value: The fixed amount of funds the bond issuer pays to bondholders at 
maturity. 
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2. Coupon/Interest: The fixed amount of funds the bond issuer pays bondholders 
periodically until maturity. Such a period can be semi-yearly or yearly, 
depending upon the contract.  
Sukuk entitle the holder to the ownership of existing resources or a pool of 
diversified tangible assets (Jobst, Kunzel, Mills, & Sy, 2008). The risk and return 
associated with the related cash flow is proportional to that of the underlying assets. In 
the following, we highlight the key differences and similarities between sukuk and 
conventional bonds. 
1. Sukuk owners claim the ownership of assets and their cash flows.  
2. Sukuk returns can be estimated from the associated underlying resource as 
opposed to the traditional/debt regime that is often associated with 
predetermined returns. 
3. By holding sukuk, it is possible that the value of an associated asset may 
appreciate or depreciate and hence influence Sukuk returns, unlike fixed 
conventional bond returns. This also means that the returns are not guaranteed 
at maturity. 
4. A sukuk contract represents a seller–buyer relationship as opposed to bonds’ 
customer–lender relationship. 
5. The assets associated with sukuk can be tangible or intangible, existing or with 
deferred delivery, usufruct, etc., while bonds are only associated with non-
existent resources. 
6. Sukuk returns can be fixed or variable.  
7. LIBOR is utilized in pricing and valuation, like many other conventional bonds 
and Eurobonds. 
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Even with the above-demonstrated similarities between sukuk and 
conventional bonds, some studies provide different views. For instance, Cakir and Raei 
(2007) assert that sukuk can be fundamentally different from conventional bonds. They 
suggest that sukuk are essentially less risky compared with conventional sovereign 
bonds. Examining a portfolio of various sukuk and Eurobond contracts from the same 
issuer, the authors compare the VaR for a hybrid portfolio to a portfolio that holds only 
Eurobonds. According to the authors’ estimation, sukuk reduce the overall portfolio 
risks when added and can create diversity for investors. Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 
summarize the structural and other differences between conventional bonds and sukuk. 
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Table 3.1: Structural differences between conventional bond and sukuk 
 Conventional Bonds Sukuk 
Asset ownership Bonds do not give the 
investor a share of ownership 
in the asset, project, 
business, or joint venture 
they support. They are a debt 
obligation from the issuer to 
the bond holder. 
Sukuk give the investor 
partial ownership in the 
asset on which the Sukuk 
are based. 
Investment criteria Generally, bonds can be used 
to finance any asset, project, 
business, or joint venture 
that complies with local 
legislation. 
The asset on which Sukuk 
are based must be sharia-
compliant. 
Issue unit Each bond represents a share 
of debt. 
Each Sukuk represents a 
share of the underlying 
asset. 
Issue price The face value of a bond 
price is based on the issuer’s 
credit worthiness (including 
its rating). 
The face value of Sukuk 
is based on the market 
value of the underlying 
asset. 
Investment rewards 
and risks 
Bond holders receive 
regularly scheduled (and 
often fixed rate) interest 
payments for the life of the 
bond, and their principal is 
guaranteed to be returned at 
the bond’s maturity date. 
Sukuk holders receive a 
share of profits from the 
underlying asset (and 
accept a share of any loss 
incurred). 
Effects of costs Bond holders generally 
aren’t affected by costs 
related to the asset, project, 
business, or joint venture 
they support. The 
performance of the 
underlying asset doesn’t 
affect investor rewards. 
Sukuk holders are 
affected by costs related 
to the underlying asset. 
Higher costs may 
translate to lower investor 
profits and vice versa. 
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Table 3.2: Sukuk versus conventional bonds in terms of return, issuers, and risk 
Sukuk Conventional 
Bonds 
1. Income is generated from assets 
1. Income is derived from 
debt instrument 
2. Return is expected 
2. Return is interest and 
pre-determined 
3. Negotiability is restricted to specific types of 
Sukuk 
3. Negotiable financial 
paper 
4. Sukuk issue is a seller of assets 
4. Bond issuer is a 
borrower 
5. Sukuk holder is an owner of assets 5. Bond holder is a lender 
6. Seller-Buyer relationship 
6. Lender-borrower 
relationship 
7. Business risk-return relationship 
7. Issuer guarantees the 
payment of face value and 
periodic interest 
8. Major risk lays with underlying assets 
8. Major risk is with issuer 
– credit risk 
 
9. Return is expected from the underlying assets 
9. Interest payment is an 
obligation 
 
10. Return of investor’s capital cannot be 
guaranteed 
10. Issuer is obligated to 
return investor’s capital 
(face value) 
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Table 3.3: Structural differences between conventional bonds and sukuk 
 Conventional Bonds Sukuk 
Asset ownership Bonds do not give the 
investor a share of 
ownership in the asset, 
project, business, or joint 
venture they support. They 
are a debt obligation from 
the issuer to the bondholder. 
Sukuk give the investor 
partial ownership in the 
asset on which the sukuk 
are based. 
Investment criteria Generally, bonds can be 
used to finance any asset, 
project, business, or joint 
venture that complies with 
local legislation. 
The asset on which sukuk 
are based must be 
Shari’ah-compliant. 
Issue unit Each bond represents a share 
of debt. 
Each sukuk represents a 
share of the underlying 
asset. 
Issue price The face value of a bond’s 
price is based on the issuer’s 
credit worthiness (including 
its rating). 
The face value of sukuk 
is based on the market 
value of the underlying 
asset. 
Investment rewards 
and risks 
Bondholders receive 
regularly scheduled (and 
often fixed rate) interest 
payments for the life of the 
bond, and their principal is 
guaranteed to be returned at 
the bond’s maturity date. 
Sukuk holders receive a 
share of profits from the 
underlying asset (and 
accept a share of any loss 
incurred). 
Effects of costs Bondholders generally are 
not affected by costs related 
to the asset, project, 
business, or joint venture 
they support. The 
performance of the 
underlying asset does not 
affect investor rewards. 
Sukuk holders are 
affected by costs related 
to the underlying asset. 
Higher costs may 
translate to lower investor 
profits and vice versa. 
 
 
  
57 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Sukuk compared with conventional bonds in terms of returns, issuers, and 
risk 
Sukuk Conventional Bonds 
1. Income is generated from assets 1. Income is derived from the debt 
instrument 
2. Return is expected 2. The return is interest and is 
predetermined 
3. Negotiability is restricted to 
specific types of sukuk 
3. Negotiable financial paper 
4. Sukuk issuer is a seller of assets 4. Bond issuer is a borrower 
5. Sukuk holder is an owner of assets 5. Bondholder is a lender 
6. Seller–buyer relationship 6. Lender–borrower relationship 
7. Business risk–return relationship 7. Issuer guarantees the payment of face 
value and periodic interest 
8. Major risk lies with underlying 
assets 
8. Major risk is with issuer: credit risk 
 
9. Return is expected from the 
underlying assets 
9. Interest payment is an obligation 
 
10. Return of investor’s capital cannot 
be guaranteed 
10. Issuer is obligated to return 
investor’s capital (face value) 
3.7 Risk Exposure 
Assessing risk exposure is perhaps the most important element in any study 
aiming to investigate and contrast sukuk with other assets (Abdel-Khaleq & 
Richardson, 2006; Al-Zoubi & Maghyereh, 2007; Viceira, 2012). Although sukuk and 
conventional bonds have different structures, they may have similar risks; moreover, 
each also has its own risks. The following are the various risks associated with the 
holding of both assets. 
1) Financial Risk. This is the risk when the issuer defaults on interest 
or face value or both. Although Sukuk and bonds both carry this risk, their 
remedial methods differ. Conventional bondholders have no choice but to 
chase the issuer for unpaid amounts through a lawsuit. Thus, there is 
uncertainty about how much can be retrieved from the original amount that is 
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due. However, in the case of a default, sukuk holders have recourse to the assets 
of the bankrupted individual. 
2) Call Risk. This is the risk that a bondholder is obligated to sell the 
bonds back to the issuer. When market interest rates rise, conventional bonds 
are exposed to this risk. This situation may create significant cash flow 
problems to bondholders because they will not be receiving the higher market 
interest rates. In contrast, sukuk are not exposed to interest rate fluctuations 
(Bask, 2010; Tariq & Dar, 2007) 
3) Liquidity Risk. This occurs when a bond cannot be sold in 
secondary markets because of a lack of interest. Such a situation can be equally 
applicable to corporate and municipal bonds in the US market, for instance, 
and to some sukuk. Sukuk can be entirely tradable, which means they also bear 
this risk (Hayat & Kraeussl, 2011).  
4) Interest Rate Risk. When interest rates change, there is an inverse 
relationship between interest rates and bond prices. Thus, the overall return for 
bonds will change with the interest rate; however, such a risk is typically 
mitigated through holdings over long periods (Ahmad et al., 2012; Tariq & 
Dar, 2007). 
5) Purchasing Power Risk. Rising inflation rates can reduce 
conventional bond yields while strengthening sukuk returns because the latter’s 
underlying asset values increase with inflation (Usmani, 2008). 
6) Foreign Exchange Risk. Fluctuations in market currency influence 
both sukuk and conventional bonds. However, sukuk, which are liquid, namely 
short term, have less exposure to this risk (El Shazly & Tripathy, 2013). 
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7) Price Risk or Collateral Risk. Sukuk are exposed to the risk of 
depreciation in the value of their corresponding assets upon maturity (Tariq, 
2004; Usmani, 2008). 
8) Shari’ah and Legal Risk. Risks resulting from the violation of 
Shari’ah fundamentals or changes in policies apply only to sukuk. Suck risks 
are more pronounced in countries that do not comply with Shari’ah (Hesse et 
al., 2008). 
9) Operational Risk. The risk of delay in accruing the benefits of the 
underlying asset or cash flow for operational reasons (Tariq & Dar, 2007). 
Of the foregoing, systemic market risks include interest rates, foreign 
exchange, price risks, and commodity risks. These are addressed in detail by a 
considerable amount of literature. The risks also include idiosyncratic risks such as 
credit, Shari’ah, and operational risks (Hayat & Kraeussl 2011). Interest rate risks are 
similar for sukuk with fixed rates and conventional bonds with fixed rates. When 
market rates rise above the coupon’s value, the value of fixed rate sukuk falls. Foreign 
exchange and currency risks vary with time and influence both assets. There are also 
some specific risks associated with the operation and issuance of sukuk, in accordance 
with their structure. Additionally, coupon risks associated with the obligor failing to 
pay on time may also occur. Moreover, the associated asset may not be fully redeemed, 
thereby exposing the sukuk holder to redemption risks (Alhabshi, 1994).  
Further, sukuk structures expose sukuk to liquidity risks because there is no 
up-to-date and well-structured secondary market for trading, and most of the 
certificates tend to be held until maturity. Assets associated with sukuk may also be 
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subject to the risk of asset loss or depreciation. Such risks are usually mitigated by the 
Islamic form of insurance (Tariq & Dar, 2007).  
As is the case for all assets and securities, institutions and governments must 
evaluate and manage bonds’ risks. The 1988 Basel Accord suggested regulations and 
guidelines for credit and market risks. The novel formation and structure of sukuk 
inherently mean that sukuk have greater exposure to certain markets, assets, and, 
hence, risks. Overall, the Islamic financial regime has its own structure and risks, as 
do sukuk (Tariq, 2004). However, because of Shari’ah fundamentals, Islamic banks do 
not allow the issuance of, or trading in, derivative instruments and other high risk-
bearing instruments, unlike conventional financial institutions (Tariq, 2004).  
Sukuk markets mainly operate in emerging nations where less sophisticated 
risk management expertise and mechanisms exist compared with the developed 
traditional bond markets. The marked-up pricing of debt at a higher rate is not 
permissible because of the Shari’ah prohibition of interest. Consequently, 
counterparties in the market are, accordingly, inclined to default on their commitments 
to other parties. In addition, institutional fees are higher in accordance with PLS 
arrangements. Recently, diversified sukuk issuances have mainly involved assets 
based on ijarah, istisna’a, salam, and murabaha contracts, which have credit risk 
considerations at various levels (Azmat, Skully, & Brown, 2013; Bask, 2010; Dusuki, 
2010). Additionally, sukuk-issuing institutions may have a difficult time developing 
and executing effective risk management strategies congruent with Shari’ah 
fundamentals (Khan, 2010). 
More importantly, market risk in well-defined markets includes systematic 
risks that occur because of monetary policy and idiosyncratic risks because of 
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instruments that may differ from predominant market instruments (Hakim & 
Rashidian, 2002). Market risk includes interest rate and foreign exchange risks. With 
regard to sukuk, interest rate risks can be considered rate of return risks. Maturity terms 
also affect risk considerations. The longer a term, the higher the risk. Sukuk contracts 
with fixed rates may be exposed to risks in almost the same way as fixed-rate 
conventional bonds have market interest rate risks. Essentially, sukuk are indirectly 
exposed to fluctuations in interest rates through widespread benchmarking with 
LIBOR (i.e., in their financing operations). Opposing fluctuations of market rates also 
affect the creditworthiness of issuers unfavorably; hence, such fluctuations result in a 
higher credit risk (Tariq, 2004; Tariq & Dar, 2007).  
3.7.1 Market Risks/Rate of Return Risk 
Any rise in market interest rates may result in a noticeable decline in the value 
of fixed-rate sukuk. This is because the exposure of fixed-rate sukuk to rates of return 
is similar to that of fixed-rate bonds to interest-rate risk (Abdel-Khaleq & Richardson, 
2006). Additionally, when a traded asset is not liquid, a reinvestment risk occurs in 
addition to the opportunity cost of investing at the new rate, as is the case with zero-
coupon non-tradable sukuk. Essentially, sukuk are indirectly exposed to fluctuations 
in interest rates through widespread benchmarking with LIBOR. For instance, markup, 
which is a defining characteristic of a murabahah contract, is the most popular Islamic 
financial instrument on the asset side of the balance sheet (Wilson, 2008). Every 
contract benchmarked with LIBOR inherits the risk that future LIBOR rates will rise 
and that the issuer, on the asset side, may not have earned as much.  
The liability side of the issuer’s balance sheet is also of interest. This has 
provisions dependent upon varying market conditions. Sukuk issuers have to counter 
62 
 
 
 
fluctuations in LIBOR because any increase in earnings will have to be shared with 
the investors in accordance with the sukuk structure. On the asset side, meanwhile, 
repricing of murabahah contracts is not permissible because debts are non-tradable 
according to the Islamic financial regime (Jin & Ziobrowski, 2011). Thus, a conflicting 
situation occurs whereby a murabahah contract exposes the issuer and buyer to a 
considerable interest rate risk, albeit indirectly. Some sukuk issuances, such as IDB 
trust certificates, have assets that include murabahah receivables; hence, they are 
exposed to an interest rate risk. 
3.7.2 Foreign Exchange-Rate Risks 
Currency risks arise from unfavorable fluctuations that influence holdings in 
foreign currencies. Sukuk investors can also be exposed to such risks when held in 
foreign currencies. For instance, according to the IDB, an Islamic dinar (ID) is 
equivalent to one special drawing right (SDR) of the IMF, composed of 45% US 
dollars, 29% euros, 15% Japanese yen, and 11% British pounds. However, sukuk are 
denominated by US dollars and are consequently exposed to currency risk.  
Over the last few years, this currency mismatch has been favorable for the IDB 
because of the weakness in the US dollar relative to the ID. Thus, such IDB strength 
has served as a guarantor and bench market protection for investors in sukuk with 
foreign currencies. This, however, may not completely mitigate the exchange risk for 
sukuk originators. Generally speaking, with fast-growing and globalized market-based 
economics, currency exchange rates become more volatile and hence pose greater risk 
exposure to financial instruments. As such, issuing institutions and governments 
should implement effective exchange-risk management strategies that are compliant 
with Shari’ah principles (Grewal, 2007; Khan, 2010).  
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3.7.3 Credit and Counterparty Risk 
This risk occurs when an asset or loan becomes irrecoverable because of 
default or a delay in settlement. Chapra and Khan (2000), Khan and Ahmed (2001), 
and El-Hawary, Grais, & Iqbal (2004) identify various credit risks that are unique to 
Islamic finance. Sukuk trade in emerging markets, where counterparties enjoy less 
sophisticated risk management mechanisms and the rescheduling of debt at higher 
rates is not permissible because of the prohibition of interest; thus, counterparties are 
more inclined to default on their commitments to other parties.  
3.7.4 Default and Coupon Payment Risks 
These risks can result in contract termination in the case of obligor default. 
When a sukuk obligor fails to pay the rental due on the ijarah, namely the coupon 
payment, the holder may exercise the right to nullify the contract and force the 
defaulting obligor to purchase the assets back, against the obligor’s will and at a non-
favorable value. Further, legal action can be taken against the obligor if they fail to 
return the principal amount. Delayed funds, due to obligor failure to pay on time, are 
subject to a specified penalty payment amount, typically accumulated with the SPV 
(Tariq, 2004; Viceira, 2012). Shari’ah boards recommend that such funds are donated 
to charity. 
3.7.5 Asset Redemption Risk 
 Redemption risk is more likely to occur when the originator has to purchase 
an asset back because the originator may not be able to afford the purchase at that time 
(Tariq, 2004).  
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3.7.6 Liquidity Risk 
Because of the lack of a well-structured and adequate secondary liquid market, 
sukuk are exposed to liquidity risk. Usually, sukuk are listed on several local markets 
that may be unable to provide the desired liquidity. Sukuk certificates are usually 
medium to long term in maturity; further, their long-term success largely depends upon 
their ability to provide higher liquidity with adequate risk management mechanisms. 
Moreover, fixed-rate sukuk bear this risk in a very similar way to fixed interest rate 
bonds. However, sukuk certificates are directly exposed to interest rate fluctuations 
because of benchmarking with LIBOR (Tariq, 2004). Opposing alterations in market 
rates may even unfavorably alter the credit history of issues. Further, sukuk are 
exposed to foreign currency-rate risks just like any negative exchange-rate 
fluctuations. With such, there is a school of thought that suggests sukuk as an ideal 
tool for liquidity management and the mobilization of fresh funds. The collateral assets 
eventually make them a safe form of asset. Indeed, existing asset-backed securities can 
be bundled together and transformed into new sukuk that can, in turn, generate fee 
income (Bask, 2010; Giot & Laurent, 2003).  
Investors can choose between fixed or variable returns depending upon future 
market expectations and have the opportunity to finance infrastructure projects. In this 
regard, sukuk have become a vehicle for the equitable distribution of wealth because 
they allow investors to benefit from true economic profits in equal shares (Vishwanath 
& Azmi, 2009). Additionally, because sukuk are asset-backed, they provide asset 
security or corporate guarantees (referred to as special vehicles in sukuk contracts) to 
investors even in the case of default. Sukuk also undergo credit rating and auditing 
procedures similar to conventional bonds. Ab Majid et al. (2010) suggest that sukuk 
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default occurs primarily because of a breach of binding obligations in the agreement 
between the issuer and holder.  
Cakir and Raei (2007) examine the considerable risk-reduction advantages of 
holding sovereign sukuk. Using the case of sovereign Sukuk and euro bonds from 
similar issuers, they estimate and compare the VaR for a portfolio that includes both 
instruments with one that only has Eurobonds. The results indicate lower VaR when 
sukuk are added to the portfolio, demonstrating the diversification benefits of sukuk. 
However, Godlewski et al. (2011) suggest no significant market reaction to 
conventional bond issues but a significant negative stock market reaction to sukuk. 
The researchers attribute the different markets’ reactions to two factors. First, investors 
expect an adverse selection mechanism to encourage the less healthy entities to prefer 
sukuk over conventional bonds. Second, investors may think that if companies issuing 
sukuk are prevented from entering the conventional bond market, they can still take 
advantage of excess demand for sukuk from Islamic banks. 
Tariq and Dar (2007) study how expanding sukuk markets have highlighted 
Islamic property-based securities in emerging economies. In this context, the authors 
consider the securities’ fluidity, credit ability, and market risk. The ultimate goal is to 
evaluate sukuk structures and gauge the numerous risks associated with Islamic private 
and commercial structures. Such worthwhile examinations have been undertaken by 
investigators such as Elgari (1997), Kahf (1997),  and Zarqa (1997) with regards to 
funding in Islamic economies.  
Further, Al-Suwailem (1999) and El-Gamal (2001) inspect the consequences 
of doubt and uncertainty in Islamic economies that may develop into pivotal points 
regarding Islamic risk management instruments. Nevertheless, Godlewski et al. (2011) 
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suggest that there is no noteworthy reaction in the market to traditional bond issues 
and that there may be considerable negative reaction to the sukuk by the market. The 
literature contrasts the different stock market reactions to such assets; for example, the 
study by Hayat and Kraeussl (2011) indicates that Islamic equity funds (IEFs) can be 
typical investment vehicles that receive neutral reaction. However, IEFs must comply 
with numerous ethical and financial criteria before acceptance in accordance with 
Islamic law. Over the last decade, the IEF industry has exhibited solid growth; minimal 
academic literature has analyzed the funds, though.  
In a prior investigation (Hayat & Kraeussl, 2013), the performance of IEFs is 
examined. The researchers utilize well-known techniques to develop estimated 
coefficients for systematic risk (beta), risk-adjusted return (alpha), market timing 
(gamma and theta), and downside risk (relative beta) using the excess returns of 145 
open-ended IEFs over the decade following the year 2000. On average, IEFs have 
underperformed both Islamic and conventional benchmarks considerably prior to 
including management fees. The authors also find that globally invested IEFs, 
surprisingly, have the worst performance, while locally invested IEFs perform slightly 
better. Throughout the recent financial crisis of 2008–09, this underperformance has 
further increased.  
Such a finding is surprising because it widely contrasts with the prior literature, 
which asserts that IEFs perform better during bear than bull markets (Hayat & 
Kraeussl, 2011). However, to thoroughly examine market timing, the investigators 
also employ parametric and non-parametric approaches, only to find that, based on 
numerous robustness tests, IEFs are poor market timers. The authors also explicitly 
analyze the downside risk as a potential explanation for inferior performance, but find 
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that IEFs do not possess any significant downside risk. Moreover, one should note that 
next to being relative underperformers, IEFs possess some unique and specific risks 
that cannot simply be modeled with existing conventional investments because they 
are dissimilar. Such risks include the changing Shari’ah rules, the evident lack of 
sufficient historical data, high exposure to companies that may be suboptimally 
leveraged, and considerable exposure to companies with low working capital. Indeed, 
such risks should be taken into account when assessing IEFs as an investment 
alternative in order to yield accurate judgment. Meanwhile, it seems that IEF managers 
still need further time and experience before offering Muslims an investment 
instrument that is attractive in terms of risk and return, although prior research 
indicates the competitiveness of Islamic indices compared with conventional indices 
(Albaity and Ahmad, 2008). 
Additionally, Hakim and Rashidian (2002) conduct a study on the risk and 
return of Islamic stock market indices. Introduced in 1999, the Dow Jones Islamic 
Market Index (DJIMI) has rapidly gained traction from Muslim investors worldwide. 
The index caters to the needs of investors seeking Shari'ah-compliant assets and 
equities. Further, it gives investors a viable benchmark to gauge the performance of 
Islamic funds/portfolios, whereby better-performing fund managers are rewarded 
while underperforming managers are penalized. As such, this index is an indication of 
the maturity process of Islamic financial markets, which is estimated today as having 
a value of US$251 billion (DinarStandard, 2013). However, even with such 
attractiveness, the stochastic properties of the DJIMI remain unexplored, primarily 
because of the absence of academic research.  
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Rusgianto and Ahmad (2013) conduct a study about the volatility behavior of 
the sukuk market. The aim of the study is to examine such behavior in terms of 
structural breaks. The Dow Jones Citigroup Sukuk Index (DJCSI) for 2007–2011 is 
used as a proxy of the global sukuk market. In their results, the authors indicate that 
structural breaks significantly alter the volatility behavior of sukuk. In other words, 
volatility during the pre-crisis period and the contemporaneous period is more 
sensitive to market events compared with the post-crisis period. The findings imply 
that in order to realize a more rational and efficient sukuk market, a need exists for 
policies that are more transparent, impose information disclosure, and offer better 
incentives to attract investors. Such policies could, in turn, lead to higher trading 
activities in the secondary market. Future research may develop a risk-return 
forecasting model incorporating the volatility behavior of the sukuk market. 
However, Ramasamy et al. (2011) urge that sukuk are less risky than 
conventional bonds. Sukuk differ from governmental and conventional bonds as far as 
rates and the calculations of delayed payments are concerned (Bacha, 1996). Thus, 
with conventional finance, interest rates accrue and add to the principal because 
borrowers fail to repay their dues on time. As such, interest earns interest based on the 
length of the time the funds are utilized by the borrowers (Lydon, 2009). Such charges 
are not permitted by Shari’ah and are considered as mere markup (profit) because of 
delays in payment (Al-Omar & Abdel Haq, 1996). That said, in an Islamic-compliant 
regime, this exposure by the lender to risk also yields a higher return while offering 
investors a steady income stream, which, although low, is less risky when compared 
with shares. As such, sukuk are unique in character and pricing mechanism. Indeed, as 
a financial instrument, they eventually cannot deviate much from conventional bonds 
because arbitrage opportunities will emerge between the two markets. However, 
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overpricing of one asset and not the other will deter investors from parking their funds 
in sukuk while underpricing will attract everyone in a chaotic pattern. This necessitates 
the development of an efficient fair pricing mechanism to avoid arbitrage between 
Islamic and conventional bonds (Al-Zoubi & Maghyereh, 2007) 
 We can also say, generally, that government bonds should always be 
considered as safe and highly liquid, while offering lower yield. Sukuk are growing 
fast, along with governmental and conventional bonds. Sukuk funds invest, as per 
Shari’ah principles, in halal (permissible) businesses; as such, they are safer when 
compared with conventional bonds. When empirically analyzed for riskiness, 
however, the results reveal that sukuk are moderately more risky than governmental 
bonds and less risky than conventional bonds, indicating a possible lower return. 
Nonetheless, such an asset can offer a great opportunity to investors to diversify, even 
for those who do not follow Islamic laws. Ultimately, investors who resort to parking 
their money in the bond market are usually risk averse (Ramasamy et al., 2011). 
3.7.7 Shari’ah Compliance 
When issuers breach their responsibility to comply with Shari’ah, this can 
possibly result in the loss of asset value. Dissolution clauses of Sukuk prospectuses 
outline events that make contracts void because of Shari’ah noncompliance. If sukuk, 
for instance, are based on a hybrid of ijarah and istisna assets, ijarah must always have 
greater precedence than istisna otherwise the contract will dissolve (Usmani, 2008). 
As such, there is a risk of the ability of such sukuk to compete and survive in the market 
as distinct Shari’ah-compliant assets. There are numerous conflicts concerning the 
applicability of Islamic financial instruments in accordance with different schools of 
thought; hence, sukuk issuance and structure are affected, thereby posing a further risk. 
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For example, the applicability of the murabahah varies among diverse schools of 
thought. For instance, bodies such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC) 
Fiqh Academy asserts that murabahah contracts are binding only on the seller and not 
the buyer, while other schools of thought say that such contracts are binding on both 
(Vogel & Hayes III, 1998). 
With regard to liquidity facility, sukuk prospectuses stipulate that a facility 
must limit lags between payments to investors and returns on underlying asset pools. 
Some facilities are formed to permit a trustee to improve the facility for any liquidity 
deficit ensuing from default in sukuk asset pools. The imbursement of liquidity 
services has been provisional upon surplus funds after the distribution of coupon 
payments to sukuk holders. The sole purpose of such a facility is to reduce lags 
between investor payments and returns on the underlying asset pools. The importance 
of such a liquidity facility can most effectively be appreciated when the arrangement 
has floating-rate payments because fixed-rate returns would imply the nonexistence of 
interest-rate differentials (Zakaria et al., 2012).  
It is important to note that sukuk prospectuses are subject to the same fiduciary 
risks as Islamic banks (El-Hawary et al., 2004). As such, if compliance is not proved, 
originator reputation can suffer because investors would lose their confidence in the 
issuer, who would hence lose potential investments. Thus, overall, the association of 
Shari’ah auditors with sukuk issuances ensures investor confidence and market flow. 
However, devising mechanisms that assure compliance with competitive market 
conditions remains a challenge for sukuk issuances. 
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3.8 Risk and Return  
The novelty of sukuk inherently entails a higher exposure to certain market and 
financial risks. The credit and counterparty risks inherent in Islamic finance are unique 
owing to the nature of Islamic financial instruments that have become the foundation 
of the sukuk assets pool. Unlike conventional financial institutions, Islamic banks do 
not have access to derivative instruments and other credit risk management 
mechanisms because of Shari’ah considerations.  
Sukuk issuers operate, for the large part, in emerging markets where 
counterparties possess less sophisticated risk management mechanisms. The 
rescheduling of debt at a higher markup rate does not occur because of the prohibition 
of interest. Consequently, counterparties are more inclined to default on their 
commitments to other parties. Agency costs are also higher with regard to PLS 
arrangements.  
Recent major sukuk issuances have mainly involved assets based on ijarah, 
istisna’a, salam, and murabaha contracts. There are numerous credit risk 
considerations associated with these modes of finance. In addition, sukuk are exposed 
to a variety of systemic risks such as interest rate and exchange rate risks, and 
operational risks such as redemption and SPV-specific risks. 
3.9 Literature Review of Sukuk Performance   
OIC Fiqh legitimized sukuk in 1988; since then, sukuk have gained significant 
acceptance in the world’s leading financial markets. This is because tangible assets 
back most Islamic financial transactions and a sukuk signifies asset ownership. In 
contrast, a bond is a real debt agreement between two parties, the investor and the 
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issuer (Omar, Abduh, & Sukmana 2013). Moreover, a sukuk is known as a method of 
mobilizing funds for supporting an investment but with an expectation of earning a 
future yield for settling obligations, thus enabling it to access financial markets 
(Nagano, 2017). However, Islamic bonds are designed in such a way that they adhere 
to the guidelines and regulations of Shari’ah, although they have the characteristics of 
both stocks and bonds (Klein & Weill, 2016).  Sukuk are known for their low volatility, 
which makes them an even more stable option for investment (Alaoui, Diwandaru, 
Azhar, & Masih, 2014; Boumediene, 2015). Further, Nagano (2017) finds that large 
corporations with high demands for funding opt to use the sukuk market instead of the 
conventional debt market, especially when there is a significant need for financing in 
situations where information relating to the conventional debt market is not matched, 
meaning that accessing funds from banks may become difficult. Specifically, sukuk 
are a readily available option for large-scale funding that may be beyond the limits of 
the conventional debt market, especially from the banks. 
Moreover, Azmat et al., (2014), upon further analysis, note essential 
characteristics that distinguish conventional bonds from Islamic bonds. For example, 
it is apparent that when choosing Islamic bonds, issuers do not have a similar approach 
as they would for a debt-deriving common bond. This is because they do not regard a 
debt-equity investment venture bond as an equity instrument. Besides, it is clear that 
the distance to the issuer, the type of sukuk, and the Shari’ah advisor’s popularity 
determine the stock price (Godlewski, Turk-Ariss, & Weill, 2016). This means that the 
issuers must find ways to suit their preferential needs. They can achieve their aim by 
upholding Shari’ah principles consistently without considering fatwas. 
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Nevertheless, it is noted that Malaysian investors fail to react to the 
announcement of conventional bonds; however, they have an adverse reaction to sukuk 
in the stock market (Godlewski et al., 2013; Klein & Weill, 2016). This situation 
applies despite conventional bonds and sukuk being different before, during, and after 
the financial crisis that affected the whole world. In fact, when the two are compared 
in an empirical investigation, the announcement of conventional bonds and sukuk has 
caused a negative market reaction, although this reaction differed at specific times of 
the financial crisis period. For example, conventional bonds had negative effects only 
during and after the crisis, while sukuk had negative effects before and during the crisis 
(Alam et al., 2013).  
Nevertheless, in the case of a single product, for instance sukuk only, there is 
a possibility of obtaining varying results during the crisis period from different 
international markets. For example, it is apparent that analyzing the sukuk market 
using wavelet technique during the crisis period shows that sukuk proved to be of high 
quality, while at the same time having less risk, with the Dubai Financial Market being 
the top index in the GCC region (El Alaoui et al., 2015). Moreover, when the analysis 
is conducted using the Markov switching technique, the results are impressive. For 
example, Aloui, Hammoudeh, and Hamida (2015) analyze the GCC sukuk market and 
Shari’ah-compliant stock. They find that when using two different regimes, the first 
shows that the bonds have higher means and a smaller variance, while in the second, 
the results are inverse. Moreover, the authors demonstrate that the regime determines 
the link between Shari’ah-compliant stock and sukuk. They also show that Shari’ah-
compliant stock responds to the sukuk market’s activities in an asymmetrical way. In 
addition, using dynamic conditional correlations for 1241 observations on a daily basis 
together with the multivariate integrated asymmetric power of an autoregressive 
74 
 
 
 
conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model, Aloui, Hammoudeh, and Hamida 
(2015a) investigate the spillover of Shari’ah-compliant stock with sukuk in the GCC 
region. The researchers find that for corporate and financial services, sukuk and 
Shari’ah-compliant stock have a high correlation and an inverse interaction. In the 
second phase of their analysis, the researchers discover that in the GCC, there is 
behavior that exhibits itself as a dynamic conditional correlation, which is a spillover 
from the crisis period from the US. However, during the crisis, the Islamic indices 
showed detachment from conventional products, despite evidence of an adverse effect 
spreading from the crisis to conventional portfolios and Islamic bonds (Hkiri et al., 
2017). In other words, Islamic finance is a safe option for investors who would like to 
diversify so that they can spread and minimize risks, especially during a financial 
crisis. In addition, when Aloui, Hammoudeh, and Hamida (2015b) use a wavelet 
squared coherency approach to determine the co-movement power between 
conventional bonds and sukuk in the GCC capital market, they realize that Shari’ah 
stock and sukuk have a dependent relationship that involves a kind of co-movement. 
This co-movement mostly depends upon time-frequency and the long-term effect. 
Nonetheless, Arundina, Omar, and Kartiwi (2015) give neural networks 
priority over multinomial logit techniques when they conduct research to determine 
sukuk rating accuracy. They prove that sukuk ratings depend upon sukuk structure and 
share price. There is also a dissimilar transmission between the two, as revealed by a 
dynamic spillover index (Maghyereh & Awartani. 2016). Further, Maghyereh and 
Awartani (2016) discover that sukuk have high transmission mechanisms brought 
about by the availability of information relating to market equity, regardless of the 
slow integration of sukuk into other markets. Nevertheless, Kenourgios, Naifar, and 
Dimitriou (2016) note an advantage with Islamic portfolios, claiming that such 
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portfolios have the potential to protect investors against risks and economic instability, 
a benefit that was exhibited during financial crises. This is especially the case when 
sukuk are diversified and used in both developed and developing economies. 
Consequently, it is possible for investors to gain higher profits, provided that they can 
distinguish a domestic market from regional markets and have a strategy that enables 
proper resource allocation. Balcilar, Cerci, and Demirer (2016) unearth unmatched 
diversification options for sukuk that are unique in a way that conventional bonds are 
not. The authors base their argument on an examination of performance analysis. 
However, they discover that during financial crises, sukuk have a negative correlation 
with global stock markets. However, Nagano (2017) describes the importance of 
timing the market efficiently, especially when issuing sukuk. Notably, Nagano (2017) 
says that ordering should be in a sequence flow, starting from sukuk market 
accessibility, financial constraint, and undervaluation of the organization just before 
sukuk are issued. Similarly, Mohamed, Masih, and Bacha (2015) highlight two events. 
The first promotes trade-off theory for products in the process of achieving optimal 
behavior. The second indicates that the two product issuers mimic pecking order 
theory, whereas those who issue exchange-based sukuk and straight bonds use 
underlying growth opportunity theory. Consequently, each event is unique, although 
the uniqueness depends upon the preferred products and their target matches. 
Regarding returns, Naifar (2016) discovers that sukuk returns depend upon the 
volatility of the stock market in Saudi Arabia. Further, with regard to the UAE, 
Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia, Islamic bond indices show that sukuk have a sensitive 
effect on the world’s conventional stock markets compared with Islamic products in 
global, regional, and local markets (Naifar, Hammoudeh, & Al Dohaiman, 2016). 
Naifar and Hammoudeh (2016) decide to investigate the effect of economic policy, oil 
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uncertainties, and the global financial crisis on sukuk returns using quantile regression. 
Particularly in GCC countries, they discover that policy, uncertainty, and a crisis affect 
the lower quantile negatively; however, only a crisis affects the higher quantile 
negatively. The authors also note that gold uncertainty combined with bonds has no 
impact on sukuk returns in the GCC. Notably, according to Halim, How, and 
Verhoeven (2016), corporations suffering agency costs and still experiencing 
problems of underinvestment choose sukuk in most instances instead of deciding to 
issue bonds. This action suggests that sukuk can lessen the effects that 
underinvestment and agency costs cause to a corporation. Nonetheless, future studies 
should focus on cost and benefit analysis.  
3.10 Conclusion 
With such attention, sukuk transactions have shown solid growth over the last 
decade from US$8 billion to more than US$856 M globally (IIFM, 2016). By holding 
sukuk, it is possible that the value of associated assets may appreciate or depreciate 
and thereby influence sukuk returns, unlike fixed conventional bond returns. Sukuk 
are exposed to many types of risk such as liquidity and Shari’ah-compliance risks. 
More importantly, sukuk are exposed to market risk. In well-defined markets, the risks 
include systemic risks that occur because of monetary policy and idiosyncratic risks 
that occur because instruments may differ from predominant market instruments 
(Hakim & Rashidian, 2002). Sukuk are an ideal tool for liquidity management and the 
mobilization of fresh funds. They are a relatively safe form of investment because they 
are asset-backed. Existing asset-backed transitions can be bundled together and 
transformed into new sukuk. These instruments generate a significant amount of fees 
as income for Islamic financial institutions. However, investors may select fixed and 
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variable returns depending upon future market expectations. Investors also have the 
potential to finance infrastructure projects. Sukuk are a means to achieve the equitable 
distribution of wealth and enable investors to benefit from the true profits that result 
from enterprises in equal shares.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.1 Introduction  
The literature has identified some appropriate techniques for use in this thesis, 
namely the VaR approach and hedging analysis. The objective behind selecting these 
is as follows.  
1. To measure and quantify the level of financial risk within a company over a 
specific time. 
2. To determine the extent and occurrence ratio of potential losses in institutional 
portfolios. 
3. To empirically explore the diversification benefits of sukuk in fixed income 
portfolios.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 describes the VaR 
approach used and section 4.3 describes hedging analysis.  
4.2 Value at Risk Approach 
The concept of value at risk was originally initiated as a substitute risk measure 
of variance by Bawa (1978). However, it was not until the early 1990s that the term 
“VaR” came into common use. According to Linsmeier and Pearson (1996), VaR 
provides a general and consistent measure of risk, taking into account a range of 
positions and risk factors. Through VaR, the risk linked with a fixed income asset can 
be measured in a way that is consistent with and comparable to the measure of risk 
linked with the equity position. Another feature of VaR is that it considers correlations 
among various risk factors. The methods by which VaR information could be utilized 
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for the provision of strategic risk assessments for managers, traders, and other 
employees have been discussed by Kuruc and Lee (1998). They suggest ways for 
dissuading the excess risk taking that takes place when traders are rewarded solely on 
the basis of profits. Such risk assessment could even be used in a portfolio context. 
The use of VaR for reporting and disclosing has been discussed by Jorion (1996), who 
observes that companies are progressively ensuring the reporting of VaR information 
in their annual reports. It has been suggested by Dowd (1999) that portfolio hedging 
approaches against the amount measured by VaR could be applied through VaR 
information.  
The VaR model can perhaps be commonly regarded as a quantitative tool for 
the purpose of calculating the possible loss that could occur in a financial institution 
for a number of assets within a specific time period (Jin & Ziobrowski, 2011). The 
banking industry presently uses conditional VaR for the measurement of market risk 
since it is related to commodity, equity, interest rate, and currency risk. In financial 
institutions, VaR is acknowledged and regularly used because of its easy-to-
comprehend definition: It sums up the possible inadequacy of a portfolio of assets into 
numbers stated as percentages or possibly nominal amounts in a selected currency (Jin 
& Ziobrowski, 2011). With regard to poor market risk, the market cost exposure from 
the financial instrument is measured through VaR, lest the next day could be 
statistically described as bad. Moreover, the risk–return profile of active market 
participants, for example resource managers or traders, could be measured through 
VaR (Jin & Ziobrowski, 2011). With regard to market risk, the market value exposure 
of a financial instrument can be measured through VaR if, for instance, the next day is 
a statistically defined bad day (Linsmeier & Pearson, 2000).  
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Even though there could be a single, strong, and distinct definition of VaR, the 
exact process of VaR application has not yet been confirmed. In accordance with its 
nature, the measurement of VaR relies strongly on good forecasts of catastrophic risk 
or unusual happenings. Thus, modeling the returns precisely is essential. It is because 
of its easily comprehensible definition that VaR is well-known and extensively used 
by financial institutions (Cakir & Raei, 2007). Such use is also because VaR totals the 
potential loss of a portfolio of assets into a nominal amount in a selected currency or 
in a number stated as a percentage. In addition, the risk–return profile of active market 
members such as asset managers or traders can be qualified through VaR (Jorion 1996; 
Pérignon & Smith, 2010).  
With regard to modeling the returns distribution, the following traditional 
techniques are used: (1) stress testing (scenario analysis), (2) parametric techniques 
(analysis based), (3) Monte Carlo simulation, and (4) historical simulation (Al-Zoubi 
& Maghyereh, 2007). 
However, there are certain Islamic finance indices such as the DJCSI in capital 
markets that could be utilized for calculating and measuring sukuk risks. The DJCSI 
was formulated to evaluate the performance of global Islamic fixed-earnings 
investments. The overall approach from the set of Citigroup fixed earnings indices and 
even the DJIMI approach for inspecting investments for Shari’ah compliance are 
followed by the DJCSI. This latter index could be benchmarked by sukuk traders in 
US dollar-denominated investment-grade sukuk issued within the international 
market. Those that have been verified for Shari’ah compliance in accordance with the 
index approach, are also included in the index. In the Islamic indices (from the 
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beginning), the usual return is an expected 83.94%. However, there is a more sensible 
8.45% in the five-year return in the Islamic indices (Al-Zoubi & Maghyereh, 2007). 
The worst possible loss of a portfolio within a particular holding period at a set 
confidence level under normal market conditions is measured through VaR (Jorion, 
1996). The analysis of whether the initiation of sukuk bond portfolios leads to any 
diversification advantage is undertaken through a VaR approach. This projection of 
the distribution of future portfolio values and the measurement of potential losses by 
utilizing past data could be undertaken through different techniques such as simulation 
methods (Pérignon & Smith, 2010). Basically, VaR is a representation of a portfolio’s 
market risk, signifying the maximum amount that could be lost during the holding 
period, in every case, except possibly 1%. For instance, through the VaR approach, it 
can be known with a confidence level between 0.99% and 1% that a given number of 
US dollars will be lost in a particular year, month, or day. Thus, 
σp = w Σ w                                                              (4.1) 
where Σ = the variance-covariance matrix of returns on securities in a portfolio, w = 
the vector of weights for the different securities in the portfolio, and w' = the 
transposed vector of weights in the portfolio. 
A portfolio’s VaR can be formed through a grouping of the risks of the main 
securities. It basically includes cover for the correlation and volatility within the 
different risk variables over time. With regard to the measurement of VaR, different 
approaches could be used. A commonly utilized approach is the variance-covariance 
method, also known as the delta-normal technique. Through this method, the worst 1% 
and 5% on the curve can be ascertained easily through the Gaussian normal 
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distribution curve, which is expressible in terms of the confidence interval, the 
standard deviation, and the mean. A key assumption here is that returns are jointly 
normally distributed. Through the following equation, a portfolio’s VaR can be 
calculated: 
VaRp = -(μp −α σpW)                                                  (4.2) 
where W = the initial portfolio value, μp = the average return of the portfolio, and α = 
the standard normal deviate (for the 99% confidence level). 
It is evident through the above formula for VaR of an asset that a smaller VaR 
is implied through lower volatility, which is quite preferred. If the returns of the 
constituent assets have small or even negative correlations, a lower volatility is 
achieved in a portfolio of assets. Gains through diversification occur through 
diversification of a portfolio of assets whose outcomes are not extremely positively 
correlated (Cakir & Raei, 2007). 
Even though there are certain shortcomings, the VaR calculation is made 
suitable through the normality assumption. As opposed to the symmetry represented 
in normal distribution, there are two common methods in which asset returns deviate 
from symmetry. By using suitable approaches, these sets of asset returns can be 
estimated by modeling volatility (this will be discussed later in the thesis). In 
calculating asset returns, fat tails are quite usual, indicating that extraordinary losses 
could occur more often than the times they have been forecast through normal 
distribution. In addition, asset returns are frequently negatively skewed, with more 
observations on the left side than the right (Dowd, 1999; Hayat & Kraeussl, 2011).  
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The Monte Carlo simulation method, as opposed to the delta-normal approach, 
requires less strong assumptions. However, it involves more calculations. At first, for 
the price paths, stochastic data-generating procedure is stated, and through the data, 
parameters such as correlations and risks are derived. Next, for all variables of interest, 
price paths are simulated through computer-generated random numbers. In order to 
create a distribution of returns, all these pseudo realizations are utilized. Through this 
approach, a VaR figure is calculated. As is the case with all other approximations, the 
projected VaR could have faults in approximation. Thus, these shortcomings should 
be taken into account before making any significant explanation, comparison, and 
implementation of the projected VaR (Linsmeier & Pearson, 1996; Linsmeier & 
Pearson, 2000).  
In the Monte Carlo simulation approach, the precision of any projected 
parameter is proportional to 1/n where n is the total count of iterations. Monte Carlo 
simulation approaches rely on computer-generated random numbers. Since these are 
not completely random numbers, they result in certain faults that reduce as n increases. 
With regard to the estimation faults, there is no closed form representation, so they 
will not be discussed further in this study. However, closed-form formulas are 
available for the standard errors of estimation using the delta-normal approach. The 
numbers for these have already been determined (Cakir & Raei, 2007; Dias, 2013).  
4.2.1 Expected Shortfalls 
According to Acerbi and Tasche (2002), a risk measure is coherent if and only 
if it is monotonous, sub-additive, positively homogeneous, and translation invariant. 
Failure to comply with any one of these four requirements invalidates the risk measure. 
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From this perspective, VaR is not coherent since it is not sub-additive. Sub-
additivity implies that a portfolio made of sub-portfolios will have a VaR smaller than 
or equal to the sum of the sub-portfolios’ VaR; in other words, diversification will 
reduce risk. This axiom is violated by VaR. Chen (2013) illustrates the lack of sub-
additivity of VaR by considering two stylized, independent, and identical projects with 
a 2% probability of a US$10m loss and 98% probability of a US$1m loss. The 97.5% 
VaR on each project is assumed to be US$1m. Looking at the combined VaR, the loss 
distribution is as follows: a 0.04% (2%*2%) probability of a $20m loss, a 3.92% 
(2*2%*98%) probability of a US$11m loss, and a 96.04% (98%*98%) probability of 
a US$2m loss. The 97.5% VaR is then US$11m, which is higher than the combined 
VaRs of the two projects (US$2m). 
The VaR approach also ignores tail risk: The α% VaR tells us that loss is not 
expected in more than α% of occurrences but says nothing about the potential loss 
should VaR exceeds. This is particularly problematic since our data display much 
bigger tails than predicted by the Gaussian distribution. The expected shortfall is an 
alternative market risk measure, defined as the average loss beyond VaR. The expected 
shortfall is a sub-additive risk measure (it is monotonous, positively homogenous, and 
translation invariant) and is thus a coherent measure of risk. We apply expected 
shortfall to our data to check whether they validate or invalidate the VaR results 
presented earlier. 
Following Acerbi and Tasche (2002), let us assume that for day t, Xt represents 
the profit and loss of a portfolio, the distribution of which can be forecast by the 
predictive distribution Pt. Thus, 
   VaRα,t = P
-1
t(α)                                                        (4.3) 
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and  
𝐸𝑆𝛼,𝑡 = −
1
𝛼
∫ 𝑃𝑡
−1(𝑞)𝑑𝑞
𝛼
0
                                                (4.4) 
In a (second) consultative paper published in January 2014, the Basel 
Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) proposed to move away from 99% VaR 
as a measure on which to base banks’ capital requirements and to replace it with 97.5% 
expected shortfall. The main rationale for the change is that VaR is not sub-additive 
and ignores tail risk. Should returns be Gaussian, the two measures would be 
equivalent. However, should returns exhibit fatter tails then 97.5% expected shortfall, 
the returns would drive a higher capital charge. When effective, the new regulatory 
environment makes expected shortfall the prime market risk measure.  
4.2.1.1 Model Set Up 
In a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH)(p,q) 
model, the volatility regresses on p against past squared returns and q past variances. 
Thus, in the GARCH(1,1) version we have 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑟𝑡
2 + 𝑐𝜎𝑡−1
2                                                          (4.5) 
where ht is the conditional variance at time t, a is a mean-reversion parameter, and b 
and c the lag-one squared returns and variance coefficients respectively. 
We implemented GARCH(1,1) with our data. In GARCH(1,1), the 
unconditional variance of returns is obtained as follows: 
σ2 = a / (1- b –c)                                                                (4.6) 
With most of our data, the constraint b+c>1 is not met; thus, the unconditional 
variance is undefined. In such cases, exponentially weighted moving average 
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(EWMA) models are normally preferred. We chose to focus on the RiskMetrics model 
(a EWMA model with lambda=0.94). 
EWMA is a special case of GARCH(1,1), where the mean reversion parameter 
is omitted and the condition b+c=1 is imposed. With EWMA, past data are given 
declining weights: (t-1) data is assigned weight 1, (t-2) data weight (1- 𝜆)𝜆, (t-3) data 
weight (1- 𝜆)𝜆)^2, … , (t-i) data weight (1- 𝜆)𝜆) ^(i-1). The entire series conveniently 
reduces to the following recursive formula: 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝜆𝜎𝑡−1
2 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑟𝑡−1
2                                                      (4.7) 
where λ is the decay parameter (the higher the value of λ, the lower the decay). The 
RiskMetrics version of EWMA uses λ=0.94 for daily data. The sample mean of 
squared residuals is used to start recursion.  
We next implemented and backtested the RiskMetrics model. 
4.2.1.2 Backtesting 
Backtesting is a statistical procedure that compares actual profit and loss 
numbers to VaR estimates with the aim of checking the VaR model’s ability to capture 
actual risks. The simplest backtesting approach is to test whether the actual frequency 
of exceptions (losses higher than VaR) is statistically different from that suggested by 
the VaR confidence interval. Since such tests are called “unconditional coverage” 
tests, we will use the Kupiec likelihood ratio (LR) test. A limitation of such a test is 
that it ignores the timings of the exceptions. Should exceptions cluster in specific 
periods, this would also invalidate the VaR model (since the model would then fail to 
capture volatility and/or correlation changes). Backtesting techniques that address this 
87 
 
 
 
shortcoming are called “conditional coverage” tests and include the Christoffersen test 
and the dynamic quartile of Engle and Manganelli. We apply the latter. 
4.2.1.3 Unconditional Coverage Test 
Each trading outcome either produces a violation or does not. The number of 
exceptions thus follows a binomial distribution, which for large samples, as in our 
case, can be approximated using the normal distribution. For a (1-α)-VaR model, the 
Kupiec LR test checks whether the frequency of exceptions is statistically different 
from α; namely, the null hypothesis is 
H0: 𝛼 = ?̂?, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ ?̂? =
𝑥
𝑛
                                                 (4.8) 
where x is the number of exceptions, n is the sample size, and hence ?̂? is the 
observed exception frequency. 
The test is conducted as a likelihood ratio and the test statistic takes the form 
Kupiec 𝐿𝑅 = −2𝑙𝑛 (
𝛼𝑥(1−𝛼)𝑛−𝑥
?̂?𝑥(1−?̂?)𝑛−𝑥
)                               (4.9) 
Under H0, the statistic asymptotically follows a chi-squared distribution with one 
degree of freedom. 
In order to further test the validity of the foregoing modeling approach, we 
computed the test statistic and associated p-values for both long (quantile losses) and 
short (quantile profits) positions. Annex 1 presents the results’ tables. They show that 
the backtesting results are mixed and that, in a significant proportion of cases, the null 
hypothesis that the frequency of exceptions is equal to the VaR confidence level is 
rejected. Specifically, we observe that the frequency of exceptions on long positions 
(quantile losses) exceeds that expected under a normality assumption, a finding that is 
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consistent with our earlier analysis of non-normality of the data. This observation 
applies to all considered confidence levels. We also note that results are far more mixed 
for short positions (quantile profits), highlighting the asymmetric impact of news. 
Negative news (evidenced by price drops) is known to have a greater impact on 
volatility than positive news (evidenced by price increases) of a similar magnitude, 
which is what we find. This is known as the leverage or asymmetric effect (as an 
illustration, the volatility index (VIX) tends to increase in a bearish stock market and 
decrease in a bullish one). 
4.2.1.4 Conditional Coverage Test 
A limitation of unconditional tests such as the Kupiec LR test is that the timing 
of exceptions is ignored. Engle and Manganelli (2004) argue that, for a VaR model to 
be validated, exceptions must be uncorrelated as well as unbiased and that any noise 
introduced into the VaR measure would change the conditional probability of an 
exception. Rather than modeling the whole distribution, their approach is to model the 
quantile directly. Specifically, they apply a conditional autoregressive quantile 
specification (called CAViaR). 
Let θ be the probability associated with VaR, let xt be a vector of time t 
observable variables (chosen to be lagged returns), and let βθ be a p-vector of unknown 
parameters. Finally, let ft(β) ≡ ft(xt−1,βθ ) denote the time t θ -quantile of the distribution 
of portfolio returns formed at time t-1, where the θ subscript is suppressed for βθ for 
notational convenience. We now have 
𝑓𝑡(𝛽)  =  𝛽0  +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1  𝑓𝑡−𝑖(𝛽)  +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑟
𝑗=1  𝑙(𝑥𝑡−1𝑡−𝑗)               (4.10) 
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where p=q+r+1 is the dimension of β and l is a function of a finite number of lagged 
values of observables. The autoregressive terms βi ft−i(β),i = 1,..., q, ensure that the 
quantile changes “smoothly” over time. The role of l(xt−j) is to link ft(β) to observable 
variables that belong to the information set. In our analysis, we use p=5.  
Under the assumptions of consistency and asymptotic normality, we now 
proceed to derive a dynamic quantile test based on a regression of the exceptions on 
their lags, which follows a chi-squared distribution. 
Annex 2 contains all the results (for both individual companies and the 
indices). The results largely conform to the Kupiec LR test results. 
4.2.2 EGARCH and the Asymmetric Impact of News 
One weakness of GARCH models is that they do not consider the asymmetric 
impact of news: Negative news (evidenced by price drops) is known to have a greater 
impact on volatility than positive news (evidenced by price increases) of a similar 
magnitude. This is known as the leverage or asymmetric effect. As an illustration, the 
VIX (an equity volatility index) tends to increase in a bearish stock market and 
decrease in a bullish one. One method to address this asymmetric news impact is to 
use an exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model. The EGARCH model differs from 
GARCH in two respects. First, it allows negative unexpected returns to have a greater 
impact on volatility than positive unexpected returns. Second, it allows big news (as 
evidenced by the absolute size of the unexpected return) to have a greater impact than 
in GARCH. EGARCH takes the following form: 
log(ℎ𝑡) = 𝑎 + 𝑐. log(ℎ𝑡−1) + 𝛾.
𝜀𝑡−1
√ℎ𝑡−1
+ 𝑏. [
|𝜀𝑡−1|
√ℎ𝑡−1
− √
2
𝜋
]                         (4.11) 
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where a, b, c, and 𝛾 are constants and 𝛾 is generally negative so that positive return 
shocks will have a lower impact on volatility than negative return shocks. 
Engle and Ng (1993) derive what they call the “news impact curve” of both 
GARCH and EGARCH. This curve measures the way that past returns’ shocks (𝜀𝑡−1) 
are incorporated into current volatility estimates (ht). The news impact curve of the 
GARCH model is symmetric (quadratic) and is centered around 𝜀𝑡=0: Positive and 
negative return shocks of the same magnitude generate the same amount of volatility. 
In contrast, the news impact curve of EGARCH has a greater impact on volatility for 
negative shocks than positive (since γ is typically negative), as expected. Engle and 
Ng (1993) also show that EGARCH allows for large shocks, independently of their 
sign, to have a greater impact than with GARCH.  
Engle and Ng (1993) examine whether some variables observed in the past and 
not included in the volatility model can predict the squared normalized residuals. 
Should these variables predict the squared normalized residuals, the variance model 
would be invalidated. The authors propose four Lagrange multiplier (LM) diagnostic 
tests to examine whether we can predict the squared normalized residuals by past 
variables not included in the linear volatility model: the sign test, the negative sign 
bias test, the positive sign bias test, and a joint test for the three prior effects.  
The sign test examines the impact of positive and negative news on the 
conditional variance not predicted by the linear model. Let 𝑆𝑡−1
−  and be a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 when 𝜀𝑡−1 is negative and 0 otherwise. The test looks at 
whether 𝑆𝑡−1
−  has any predictive power on the standardized squared residuals 𝜀𝑡
2/ℎ0𝑡, 
where ℎ0𝑡 is the unconditional variance under the null hypothesis. The sign test (as 
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well as the three following tests described below) is calculated as a t-ratio using a 
regression model. 
The negative sign bias test looks at whether the linear model explains the 
different effects between small and large negative shocks. This is undertaken by 
looking at 𝑆𝑡−1
− . 𝜀𝑡−1. Similarly, the positive sign bias test considers whether the linear 
model explains the different effects of small and large positive shocks by examining 
𝑆𝑡−1
+ . 𝜀𝑡−1, where 𝑆𝑡−1
+  is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when 𝜀𝑡−1 is positive 
and 0 otherwise. Finally, the joint test looks at the three prior effects simultaneously. 
Annex 3 presents the results of the four tests for our EWMA RiskMetrics 
version of GARCH. In all cases, the null hypothesis that the conditional variance 
follows an EWMA RiskMetrics process cannot be rejected at the 5% confidence level. 
This implies that we have found no evidence that our model failed to account for an 
asymmetric news impact fully. 
4.3 Hedging Analysis Methodology 
In this section, we present our methodology on the time-varying features of 
correlation (estimated with a dynamic conditional correlation (DCC)-GARCH model) 
between conventional bond and sukuk indices, both before and after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. Correlations are a key input in both hedging and asset allocation. 
Hedges require estimates of the correlation of the assets in the hedged portfolio. 
Further, if the correlations are changing, the hedge ratio should be adjusted 
accordingly. The construction of an optimal asset allocation relies on the specification 
of a variance-covariance matrix. 
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The DCC-GARCH model first proposed by Engle in 2002 is based on 
assuming a GARCH volatility process of the second moment of returns. This model 
allows for measuring the level of linear interdependence between markets over time. 
It calculates the time-varying correlations between any two markets. We estimate the 
DCC-GARCH model in a two-step process. In the first step, we compute a time-
varying conditional variance using a multivariate GARCH(1,1) process. In the second 
step, we calculate the time-varying correlation matrix using the standardized residuals 
from the first step’s GARCH model. 
4.3.1 DCC-GARCH Model 
Following Engle (2002), let 𝑦𝑡 = [𝑟𝑖𝑡, … , 𝑟𝑁𝑡]
′ be a 𝑁 × 1 vector of log changes 
in indices of asset markets. The conditional mean equations can then be written as 
 
𝐴(𝐿)𝑟𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡, where 𝜀𝑡⃓𝛺𝑡−1 ~𝑁(0, 𝐻𝑡), and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇            (4.12) 
 
 
where 𝐴 is a matrix, 𝐿 is the lag operator, and 𝜀𝑡 is the vector of innovations based on 
the information set, Ω, that is available at time 𝑡 − 1. The 𝜀𝑡 vector has the following 
conditional variance–covariance matrix:  
           𝐻𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡                                                                                             (4.13) 
 
where 𝐷𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(ℎ𝑖,𝑡
1/2
, … , ℎ𝑁,𝑡
1/2
) is a diagonal matrix that contains conditional 
volatilities and ℎ𝑖,𝑡 can be estimated by using a univariate GARCH(1,1) model. The R 
matrix is written as 𝑅𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑄𝑡)
−
1
2𝑄𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑄𝑡)
−
1
2. The time-varying conditional 
correlations between conventional bonds and sukuk are elements in the time varying 
R matrix and  are computed as 
 
          𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗,𝑡 √𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑞𝑗𝑗,𝑡⁄  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗                                                        (4.14)  
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We focus on these conditional correlations in this analysis. The 𝑄𝑡 ≡ 𝑞𝑖𝑗,𝑡 
matrix is an 𝑁 square symmetric positive-definite matrix that is obtained from the 
estimated univariate GARCH models of the variables and given by the following form: 
 
       𝑄𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)?̅? + 𝛼𝑢𝑡?́?𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑄𝑡−1                                               (4.15)  
 
where 𝑢𝑡 = (𝑢1𝑡, … , 𝑢𝑁𝑡)
′ is an 𝑁 × 1 vector of the standardized residuals of the first-
step estimation, 𝑄 is an 𝑁 × 𝑁 unconditional variance matrix of 𝑢𝑡, and 𝛼 and 𝛽 are 
non-negative scalar parameters with a sum of less than unity that capture the effects of 
prior shocks and dynamic conditional correlations on current correlations. 
When the restriction 𝑎 =  𝛽 = 0 is imposed, 𝑄 reduces to the constant 
conditional correlation (CCC) model. The conditional correlation coefficient  
𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 can now be expressed as follows: 
            𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 =
qt
ij
√qt
iiqt
jj
, ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗                                                                           (4.16)  
 
where 𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 indicates the direction and strength correlation between asset markets. If 
the estimated 𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is positive and statistically significant, the correlation between asset 
returns is rising and moving in the same direction or vice versa.  
Finally, the parameters in the multivariate DCC-GARCH model are estimated 
by using the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) method of Bollerslev and Wooldridge 
(1992) that takes into account the fact that a joint multivariate normal distribution is 
violated often for financial series.2 We employ Ljung–Box (LB) statistics for the 
                                                 
2 We use the quasi-Newton method of Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb, and Shanno’s (BFGS) algorithm 
with a convergence criterion of 0.00001. We estimate the multivariate DCC-GARCH model with 
WinRats 9.0 software.  
94 
 
 
 
squared standardized residuals to determine the adequacy of the estimated model of 
the conditional variances.  
4.3.2 Hedge Ratios and Optimal Portfolio Weights 
The estimated results derived from the multivariate DCC-GARCH model can 
be used to construct trading strategies that minimize unwanted risk without reducing 
expected returns for holding a two-asset portfolio. This study analyzes two trading 
strategies necessary to determine active portfolio risk management of bond stock 
prices with sukuk. More specifically, we compute the time-varying optimal hedge 
ratios and optimal portfolio weights. Following Kroner and Sultan (1993), we first 
consider the hedging problem as determining the rate at which a long position of one 
US dollar in one market (say market 𝑖) could be hedged by taking short positions in 
the other market (say market 𝑗) that minimize risk while keeping the same expected 
returns. Thus, for a holding portfolio of two market returns, the minimizing problem 
is given by3 
min
𝛽𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑝𝑡) = min
𝛽𝑡
 {𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑡
2 × 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑗𝑡) + 2𝛽𝑡 × 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝑟𝑗𝑡)}           (4.17) 
 
By solving the risk-minimizing problem (by the first-order and second-order 
derivatives of 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑝𝑡)), the time-varying optimal hedge ratio (𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ ) can be derived 
as  
𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝑟𝑗𝑡)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑗𝑡)
=
ℎ𝑖𝑗,𝑡
ℎ𝑗𝑗,𝑡
                                                                                           (4.18) 
 
                                                 
3 This model specification agrees with most prior studies (Basher & Sadorsky, 2016; Bessler et al., 
2016; Lin et al., 2014; Lin & Li, 2015; Sadorsky, 2012, 2014; among many others) on DCC hedging. 
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Alternatively, conditional volatilities from the DCC model can be used to 
construct an optimal portfolio that minimizes the portfolio risk without lowering the 
portfolio expected returns. Following the methods of Hammoudeh et al. (2014) and 
Kroner and Ng (1998), among others, the optimal weight (𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ ) for two assets is  
𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ =
ℎ𝑗𝑗,𝑡 − ℎ𝑖𝑗,𝑡
ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡 − 2ℎ𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + ℎ𝑗𝑗,𝑡
, with 𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ = {
0,  𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ < 0 
𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ ,  𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ ≤ 1
1,  𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ > 1
       (4.19) 
 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗  is weight of the asset 𝑖 in a one US dollar portfolio at time 𝑡, ℎ𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the 
conditional covariance between 𝑖 and 𝑗 at time 𝑡; ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡 and ℎ𝑗𝑗,𝑡 are the conditional 
variances of 𝑖 and 𝑗 respectively. The weight of asset 𝑗 in the considered portfolio is 
computed by (1 − 𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ ). 
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Chapter 5: Data Description  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the data used in this thesis for individual companies 
and indices. The chapter first describes the data. With regard to individual companies, 
a brief description of each company’s business and industry is followed by explaining 
the actual conventional bond and sukuk issues used in the analysis. The daily prices 
for conventional bonds and sukuk are obtained from Datastream. With regard to the 
indices (the Dow Jones Sukuk Index (DJSI) and the Dow Jones Corporate Bond 
Index), we introduce the indices’ composition and the computing methodology. 
We then proceed to introduce market risk analytic approaches and qualitatively 
describe the data prices and returns. 
5.2 The Dow Jones Sukuk Index  
Following the growing popularity of sukuk, Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) Dow 
Jones, one of the leading global providers of financial information, has developed an 
index that focuses only on Shari’ah-compliant bonds. The DJSI helps to measure the 
performance of sukuk at the global level. The DJSI is a market-value-weighted index 
that comprises US dollar-denominated instruments that have been screened for 
Shari’ah compliance in accordance with measures undertaken in the DJIMI.  
For a finance instrument to be considered eligible under the DJSI and DJIMI, 
it must pass through industry and financial ration screens. Under the industry screen, 
the primary business must be halal; thus, companies dealing with alcohol, 
entertainment, weapons and defense, tobacco, and conventional financial services are 
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considered ineligible. Under the financial ratio screen, the following elements must be 
less than 33%. 
1. Total debt divided by trailing 24-month average market capitalization. 
2. The sum of a company’s cash and interest-bearing securities divided by trailing 24-
month average market capitalization.  
3. Account receivables divided by trailing 24-month average market capitalization. 
A unique aspect of the DJSI is that it provides a benchmark for investors 
seeking exposure to fixed-income investments that comply with Shari’ah. For bonds 
to be considered eligible for inclusion under the DJSI, they must not only be Shari’ah 
compliant but must also meet the standards that are issued by the AAOIFI.  
The earliest base date for sukuk is September 30, 2005 when the index was 
first created. As of 2012, the index contained 39 instruments, with a combined market 
value of US$32.6 billion (source: S&P DJ). The stated coupons carry fixed rates and 
floating rates with a minimum maturity of one year. In most cases, maturity is much 
longer: the MacCaulay duration of the index is 4.12. Other details about the sukuk in 
the index are that the minimum size outstanding is US$200 million and the minimum 
quality is BBB (the breakdown is as follows: AAA US$2.9 billion; AA US$8.1 billion; 
A US$14 billion; and BBB US$7.5 billion). Calculation frequency is daily and 
components must be bullet or make-whole structures. We use the total return (ex-
reinvestment) version of the index (Bloomberg ticker DJSUKTXR).  
The use of DJSI in this thesis is mainly because of its comprehensive nature. 
Sukuk in this index are from diverse countries and exchanges such as London, 
Frankfurt, and Dubai. The daily calculation frequency used for DJSI also makes it 
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possible to identify subtle changes in prices and returns, and consequently the 
associated market risk.  
5.2.1 Features of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index 
The creation of the DJIMI in 1999 was a major step in the development of 
Islamic finance. According to Siddiqui (2007, p. 496), it represents “the first 
institutional approach by a Western index provider (the Dow Jones Index) to publish 
an index with a methodology that applies Shari’ah screens to define a universe of 
Shari’ah-compliant stock in the global marketplace.” In that same year, another major 
Western index, the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE), also engaged in creating 
a similar index, namely the Global Islamic Index Series (GIIS), reflecting the growing 
interest in the emerging world of Islamic finance. 
In principle, the purpose of DJIMI was to define the borders of a universe of 
Islamic finance in which components meet specific Shari’ah-based laws and to 
recognize the growing need for investments that are compliant with these laws. 
However, the creators of DJIMI were also aware that, after 400 years in which 
conventional finance dominated the world of economics and finance, identifying 
systems characterized by pure Islamic finance is almost impossible. Accordingly, the 
creation of DJIMI represented a quantum leap toward the globalization of Islamic 
finance and was the starting point of a long journey of creating and defining the 
universe of Islamic finance. 
At the most fundamental level, the DJIMI and other Islamic indices aim to 
ensure that the principles of Islamic Shari’ah are recognized and implemented by the 
businesses listed in the index. In this regard, El-Khamlichi, Sarkar, Arouri, and Teulon 
(2014) identify five major principles. The first is the principle of PLS. In conventional 
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finance, investors are interested in sharing profits while avoiding losses. In Islamic 
finance, however, the sharing of profit and loss is essential on the basis of the 
recognition that nothing can be guaranteed and that risk taking is about the sharing of 
both positive and negative outcomes. The second principle is the prohibition of 
interest, which is a fundamental principle in Islamic law. The third principle is asset-
backing, which essentially means that financing operations must be backed by assets 
to reduce risks, maximize trustworthiness, and ensure that business growth is founded 
on solid grounds. The fourth principle is the prohibition of excessive uncertainty; 
namely, extremely high uncertainty that could be potentially harmful to investors, 
regardless of how promising or lucrative the outcomes may be. This principle is also 
consistent with Islamic principles and teachings that prohibit Muslims from taking 
unnecessary and potentially destructive risks. The last principle is the exclusion of 
sectors that are inconsistent with fundamental Islamic teachings and ways of life. 
These specific sectors include industries that deal with the production, processing, and 
trade in pork, alcohol, tobacco, weapons, and defense, in addition to entertainment 
(e.g., casinos and music) and conventional finance; namely, all financial industries or 
businesses whose operations are based on interest.  
From its inception, DJIMI was intended to maintain the highest and most 
stringent standards and quality criteria in management, supervision, and performance, 
especially as it was expected to be perceived as the leading authority on the definition 
and development of the universe of Islamic finance. This is evident, for example, in 
the advanced institutional approach and the level of commitment exhibited by the Dow 
Jones management toward the supervision of operations. For example, the GIIS relies 
on outsourced supervision from a variety of Islamic supervisory boards and sources; 
however, the DJIMI took the unconventional and costly step of creating and 
100 
 
 
 
maintaining its own Shari’ah supervisory board that reflects Shari’ah views drawn 
from several major Islamic countries (Siddiqui, 2007). This unusual step by a Western 
institution had several purposes. First, it was intended to reflect the high level of 
commitment of the Dow Jones to Islamic finance. Second, it sought to highlight the 
recognition of Shari’ah supervision as a fundamental and vital aspect of Islamic 
financing. Third, the plan was to institutionalize the processes of screening and 
compliance and to ensure that high and consistent criteria and standards were 
developed and maintained within the index itself to avoid any conflicts that could arise 
when relying on several external supervisory boards.  
The supervisory board of DJIMI is responsible not only for screening and 
selecting the companies represented in the index, but also for ensuring continuous 
oversight on a permanent level. However, the screening and component selection 
processes are taken to be among the most critical functions of the supervisory board. 
The process of screening and selection is conducted at two levels; namely, the primary 
business level and the financial ratios level. 
According to Siddiqui (2007), the process of screening and selection at the 
primary business level is simple and direct, and is mainly intended to confirm that the 
businesses that comprise the index satisfy the most fundamental codes of Islamic 
Shari’ah in terms of compliance. This implies the exclusion of businesses that operate 
or that may be associated with the industries that are either excluded or that Islam 
forbids, such as industries that involve pork, alcohol, and un-Islamic entertainment. At 
the financial ratio level, the main objective of screening is to ensure compliance with 
the financial principles and criteria of Shari’ah, such as the avoidance of excessive 
risk, observing the PLS principle, and the prohibition of interest. For example, among 
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the criteria that must be observed is that a company’s board of directors must have an 
explicitly “judiciary duty of care and loyalty to examine, entertain and implement 
decisions in the best interests of the company that will enhance shareholder value” 
(Siddiqui, 2007, p. 14). 
5.3 The Dow Jones Corporate Bond Index 
Our proxy for the performance of conventional bonds is the Dow Jones Equal 
Weight US-issued Corporate Bond Index. The index comprises 96 recently issued 
investment-grade bonds spanning a variety of maturities.  
The market value of the index components is US$209 billion (financials US$96 
billion, industrials US$97 billion, and utilities US$16 billion) while the modified 
duration of the index is around 7.5 (compared with 4.1 for the DJSI index). 
5.4 Companies Included in the Portfolio Market Risk Analysis: Conventional 
and Sukuk Bonds  
In order to investigate the possible existence of a difference(s) between the 
market risk of sukuk and that of conventional bonds, we selected pairs of sukuk and 
conventional securities with the same characteristics (same issuer, rating, and 
maturity). We also selected only those bonds (Islamic and conventional) that have 
complete data for 2008 to 2013. Thus, the final sample included the Bank of London 
and the Middle East (BLME), MAF, Petronas, Rasmala, Tamweel, Dubai, and DP 
World.  
In order to compute and aggregate possible risks in the sukuk market, relevant 
data were collected from seven companies. These included Bank of London and the 
Middle East (BLME), MAF, Petronas, Rasmala, Tamweel, Dubai, and DP World.  
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5.4.1 BLME 
BLME is a well-established Shari’ah-compliant bank based in the UK. Since 
its inception in 2006, the bank has specialized in offering financial services in three 
core areas: corporate, wealth management, and treasury. We use two BLME funds in 
our analysis: BLME Asset Management High Yield US and BLME Asset 
Management Shari’ah Dollar Income. Note that January 2011 is the start date of the 
BLME data. 
5.4.2 MAF 
 MAF Global Securities Limited is a debt-issuing vehicle based in the Cayman 
Islands. The parent company is the Majib Al Futtaim Group, an Emirati holding 
company that owns and operates shopping malls and leisure centers. The bond used in 
the analysis is the 5¼% 2019 bullet issue, while the sukuk is the 5.85% 2017. Both 
issues originated in 2012. The exchange markets in consideration are Frankfurt for the 
conventional bond and London for the sukuk.  
5.4.3 Petronas  
Petronas is a state-owned fully integrated energy company that is based in 
Malaysia but has a global presence. The company’s conventional bond under 
consideration is the 5¼% 2019, issued as a 10-year fixed coupon bond in August 2009 
and listed on the Frankfurt exchange. The sukuk is a five-year 4¼% fixed coupon bond 
that was also issued in 2009 and matured in Aug 2014.  
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5.4.4 Rasmala Investment Bank  
Rasmala is an investment management company established in 1999 and based 
in the UK. Two funds are used as our proxies for conventional bonds and sukuk: 
Rasmala GCC Fixed Income and Rasmala Global Sukuk. 
5.4.5 Tamweel Funding 
Tamweel Funding Limited, a subsidiary of Tamweel PJSC, was incorporated 
in 2009 and is currently based in Saint Helier, the Channel Islands. The conventional 
bond under consideration is a convertible five-year fixed coupon bond issued in 
January 2008. The Tamweel stock lost 85% of its value in November 2008 and Dubai 
Islamic Finance acquired a majority stake in 2010. Thus, the equity option component 
of the convertible can largely be ignored and the instrument considered a conventional 
bond. The Tamweel sukuk was issued as a floating rate bond in 2008 in the Dubai 
Financial Market. This five-year bond matured in 2013.  
5.4.6 Dubai Department of Finance  
Bonds issued by the Dubai Department of Finance (DOF) were also included 
in the portfolio. The conventional bond used in the analysis is a 4.9% fixed coupon 
bond that was issued as a five-year bond in 2012 (the maturity date was May 2, 2017). 
The sukuk used is a floating rate five-year bond issued in 2009 in the London 
Exchange. 
5.4.7 DP World  
DP World Limited is a company that owns ports and terminals worldwide. In 
2007, the company issued a 30-year straight fixed coupon bond (6¼% 2037). A sukuk 
in the form of a straight 10-year 6.85% fixed coupon bond was also issued in 2007. 
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One should note the significant difference in duration between the conventional bond 
and the sukuk under consideration for this company. Other things being equal, one 
would expect greater price and returns volatility for the conventional bond. 
5.5 Market Risk Analysis  
5.5.1 Price and Returns of Conventional Bonds Compared with Sukuk  
In quantitatively evaluating the market risk associated with sukuk relative to 
conventional bonds, price and return data will be used extensively in further chapters. 
The present section qualitatively describes the data and the associated graphs.  
5.5.1.1 BLME’s Prices and Returns  
 
Figure 5.1: BLME’s prices and returns 
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Figure 5.1 shows BLME’s prices and returns for the conventional bond and the 
sukuk first issued in 2011. Notably, prices for the sukuk fund remain relatively stable 
through the date of issue to maturity with the increase being gradual. In contrast, 
BLME’s bond prices have significant variations through the period to maturity. The 
volatility of returns is clearly greater for the conventional bond than for the sukuk.  
5.5.1.2 MAF’s Prices and Returns  
 
Figure 5.2: MAF’s prices and returns  
The volatility of returns for the conventional bond and for the sukuk exhibit 
relatively similar trends, with increases and decreases occurring at almost similar 
times. This similarity in returns movement in part suggests that market factors may 
have relatively similar impacts on the prices of the two instruments. One important 
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comment is that the observed spikes in the sukuk returns are likely to be the result of 
illiquidity and/or imperfections in the data as shown in Figure 5.2. 
5.5.1.3 Petronas’ Prices and Returns  
 
Figure 5.3: Petronas’ prices and returns  
Figure 5.3 shows that over the three-year period ending in 2013, the price for 
Petronas’ conventional bond remains consistently above the company’s sukuk price 
(from a common base of 100 for both bonds at the start). It is, however, apparent that 
the higher bond returns are associated with a greater volatility level.  
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5.5.1.4 Rasmala’s Prices and Returns  
 
Figure 5.4: Rasmala’s prices and returns  
Based on the two-year data, a relatively similar trend in price movement is 
evident, thereby suggesting that the prices of the conventional bond and the sukuk 
respond in a similar manner to market conditions. Rasmala’s conventional bond also 
yields greater returns compared with the sukuk but is more volatile (Figure 5.4).  
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5.5.1.5 Tamweel’s Prices and Returns  
 
Figure 5.5: Tamweel’s prices and returns  
During the four-year period ending 2014, the conventional bond and the sukuk 
issued by Tamweel exhibit similar price movements over the first one-and-a-half 
years. Thereafter, a higher price for the conventional bond is notable while the sukuk 
remains stable. It is worth noting the number of “no price movement” days for the 
sukuk. These are more likely to be the result of illiquidity (Figure 5.5). This issue will 
be explored in the next chapter.  
109 
 
 
 
5.5.1.6 Dubai’s Prices and Returns  
 
Figure 5.6: Dubai’s prices and returns 
A cursory look at the price data shown in Figure 5.6 that the performance of 
the sukuk far exceeds that of the conventional bond. As such, the sukuk is better at 
withstanding market conditions compared with the bond. Further, the sukuk market 
for the Dubai Department of Finance is also less volatile compared with the bond 
market, which experienced highly positive and negative returns particularly in 2012 
and 2013. 
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5.5.1.7 DP World’s Prices and Returns  
 
Figure 5.7: DP World’s prices and returns 
Figure 5.7 explains the qualitative and graphical analyses of the prices and 
returns of DP World’s conventional bond and sukuk are inconclusive because 
relatively similar movements are observed during the seven-year period. To some 
extent, this is surprising given the significant difference of duration between the 
conventional bond (30 years) and the sukuk (five years). 
5.5.2 Overall Price and Return Comparison for All Companies  
From the graphical analysis of prices and returns for the seven companies under 
consideration, high correlations between sukuk and conventional bonds are evident 
only for a few companies such as Tamweel and DP World. The lack of perfect 
correlations between sukuk and conventional bonds means that a reduction in VaR is 
expected. In other words, it is likely that the inclusion of sukuk as part of a portfolio 
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could lead to diversification and consequently a reduction in VaR. Another notable 
aspect pertaining to conventional bonds and sukuk is that the latter are in most cases 
less volatile in terms of significant variations in prices and returns. This finding 
indicates that sukuk markets are relatively insulated to changes in interest rates when 
compared with conventional bond markets, possibly owing to their specific 
characteristics (among others, a greater reliance on the performance of the financed 
asset).  
5.6 Descriptive Statistics: Minimum, Maximum, Mean, and Standard Deviation  
Table 5.1 contains the descriptive statistics for bonds and sukuk over the entire 
sample period. DP World has the most volatile returns (with a standard deviation of 
0.77%, a lowest return of -11.97%, and a highest return of +8.813%). The sukuk 
market was also marked by substantial variations for some of the companies. DP 
World records the largest negative return at -10.77% and, at the same time, the highest 
return at a maximum of 8.81% (with a standard deviation of 0.68%). Comparatively, 
sukuk recorded relatively lower standard deviations than bonds, except for MAF. 
Thus, the sukuk market appears to be relatively stable while the bond market has high 
levels of market volatility.  
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics bond and sukuk returns (%) 
 Conventional Bonds Sukuk 
Min. Mean Max. Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Mean Max. Standard 
Deviation 
BLME -0.59 0.01 0.89 0.07 -0.17 0 0.24 0.023 
MAF -1.3 0.01 0.44 0.13 -3.58 0.003 3.44 0.41 
Petronas -4.41 0.004 6.6 0.26 -2.83 0 3.24 0.18 
Rasmala -1.22 0.01 0.61 0.11 -1.27 0.002 0.32 0.06 
Tamweel -10.63 0.01 15.91 1.18 -6.9 0.01 14.31 0.89 
Dubai -4.61 0.01 6.91 0.51 -2.99 0.01 6.22 0.39 
DP World -11.97 0.003 8.813 0.77 -10.77 0.002 9.43 0.68 
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5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the data that will be used throughout the rest of this 
thesis for sukuk and conventional bonds, and for individual companies and Dow Jones 
indices. We have also presented the qualitative prices and returns associated with the 
data. The next chapter focuses on a quantitative, comparative assessment of the risk–
return characteristics of sukuk and conventional bonds.  
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Chapter 6: Empirical Results 
6.1 Introduction  
In order to model the returns distribution, the following traditional techniques 
are used: (1) stress testing (scenario analysis); (2) the parametric technique (analytic 
based); (3) Monte Carlo simulation; and (4) historical simulation (Al-Zoubi & 
Maghyereh, 2007). 
However, there are certain Islamic finance indices in the capital market that 
could be utilized for the calculation and measurement of sukuk risks. The DJCSI is 
formulated to evaluate the performance of global Islamic fixed-earnings investments. 
The overall approach from the set of Citigroup fixed earnings indices and the DJIMI 
approach for inspecting investments for Shari’ah compliance are followed by the 
DJCSI. This index could be benchmarked by traders in sukuk. US dollar-denominated 
investment-grade sukuk issued within the international market that have been verified 
as Shari’ah compliant are also included in the index. In the Islamic indices, the usual 
return is an expected 83.94%. However, there is a more sensible 8.45% in the five-
year return of the Islamic indices (Al-Zoubi & Maghyereh, 2007). 
One problem with the variance–covariance (VCV) method is that it assumes 
homoskedasticity (constant variance over time). There is ample evidence of volatility 
clustering. The GARCH method allows for heteroscedasticity and may yield better 
results. We implement GARCH and EWMA RiskMetrics methods.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 presents and 
analyses the results and section 6.3 summarizes the findings. 
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6.1 Results 
6.2.1 Company-level results 
Table 6.1 presents the results for VCV and historical simulation (HS) VaR 
calculations at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels for the full sample and the 
most recent year of data. It should be noted here that the lack of secondary market 
activity for some of the securities poses a significant challenge to computing HS VaR. 
As an example, Rasmala’s conventional bond has so few actual price movements (non-
zero returns) that, at the 90% level, HS VaR is 0. The sample size is 443 observations, 
but there are only 35 strictly negative returns; hence a VaR of 0. Likewise, Tamweel’s 
sukuk has too few price movements to make the 90% and 95% HS VaR deviate from 
0 while using the full sample. The one-year HS VaR for Tamweel’s conventional bond 
and sukuk cannot be computed because of no price movements in the prior year. The 
VaR of 0 is not indicative of a lack of risk; it is the consequence of a lack of liquidity 
in the secondary market for these securities. 
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Table 6.1: Bond VaR vs. Sukuk VaR 
 Full Sample Over One Year Full Sample Over One Year 
90% 95% 99% 90% 95% 99% 90% 95% 99% 90% 95% 99% 
BLME Bond VaR 0.06% 0.12% 0.42% 0.09% 0.15% 0.29% 0.22% 0.28% 0.39% 0.16% 0.21% 0.30% 
Sukuk VaR 0.02% 0.04% 0.15% 0.03% 0.04% 0.12% 0.07% 0.09% 0.13% 0.05% 0.06% 0.09% 
DP World Bond VaR 0.87% 1.43% 5.51% 0.77% 1.17% 5.33% 2.02% 2.59% 3.66% 1.88% 2.41% 3.41% 
Sukuk VaR 0.58% 0.99% 2.29% 0.23% 0.34% 2.15% 1.69% 2.17% 3.07% 0.57% 0.73% 1.03% 
Dubai Bond VaR 0.36% 0.72% 1.28% 0.12% 0.24% 1.59% 0.53% 0.68% 0.96% 0.47% 0.60% 0.85% 
Sukuk VaR 0.23% 0.29% 0.56% 0.19% 0.26% 0.53% 0.26% 0.34% 0.48% 0.27% 0.34% 0.48% 
MAF Bond VaR 0.26% 0.42% 0.79% 0.37% 0.50% 0.84% 0.39% 0.50% 0.70% 0.46% 0.59% 0.84% 
Sukuk VaR 0.19% 0.47% 1.98% 0.14% 0.33% 1.30% 1.20% 1.54% 2.17% 0.63% 0.81% 1.15% 
Petronas Bond VaR 0.42% 0.64% 1.23% 0.36% 0.50% 0.81% 0.84% 1.08% 1.53% 0.42% 0.55% 0.77% 
Sukuk VaR 0.21% 0.37% 0.77% 0.06% 0.16% 1.13% 0.54% 0.69% 0.97% 0.35% 0.45% 0.64% 
Rasmala Bond VaR 0.00% 0.08% 1.14% 0.00% 0.12% 1.02% 0.35% 0.45% 0.63% 0.39% 0.50% 0.70% 
Sukuk VaR 0.02% 0.12% 0.42% 0.07% 0.13% 0.80% 0.25% 0.32% 0.46% 0.25% 0.32% 0.45% 
Tamweel* Bond VaR 0.27% 0.97% 3.32% N/A N/A N/A 1.51% 1.93% 2.73% N/A N/A N/A 
Sukuk VaR 0.00% 0.00% 1.73% N/A N/A N/A 1.14% 1.46% 2.07% N/A N/A N/A 
Index 
Pre-crisis 
Bond VaR 0.32% 0.44% 0.73% 0.43% 0.70% 0.93% 0.34% 0.43% 0.61% 0.45% 0.58% 0.82% 
Sukuk VaR 0.01% 0.06% 0.43% 0.09% 0.19% 0.54% 0.12% 0.16% 0.22% 0.18% 0.23% 0.32% 
Index Post-crisis Bond VaR 0.35% 0.56% 0.98% 0.38% 0.51% 0.79% 0.46% 0.59% 0.84% 0.39% 0.50% 0.71% 
Sukuk VaR 0.11% 0.18% 0.50% 0.13% 0.18% 0.35% 0.79% 1.02% 1.44% 0.19% 0.24% 0.34% 
*No price movement in the last year 
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Table 6.1: The conventional bonds’ VaR compared with the sukuk’s VaRs we 
can see in Table 6.1, at the 99% level, HS VaR rises significantly (more than the 
normal distribution would suggest). This may be due to data quirks rather than actual 
risk: while implementing HS at the 99% level with just 250 observations, the third 
biggest loss (if we are conservative) is the VaR, meaning that just a couple of outliers 
can make a large difference. 
For each issuer’s conventional bond and sukuk, we compare, at the 90%, 95%, 
and 99% confidence intervals and for both the whole sample and one year of data, the 
results for the VCV and HS VaR. Should the observed returns be normal, the results 
should be identical (since the VCV standard deviation is computed historically using 
the same returns as used for HS). Indeed, the results are markedly different because of 
the non-normality of returns. Table 6.2 presents the ratio of VCV to HS VaR for all 
issuers and for both the full sample and the most recent year of data. 
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Table 6.2: Ratio of VCV to HS VaR: full sample and one year 
 Full Sample One Year 
90% 95% 99% 90% 95% 99% 
BLME Sukuk 3.27 2.25 0.83 1.60 1.40 0.72 
Bond 3.71 2.27 0.93 1.91 1.37 1.03 
DP World Sukuk 2.94 2.20 1.34 2.42 2.14 0.48 
Bond 2.31 1.81 0.66 2.44 2.05 0.64 
Dubai Sukuk 1.18 1.19 0.87 1.42 1.34 0.91 
Bond 1.47 0.93 0.74 3.79 2.45 0.53 
MAF Sukuk 6.21 3.26 1.10 4.55 2.49 0.88 
Bond 1.51 1.17 0.89 1.25 1.18 1.00 
Petronas Sukuk 2.53 1.86 1.27 6.07 2.79 0.56 
Bond 2.02 1.70 1.24 1.17 1.10 0.95 
Rasmala Sukuk 12.61 2.62 1.09 3.62 2.34 0.56 
Bond N/A* 5.80 0.56 N/A* 4.28 0.69 
Tamweel Sukuk N/A* N/A* 1.20 N/A* N/A* N/A* 
Bond 5.58 1.99 0.82 N/A* N/A* N/A* 
Index 
Pre-crisis 
Sukuk 12.56 2.64 0.52 2.01 1.19 0.60 
Bond 1.06 0.99 0.84 1.05 0.83 0.89 
Index 
Post-crisis 
Sukuk 7.30 5.57 2.89 1.43 1.35 0.96 
Bond 1.33 1.05 0.86 1.04 1.00 0.90 
* HR VaR is 0 
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At the 90% confidence level, all the VCV VaRs of the conventional bonds and 
sukuk are higher than HS VaR for both the full sample and the one-year sample. The 
ratio of VCV to HS VaR ranges between 12.61 (Rasmala’s sukuk, full sample) and 
1.17 (Petronas’ conventional bond, one-year sample). 
At the 95% confidence level, all the VCV VaRs of the conventional bonds and 
sukuk are higher than HS VaR for both the full sample and the one-year sample, except 
for one occurrence (Dubai’s conventional bond, full sample, 0.93). The ratio of VCV 
to the HS VaR ranges from 0.93 to 5.80 (Rasmala’s conventional bond, full sample). 
At the 99% confidence level, 25 out of 34 ratios are smaller than 1. The values range 
from 0.48 (DP World’s sukuk, one-year sample) to 1.34 (DP World’s sukuk, full 
sample). 
The fact that the VCV/HS ratios differ significantly from 1 indicates the non-
normality of returns. The fact that the ratio is higher at the 90% confidence level and 
relatively lower at the 99% confidence level points to a distribution that implies that 
returns are clustered around the mean and outliers are more numerous than predicted 
by the normal distribution. Later on, we provide further evidence of this issue. 
One problem in computing VaR for the conventional bonds and sukuk in our 
data set is the lack of secondary market trading activity. A simple way to provide 
evidence of illiquidity is to consider the number of days with no price change. While 
it is of course possible that no price change on a trading day indicates that the perceived 
fundamental value has not changed, it is reasonable to assume that a high number of 
no price movements is a good indicator of illiquidity. Table 6.3 provides, for each 
security, the number of no trading days. The impact of such illiquidity on the results 
will be discussed later. Note that in the case of the sukuk indices, the number of no 
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trading days may be misleading. Over September 30, 2005 to September 12, 2008, our 
data set contains 1080 data points for the conventional bonds and only 759 for the 
sukuk. The remaining 321 days can be attributed largely to a lack of secondary activity. 
Table 6.3: Evidence of illiquidity: days with no price movements 
 No Price 
Movement 
Sample 
Size 
Percentage of No 
Movement 
BLME Bond 408 802 50.87% 
Sukuk 417 802 52.00% 
DP World Bond 57 1797   3.17% 
Sukuk 85 1797   4.73% 
Dubai Bond 168 550 30.55% 
Sukuk 49 550   8.91% 
MAF Bond 46 505   9.11% 
Sukuk 87 505 17.23% 
Petronas Bond 123 1244   9.89% 
Sukuk 189 1244 15.19% 
Rasmala Bond 443 549 80.69% 
Sukuk 356 549 64.85% 
Tamweel Bond 606 1144 52.97% 
Sukuk 1079 1144 94.32% 
Index 
Pre-crisis 
Bond 0 1080   0.00% 
Sukuk 0 769   0.00% 
Index 
Post-crisis 
Bond 1 1812   0.06% 
Sukuk 0 1427   0.00% 
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For each issuer, the VaRs of the conventional bond and the sukuk are computed 
and compared. Table  6.4 presents the results for each issuer and for both the whole 
sample and one year of data. With regard to Tamweel, only the results for the whole 
sample are presented because there is no price movement for either the conventional 
bond or the sukuk over the prior year. Table 6.4 presents indicators that show, for each 
issuer and sample size, whether the VaR of the conventional bond (“B”) or that of the 
sukuk (“S”) is the highest. Of the 102 comparisons, the conventional bond has the 
highest VaR 83 times, while the sukuk has the highest VaR 19 times. Of these 19 
occurrences, nine relate to MAF and four to Rasmala. In the Rasmala case, the 
conventional bond’s illiquidity is high (443 out of 549 observations are 0) and also 
higher than for the sukuk (356 out of 549). With regard to the conventional bond, only 
35 returns are strictly negative, meaning that the 99% confidence level of the HS VaR 
is 0 and the 95% confidence level of the VaR is very low (0.077%, compared with a 
standard deviation of 0.273%). Similar observations can be made over a one-year 
horizon.  
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Table 6.4: Bond Var vs. Sukuk Var- Bond VaR highest(B)/ Sukuk VaR highest (S) 
 Historical Simulation Variance–Covariance  
Full Sample Over One Year Full Sample Over One Year 
90% 95% 99% 90% 95% 99% 90% 95% 99% 90% 95% 99% Total B Total S 
BLME B B B B B B B B B B B B 12 0 
DP World B B B B B B B B B B B B 12 0 
Dubai B B B S S B B B B B B B 10 2 
MAF B S S B B S S S S S S S 3 9 
Petronas B B B B B S B B B B B B 11 1 
Rasmala S S B S S B B B B B B B 8 4 
Tamweel* B B B N/A N/A N/A B B B N/A N/A N/A 6 0 
Index Pre-
crisis 
B B B B B B B B B B B B 12 0 
Index Post-
crisis 
B B B B B B S S S B B B 9 3 
 83 19 
*No price movement in the last year 
123 
 
 
 
The VCV method uses historical volatility (as opposed to implied volatility) 
calculated with the same data used for HS. Should returns be normal (in a statistical 
sense), the results would be the same for both the HS and VCV method. This is not 
what we observe in Table 6.5, which presents the ratios of HS to VCV VaR. Thus, we 
provide evidence of the non-normality of log returns, looking first at the skewness and 
kurtosis of the observed distributions, providing histograms as evidence. We then 
compare the number of outliers to what we would expect should the returns be normal. 
Table 6.5: Logreturns Skewness and Kurtosis – Full Sample 
 Bond Sukuk 
BLME Skewness 2.02 1.31 
Kurtosis 42.87 29.35 
DP World Skewness -1.92 -4.97 
Kurtosis 72.41 178.77 
Dubai Skewness -0.12 0.37 
Kurtosis 7.96 3.61 
MAF Skewness -1.96 -0.11 
Kurtosis 20.46 46.21 
Petronas Skewness 6.86 1.55 
Kurtosis 276.34 162.07 
Rasmala Skewness -3.00 -7.52 
Kurtosis 32.29 102.46 
Tamweel Skewness 3.77 6.68 
Kurtosis 76.18 112.21 
Index pre-crisis Skewness -0.12 -3.59 
Kurtosis 2.11 40.57 
Index post-crisis Skewness -0.48 -9.50 
Kurtosis 7.39 321.72 
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Table 6.6: The full sample’s log returns for Skewness and Kurtosis 
 Bond Sukuk 
BLME Skewness 2.02 1.31 
Kurtosis 42.87 29.35 
DP World Skewness -1.92 -4.97 
Kurtosis 72.41 178.77 
Dubai Skewness -0.12 0.37 
Kurtosis 7.96 3.61 
MAF Skewness -1.96 -0.11 
Kurtosis 20.46 46.21 
Petronas Skewness 6.86 1.55 
Kurtosis 276.34 162.07 
Rasmala Skewness -3.00 -7.52 
Kurtosis 32.29 102.46 
Tamweel Skewness 3.77 6.68 
Kurtosis 76.18 112.21 
Index Pre-crisis Skewness -0.12 -3.59 
Kurtosis 2.11 40.57 
Index Post-crisis Skewness -0.48 -9.50 
Kurtosis 7.39 321.72 
 
Table 6.6 reveals that as further evidence of non-normality we note that, for 
each conventional bond and sukuk, the number of (negative) log returns is more than 
three standard deviations away from the mean return; thus, we divide the number by 
the total number of returns. This frequency of “3σ outliers” is then compared with the 
frequency predicted by the normal distribution (0.135%).  
Table 6.7 summarizes the results. For all conventional bonds and sukuk, the 
number of outliers is higher than predicted by the normal distribution. The ratio of 
actual to normal outliers is as high as 12.14 for Rasmala’s conventional bond and has 
a minimum value of 1.79 for Petronas’ sukuk. 
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Table 6.7: Actual compared with normal frequencies of returns less than three standard deviations away from the mean 
  Bond Sukuk  Bond Sukuk 
Sample Size Log Returns <-3 σ Normal Ratio Actual/Normal 
BLME 802 7 8 1.083 6.465 7.389 
DP World 1797 21 10 2.426 8.656 4.122 
Dubai 550 6 4 0.743 8.081 5.387 
MAF 505 4 5 0.682 5.867 7.334 
Petronas 1244 4 3 1.679 2.382 1.786 
Rasmala 549 9 5 0.741 12.143 6.746 
Tamweel 1144 11 8 1.544 7.123 5.180 
Index Pre-crisis 1080/769 8 13 1458/1.025 5.487 12.687 
Index Post-crisis 1817/1427 12 6 2.446/1.926 4.906 3.115 
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Finally, for each time-series return, we apply the Jarque–Bera (JB) normality 
test. The JB test is a goodness-of-fit test with the null hypothesis that the returns have 
a skewness and kurtosis matching that of a normal distribution. We find, in all cases, 
that the p-value associated with the test is 0 (when rounded to the sixth decimal place), 
leading us to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that returns are non-normal. The 
results are shown in of annex 4. 
While the fact that financial returns exhibit kurtosis is a known phenomenon, 
we believe that the illiquidity of the conventional bonds and sukuk under consideration 
have contributed to our observations on the distribution of returns (clustering around 
the mean and fat tails effect). 
Consider the following example. Assume that the “true” (or fundamental) 
values of a security in successive days are 100, 100.5, 101, and 103. The “true” log 
returns are then 0.50%, 0.99%, and 1.47%. Now assume that because of illiquidity, the 
security does not trade between day one and day four. The daily end-of-day prices now 
read 100, 100, 100, and 103, and the associated log returns are 0%, 0%, and 2.96%. It 
is easy to see how a repeat of this scenario (persistent illiquidity) would lead to a high 
number of observed returns clustered around 0 and a fatter tail (or kurtosis). This is 
exactly what we observe in our data. 
6.2.2 Indices’ Results  
Although less directly apparent, the problem of illiquidity also exists for 
indices, for which the number of days with no price change is a lesser indicator of 
illiquidity (if only one component of the index has a price movement, so will the 
index).  
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The sukuk index in particular has several features associated with illiquidity: a 
smaller number of data points than the bond index over the same period, greater 
skewness and kurtosis (40.57 pre-2008 and 321.72 post-2008) and large outliers. The 
frequencies of “3σ outliers” are 12.687 times (pre-2008) and 3.115 times (post-2008) 
greater than those suggested by the normal distribution and post-crisis. The sukuk 
index has five data points with more than six standard deviations from the mean, 
including one with 25 standard deviations from the mean. 
The bond index displays lower illiquidity than the sukuk, as expected, with 
lower skewness (-0.12 pre-crisis and -0.48 post-crisis) and lower kurtosis (2.11 pre-
crisis and 7.39 post-crisis), while still displaying a larger number of “3σ outliers” than 
predicted by the normal distribution (by a ratio 5.457 pre-crisis and 4.906 post-crisis). 
For both the sukuk and Bond indices, the number of “no price movements” is 
close to 0. This is to be expected because it only takes trading in one of the index 
components for the index to change. Consequently, this finding cannot be taken as an 
indicator of satisfactory liquidity. In addition, the number of data points, over the same 
time span, is smaller for the sukuk than for the conventional bond, further pointing to 
the illiquidity of the former. 
The results of a comparison of VCV and HS VaR for the indices are consistent 
with those of individual companies (a higher VCV VaR at the 90% and 95% 
confidence levels and a higher HS VaR at the 99% confidence level) with one notable 
exception: the pre-crisis VCV VaR for the sukuk is 2.89 times that of the HS VaR. A 
closer inspection of the data shows that there are a limited number of extreme outliers 
(up to 25 standard deviations from the mean). These impact the standard deviation 
calculation (and hence the VCV VaR) while having only a limited impact on the HS 
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VaR (because of their low number: whether an outlier is just beyond the VaR level or 
many standard deviations away will not impact the HS VaR provided the number of 
such extreme outliers is low). Consequently, the observation that the HS VaR is 
generally higher at the 99% confidence level while the VCV VaR is higher at the 90% 
and 95% confidence levels still stands and is consistent with illiquidity (with returns 
clustered around 0 and fatter tails than predicted by the normal distribution). 
6.2.3 Expected Shortfall 
We implement expected shortfall (ES) for our data, using the HS results, for 
the individual companies and the indices. We then discuss the results. ES values are 
computed at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels for both the last year of data 
and the whole sample. The results are presented in the Table 6.8. Table 6.9 contains 
binary indicators that (for each company, sample, and confidence level) take the value 
“B” when the conventional bond is riskier and “S” when the sukuk is riskier.  
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Table 6.8: Expected shortfall 
 Bond Sukuk 
One Year One Year 
99% 95% 90% 99% 95% 90% 
BLME 0.624% 0.297% 0.206% 0.173% 0.096% 0.067% 
DP World 9.684% 3.447% 2.230% 2.322% 1.030% 0.659% 
Dubai 1.883% 0.995% 0.583% 0.695% 0.432% 0.329% 
MAF 2.009% 0.903% 0.661% 3.140% 1.069% 0.653% 
Petronas 0.902% 0.656% 0.541% 1.212% 0.837% 0.466% 
Rasmala 2.214% 0.804% 0.422% 1.443% 0.539% 0.324% 
Tamweel 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
Index Pre-crisis 1.304% 0.847% 0.728% 0.841% 0.467% 0.304% 
Index Post-crisis 1.109% 0.735% 0.591% 0.913% 0.353% 0.253% 
 Full Sample Full Sample 
 99% 95% 90% 99% 95% 90% 
BLME 0.99% 0.46% 0.30% 0.37% 0.15% 0.10% 
DP World 9.57% 3.63% 2.39% 7.28% 2.54% 1.66% 
Dubai 1.90% 1.13% 0.81% 0.69% 0.45% 0.35% 
MAF 1.37% 0.76% 0.56% 6.17% 1.92% 1.14% 
Petronas 2.44% 1.14% 0.83% 1.83% 0.78% 0.53% 
Rasmala 1.80% 0.70% 0.13% 1.48% 0.49% 0.10% 
Tamweel 5.57% 2.41% 1.47% 4.18% 0.89% 0.44% 
Index Pre-crisis 0.88% 0.63% 0.50% 0.65% 0.27% 0.15% 
Index Post-crisis 1.22% 0.81% 0.61% 3.24% 0.85% 0.49% 
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Table 6.9: The ES of the conventional bonds compared with the ES of the sukuk 
 One Year Full Sample 
99% 95% 90% 99% 95% 90% 
BLME B B B B B B 
DP World B B B B B B 
Dubai B B B B B B 
MAF S S B S S S 
Petronas S S B B B B 
Rasmala B B B B B B 
Tamweel S S S B B B 
Index Pre-
crisis 
B B B B B B 
Index Post-
crisis 
B B B S S B 
Total B 42     
Total S 12 
 
The results show a similar pattern to the VaR results presented in prior sections; 
namely, that conventional bonds are riskier than sukuk in most cases, with the notable 
exceptions of Tamweel’s bond (because of poor data) and MAF’s bond (because of 
the specific structure of the two securities under consideration). We conclude that the 
non-coherence (as defined by Acerbi & Tasche, 2002) of the VaR measure does not 
invalidate our results. 
6.2.4 EWMA and GARCH 
Financial data exhibit volatility spikes (some periods are more volatile than 
others) and serial correlation (or autocorrelation, meaning that these volatility spikes 
do not occur randomly over time). The combination of these two effects is referred to 
as volatility clustering; moreover, the fact that the variance may not be constant 
throughout the data sample is called heteroskedasticity. The VCV (and HS) VaR of 
prior sections uses simple historical volatility estimates, which give equal weight to all 
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the error terms in the sample (the homoskedasticity assumption). In the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, these VaR measures would misrepresent risk. In this section, we 
implement two alternative volatility measures to compute VaR and analyze the results. 
These measures are EWMA (which is a special instance of GARCH(1,1)) and 
GARCH(1,1). We find that, in most cases, GARCH(1,1) does not fit the data well 
(some constraints are not met); thus, we focus our analysis on EWMA, which yields 
better results. The following subsections present tests on autocorrelation applied to our 
data (Ljung–Box Q-statistics and the Engle autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) test), specify the model’s setup, and present the fitting 
results. Further subsections describe backtesting to check the validity of the results. 
6.2.4.1 Evidence of Autocorrelation 
We use the Ljung–Box Q-statistics to test for autocorrelation in our returns 
data. The test is defined as testing the null hypothesis that the data is independently 
distributed compared with the alternative hypothesis that the data is serially correlated 
(i.e., we test whether the observed autocorrelation coefficient is statistically different 
from 0). The Q(h)-statistic is computed as follows: 
𝑄(ℎ) = 𝑛(𝑛 + 2) ∑
𝑝𝑘
2
𝑛−𝑘
ℎ
𝑘=1                                             (6.1) 
where n is the sample size, h is the number of lags, and ?̂?𝑘 is the autocorrelation 
at lag k. Q(h) follows a chi-squared distribution with h degrees of freedom. The Ljung–
Box statistic tests the null hypothesis that the residuals are independently distributed 
compared with the alternative hypothesis that serial correlation is present. Table 6.10 
presents the Q-statistics and the associated p-values for all companies in our data set, 
with lags of 5, 10, 20, and 50 observations and for both raw and squared residuals. 
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Table 6.10: Ljung-Box Q statistics and associated p-values (p-values>0.95 in bold) 
Raw Data         
 BLME 
bond 
BLME 
sukuk 
MAF bond MAF sukuk Petronas 
bond 
Petronas 
sukuk 
Rasmala 
bond 
Rasmala 
sukuk 
Q(5) 49.6483 
[0.00000] 
20.5525 
[0.00098] 
40.9540 
[0.00000] 
57.9161 
[0.00000] 
6.91029 
[0.22734] 
352.139 
[0.00000] 
48.3197 
[0.00000] 
13.7359 
[0.01738] 
Q(10) 58.4428 
[0.00000] 
26.0852 
[0.00362] 
52.3293 
[0.00000] 
59.9994 
[0.00000] 
104.861 
[0.00000] 
353.463 
[0.00000] 
49.0289 
[0.00000] 
15.6749 
[0.10932] 
Q(20) 70.7522 
[0.00000] 
50.4168 
[0.00019] 
68.6041 
[0.00000] 
70.4475 
[0.00000] 
109.074 
[0.00000] 
354.896 
[0.00000] 
50.9469 
[0.00000] 
19.7247 
[0.47527] 
Q(50) 155.940 
[0.00000] 
118.099 
[0.00000] 
121.353 
[0.00000] 
74.8026 
[0.01310] 
140.514 
[0.00000] 
373.699 
[0.00000] 
62.0766 
[0.00000] 
30.8077 
[0.98505] 
 Tamweel 
bond 
Tamweel 
sukuk 
Dubai bond Dubai 
sukuk 
DP World 
bond 
DP World 
sukuk 
Index bond Index 
sukuk 
Q(5) 26.9458 
[0.00006] 
28.4044 
[0.00003] 
26.9458 
[0.00006] 
28.4044 
[0.00003] 
5.58588 
[0.34862] 
23.4484 
[0.00028] 
15.3548 
[0.00895] 
6.57679 
[0.25406] 
Q(10) 42.7137 
[0.00001] 
81.1560 
[0.00000]  
42.7137 
[0.00001] 
81.1560 
[0.00000] 
32.7779 
[0.00030] 
36.2237 
[0.00008] 
30.2536 
[0.00078] 
7.34219 
[0.69279] 
Q(20) 56.4181 
[0.00003] 
89.0956 
[0.00000] 
56.4181 
[0.00003] 
89.0956 
[0.00000] 
55.2117 
[0.00004] 
43.9466 
[0.00153] 
61.4994 
[0.00000] 
22.0904 
[0.33563] 
 Q(50) 86.6699 
[0.00049] 
135.991 
[0.00000] 
89.6699 
[0.00049] 
135.991 
[0.00000] 
104.553 
[0.00001] 
99.4832 
[0.00004] 
101.645 
[0.00002] 
163.153 
[0.00000] 
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Table 6.10: Ljung-Box Q statistics and associated p-values (p-values>0.95 in bold) (Continued) 
Squared 
Data 
        
 BLME 
bond 
BLME 
sukuk 
MAF bond MAF sukuk Petronas 
bond 
Petronas 
sukuk 
Rasmala 
bond 
Rasmala 
sukuk 
Q(5) 12.4425 
[0.02920] 
19.0833 
[0.00186] 
24.6022 
[0.00017] 
58.3233 
[0.00000] 
0.60774 
[0.98765] 
455.616 
[0.00000] 
25.3315 
[0.00012] 
0.58623 
[0.98862] 
Q(10) 16.2907 
[0.09161] 
25.5162 
[0.00449] 
41.3629 
[0.00001] 
58.9791 
[0.00000] 
170.507 
[0.00000] 
455.686 
[0.00000] 
45.5807 
[0.00000] 
0.73803 
[0.99996] 
Q(20) 43.9541 
[0.04135] 
111.988 
[0.00000]  
55.5402 
[0.00003] 
62.5850 
[0.00000] 
170.560 
[0.00000] 
455.935 
[0.00000] 
95.6539 
[0.00000] 
1.26925 
[1.00000] 
Q(50) 68.6134 
[0.04135] 
216.272 
[0.00000] 
61.5505 
[0.12673] 
66.8816 
[0.05551] 
171.595 
[0.00000] 
456.357 
[0.00000] 
137.631 
[0.00000] 
2.32407 
[1.00000] 
 Tamweel 
bond 
Tamweel 
sukuk 
Dubai bond Dubai 
sukuk 
DP World 
bond 
DP World 
sukuk 
Index bond Index 
sukuk 
Q(5) 5.68891 
[0.33768] 
12.8065 
[0.02526] 
5.68891 
[0.33768] 
12.8065 
[0.02526] 
0.25680 
[0.99834] 
9.64491 
[0.08594] 
173.070 
[0.00000] 
0.06365 
[0.99995] 
Q(10) 18.6455 
[0.04500] 
31.8341 
[0.00043] 
18.6455 
[0.04500] 
31.8341 
[0.00043] 
4.05972 
[0.94461] 
42.3191 
[0.00007] 
419.920 
[0.00000] 
0.09127 
[1.00000] 
Q(20) 19.5306 
[0.48762] 
53.3242 
[0.00007] 
19.5306 
[0.48762] 
53.3242 
[0.00007] 
8.94420 
[0.98354] 
42.7728 
[0.00219] 
904.361 
[0.00000] 
1.36403 
[1.00000] 
Q(50) 28.6338 
[0.99345] 
84.1283 
[0.00180] 
28.6338 
[0.99345] 
84.1283 
[0.00180] 
23.7390 
[0.99941] 
61.9321 
[0.11997] 
1426.55 
[0.00000] 
30.3014 
[0.98753] 
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With regard to testing the raw residuals, a low p-value indicates that positive 
(negative) returns tend to be followed by more positive (negative) returns. With regard 
to testing squared residuals, a low p-value indicates that large (low) absolute returns 
tend to be followed by further large (low) absolute returns; namely, volatility clusters 
over time. 
Our results show that, using the raw data, the null hypothesis can be rejected 
in many cases. We can thus conclude that there is strong evidence of serial correlation 
in our data. In order to further test for volatility clustering, we apply Engle’s ARCH 
test. An uncorrelated time series may still be serially dependent because of dynamic 
conditional variance (or autocorrelation of the squared residual series). Such series 
display ARCH effects. Engle’s ARCH test examines such heteroskedasticity. The 
alternative hypothesis for Engle's ARCH test is autocorrelation in the squared 
residuals, given by the regression 
Ha:e
2
t=α0+α1e
2
t−1+…+αme
2
t−m+ut,                         (6.2) 
where ut is a white noise error process. The null hypothesis is 
H0:α0=α1=…=αm=0                                                  (6.3) 
The test statistic is the F statistic of the regression of residuals. We apply 
Engle’s ARCH test to our residuals for two, five, and 10 lag terms (m). Table 6.11 
presents the p-values for all our time series. 
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Table 6.11: p-values for Engle's ARCH tests 
 ARCH 1-2 F test ARCH 1-5 F test 
ARCH 1-10 F 
test 
BLME bond 0.9638 0.0318 0.1564 
BLME Sukuk 0.7608 0.0021 0.0139 
MAF bond 0.0004 0.0021 0.0009 
MAF Sukuk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Petronas bond 0.8203 0.9885 0.0000 
Petronas Sukuk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Rasmala bond 0.5980 0.0002 0.0001 
Rasmala Sukuk 0.9608 0.9895 1.0000 
Tamweel bond 0.0614 0.3478 0.0491 
Tamweel Sukuk 0.4439 0.0295 0.0023 
Dubai bond 0.0614 0.3478 0.0491 
Dubai Sukuk 0.4439 0.0295 0.0023 
DP world bond 0.8856 0.9984 0.9477 
DP world Sukuk 0.1802 0.1242 0.0000 
Index bond 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Index Sukuk 0.9772 0.9999 1.0000 
 
Annex 3 contains all the results (for individual companies and the indices). The 
results largely conform to the Kupiec LR test results. Annex 4 presents the results of 
the four tests for our EWMA RiskMetrics version of GARCH. In all cases, the null 
hypothesis that the conditional variance follows an EWMA RiskMetrics process 
cannot be rejected at the 5% confidence level; thus, we find no evidence that our model 
has failed to adequately take into account asymmetric news impacts. 
6.2.4.2 The VaR of Conventional Bonds Compared with the VaR of Sukuk 
The VaR of conventional bonds is generally, and significantly, higher than the 
VaR of the sukuk from the same issuer (MAF is a notable exception). 
136 
 
 
 
Table 6.4 presents indicators that show, for both the HS and VCV methods and 
over the full sample and the last year of data, whether the VaR of conventional bonds 
is highest (B) or whether the VaR of sukuk (S) is highest. Of 102 comparisons, the 
VaR of conventional bonds was highest 83 times and that of Sukuk was highest 19 
times. The results were discussed in more detail in the prior section. 
Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007) found that, over 1996–2005, VaR for the DJII 
is lower than that of the Dow Jones World Index, implying a lower risk. Our results 
confirm and expand these findings, using individual companies as well as indices and 
over a time frame that spans the 2008 financial crisis. 
The PLS mechanism of Islamic finance is based on either the mudarabah or the 
musharaka principle. Under the mudarabah principle, lenders share the profits in good 
circumstances (the return being higher than interest rates) but bear the losses in bad 
circumstances (provided there is no misbehavior on the borrower’s part). Under the 
musharaka principle, lenders and borrowers both share profits and losses. 
The Islamic finance PLS mechanism affects the payoffs of investors and 
lenders in the following way. Shareholders have a lower return in positive 
circumstances because some of the profits accrue to the lender; however, shareholders 
have a higher return in negative circumstances because the lender takes all 
(mudarabah) or part (musharaka) of the losses. Bondholders receive a higher return in 
positive circumstances (since profit sharing leads to returns generally higher than 
interest rates) and a lower return in negative circumstances because they bear all or 
part of the losses. One would therefore expect that (i) the shares of companies that are 
compliant with Islamic financial principles are less risky than non-compliant shares 
and (ii) sukuk are more risky than non-compliant conventional bonds. 
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Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007) argue, and empirically prove using VaR, that 
the foregoing leads to a situation where the shares of companies that are compliant 
with Islamic principles become less risky. Our analysis also shows that sukuk are less 
risky than non-compliant conventional bonds. 
There are several reasons why the risk of a sukuk differs from that of a 
conventional bond. These reasons collectively explain why sukuk risk is lower than 
that of non-compliant bonds despite the sharing of profits and losses. First, Islamic 
principles that prohibit interest or usury (riba), and place strong emphasis on the 
performance of underlying assets in determining the payoff to investors, have led to a 
smaller effect of interest rate changes on sukuk values. Further relevant characteristics 
of Islamic finance are the prohibition of speculation (gharar); of short selling, betting, 
and gambling (qimar); and of arbitrage (Jobst, 2008). Another contributing factor is 
that sukuk are illiquid instruments compared with conventional bonds as evidenced by 
the lack of secondary market activity. 
Second, there are structural differences between Islamic and conventional 
assets. Sukuk can be based on various Islamic partnerships and leasing arrangements; 
however, all of these are backed by tangible assets. Moreover, most sukuk are 
independent of interest rate movements; thus, the profit depends upon the underlying 
asset’s performance.  
To the extent that the value of the tangible assets backing sukuk is less volatile 
than interest rates (or, more precisely, the impact of the value of sukuk on the 
movement in interest rates), one would expect the VaR of sukuk to be lower than that 
of conventional bonds. This is what we observe in most cases. 
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Third, Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007) show that the additional benefits 
accorded by the PLS arrangements of Islamic finance are that they decrease agency 
costs (lenders sharing the cost of failure leads to more conservative lending policies), 
decrease the bankruptcy costs of companies, and eliminate conflicts between 
bondholders and shareholders. 
6.3 Conclusions  
We have shown that the observed returns are non-normal. More specifically, 
returns are more clustered around the mean and exhibit heavier tails than predicted by 
the normal distribution. While financial returns are known to exhibit heavier tails than 
the normal distribution, we believe that this phenomenon is exacerbated in our sample 
by the illiquidity of the secondary market for the securities of our data set. 
Should the number of simulations be increased for the Monte Carlo VaR, the 
results would be the same as for the VCV VaR (they both make the same distributional 
assumption). Further, using GARCH does not lead to values that differ significantly 
from VCV. Thus, having compared the results for different VaR implementations, we 
focus on VCV compared with HS. 
By comparing the VCV and HS VaR, we find that the impact of the non-
normality of returns is twofold. First, the HS VaR is generally and significantly higher 
than the VCV VaR for high confidence intervals (because of the heavy tails of the 
observed distribution of returns). Second, the VCV VaR is generally higher than the 
HS VaR at the 90% confidence level (because of clustering around the mean). 
The “fat tails” phenomenon exhibited by financial returns is well documented 
in the literature, starting, among others, with Mandelbrot (1963), who notes that “the 
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empirical distributions of price changes are usually too ‘peaked’ relative to the 
Gaussian property”. Fama (1965) shows that, for all stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average, the frequency of outlier returns far exceeds that predicted by a normal 
distribution. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Assaf (2009) 
observed tails significantly heavier than predicted by the normal distribution in four 
stock markets. Our results concur with these studies and provide evidence of similar 
characteristics for conventional bond and sukuk returns, compounded further by sukuk 
illiquidity. 
Since illiquidity contributes to the heavy tails phenomenon, it is likely that 
“true” (unobservable) returns would exhibit lighter tails than observed returns. The 
implication is that the HS VaR possibly overstates the risk for high confidence 
intervals. This is particularly true for sukuk, for which illiquidity is highest. 
The VaR of a conventional bond is generally and significantly higher than that 
of a sukuk for a given issuer, indicating a higher level of risk in holding the 
conventional bond relative to the sukuk. Our analysis showed that sukuk are less risky 
than conventional bonds. Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007) demonstrate that shares of 
companies that are compliant with Islamic principles are less risky than non-compliant 
shares. These results naturally lead to the conclusion that lending compliance with 
Islamic finance principles should be encouraged. 
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Chapter 7: Hedge Analysis 
7.1 Introduction 
The present chapter empirically explores the diversification benefits of sukuk 
in fixed-income portfolios, both prior to and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
2008. While conventional bond returns are driven solely by changes in interest rates, 
sukuk place a greater emphasis on the performance of the underlying asset(s). We 
postulate that the lower dependence of sukuk on interest rates should mean that they 
are good diversifiers for a bond portfolio. We proceed to test this hypothesis in three 
steps.  
This chapter first explores the DCC features associated with the Dow Jones 
bond and sukuk indices, both before and after Lehman Brothers’ collapse. Next, we 
use the DCC results to explore the diversification benefits of introducing a sukuk 
allocation (constrained or unconstrained) to a bond portfolio. Finally, we run a hedge 
analysis on the optimal DCC bond–sukuk portfolio. 
Our main contribution is to show that introducing a sukuk allocation to a fixed-
income portfolio improves the risk-return trade-off in all cases considered (pre- and 
post-crisis for constrained/unconstrained/fixed allocations).  
We use daily data for both the Dow Jones Bond Index and DJSI from October 
2005 to February 2014. The eligibility criteria for the DJSI have already been outlined 
in Chapter 4. The DJSI construction makes it a good proxy for global sukuk 
performance. All analyses are completed over three time-series panels: the whole 
sample, pre-crisis (10/3/2005 to 9/15/2008), and post-crisis (9/16/08 to 2/3/2014) 
periods.The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 7.2 analyses the 
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empirical methods that are followed and section 7.3 presents the data used in this 
chapter. Section 7.4 then discusses the empirical findings, while section 7.5 concludes 
the chapter by summarizing the main results. 
7.2 Empirical Results 
7.2.1 DCC-GARCH results 
Results from the DCC-GARCH model consist of a series of correlations 
demonstrating the changes in returns association over the sample period. Table 7.1 
contains the estimation results of the DCC model. With regard to the conditional 
return-generating processes, one can observe that for the three times-series panels, the 
one-period lagged conventional bond and sukuk returns, denoted by AR(1) 
coefficients, significantly affect their current values. This finding suggests strong 
evidence of short-term predictability in conventional bond and sukuk price changes 
over time. It is also worth noting that the relatively small size of ARCH coefficients 
suggests that conditional volatility changes more rapidly as a result of the substantial 
effects of past volatility rather than past news or shocks. 
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Table 7.1: Estimation results of the DCC-GARCH model 
 Pre-crisis Period,  
10/3/2005–9/15/2008 
Post-crisis Period,  
9/16/2008–2/2/2014 
Total Period  
10/3/2005–2/2/2014 
Bond Sukuk Bond Sukuk Bond Sukuk 
Panel A: Univariate GARCH Estimates and Univariate Diagnostic Tests 
Conditional mean equation 
φ0 
 
-0.003457 0.007002*** 0.004984 0.010363*** 0.001807*** 0.008902*** 
(0.3964) (0.0000) (0.1984) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
φ1 -0.093874*** -0.027118 -0.027065 0.340854*** -0.047731** 0.290181*** 
(0.0070) (0.6384) (0.3662) (0.0005) (0.0307) (0.0000) 
Conditional Variance Equation 
θ0 
 
0.008954*** 0.00336*** 0.0002015*** 0.00762*** 0.54370** 0.32467** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0437) (0.0319) 
θ1 0.026052*** 0.116304** 0.061551*** 0.039241** 0.054302*** 0.129102** 
(0.0064) (0.0378) (0.0000) (0.0265) (0.0000) (0.0393) 
θ2 0.975564*** 0.941540*** 0.941578*** 0.969330*** 0.949128*** 0.946501*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
θ1 + θ2 1.00162 1.05784   1.00343 1.07560 
Univariate Diagnostic 
Q(10) 18.3823** 30.8931*** 4.76230 22.4365** 10.4596 30.3186*** 
 (0.0488) (0.0006) (0.9064) (0.0130) (0.8631) (0.0007) 
𝑄2(10) 
 
29.0122** 3.43190 15.9099 0.623094 31.5032*** 0.363199 
(0.0012) (0.9693) (0.1022) (0.9999) (0.0004) (0.9999) 
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Table 7.1: Estimation results of the DCC-GARCH model (Continued) 
 Pre-crisis Period,  
10/3/2005–9/15/2008 
Post-crisis Period,  
9/16/2008–2/2/2014 
Total Period  
10/3/2005–2/2/2014 
Bond Sukuk Bond Sukuk Bond Sukuk 
Panel B: Conditional Correlation Estimates and Multivariate Diagnostic Tests 
Multivariate DCC Equation 
α 0.00005**  0.032961*  0.025095***  
(0.0267)  (0.0639)  (0.0020)  
β 0.883993***  0.884480***  0.813277**  
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0417)  
Dynamic Conditional Correlations 
ρBond−Sukuk 0.061651**  0.022447  0.026974  
(0.0450)  (0.6594)  (0.3820)  
Multivariate Diagnostic 
𝐿𝑖 − 𝑀𝑐𝐿 𝑄(10) 69.9251*  58.4036**  86.4572  
(0.0517)  (0.0235)  (0.1895)  
𝐿𝑖
− 𝑀𝑐𝐿 𝑄2(10) 
54.9710*  39.9745  347.803  
(0.0868)  (0.3824)  (0.2315)  
Notes: Q(10) and Q2(10) are the univariate Ljung–Box test statistics for serial correlation in standardized and squared residuals respectively. 
Li-McL Q(10) and Li-McL Q2 (10) are the multivariate Li and McLeod's (1981) test statistics for serial correlation in standardized and 
squared residuals respectively. The values in parentheses are the actual probability values. *, **, and *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. 
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The estimates of ARCH (θ1) and GARCH (θ2) coefficients that capture shock 
dependence and volatility persistence in the conditional variance equations are statistically 
significant at least at the 5% level for the three times-series panels. This finding provides 
evidence of a significant relationship between current volatility and lagged volatility and 
lagged residuals for conventional bond and sukuk market returns. The results show that 
θ1 + θ2 is close to 1 (in the range 1.00162 to 1.07560), which indicates that volatility is 
persistent. The DCC model seems a good fit because both 𝑎 and 𝛽 are significant at the 
1% or 5% levels, except for alpha post-crisis, which is significant at the 10% level. In 
addition, the sum of 𝑎 and 𝛽 is inferior to 1, indicating that correlation is mean-reverting. 
The implication of mean reversion is that sukuk are likely to be good long-term 
diversifiers for a bond portfolio. 
The pre-crisis conditional correlation between conventional bonds and sukuk is 
small (0.0617) and statistically significant at the 5% level. This points to the significant 
diversification potential of including sukuk in fixed-income portfolios. Interestingly, the 
correlation falls post-crisis (to 0.0224), suggesting that  sukuk have retained their 
diversification potential through the crisis despite widespread evidence of increasing 
cross-market correlations at the time. Further evidence of the enduring low conditional 
correlation through the 2008 crisis is provided in Table 7.1. Care should, however, be 
taken because the post-crisis conditional correlation coefficient is not statistically 
significant at any reasonable confidence level. 
Figure 7.1 shows the evolution of the DCC over time. While there is some 
variation in the correlation, it is worth pointing out that only over two brief episodes does 
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the DCC exceed 0.2, thereby confirming the diversification potential of sukuk. Note also 
that the jump in conditional correlations during the 2008 financial meltdown, which spikes 
to approximately 0.4 in early 2009, also falls afterward to a negative figure of 0.2 by the 
end of 2009. Indeed, following the outbreak of the global financial crisis, correlations 
revert back to their initial levels. The graph reconfirms the foregoing results to the extent 
that sukuk are weakly correlated with bonds and that they have great diversification 
potential in the context of global portfolios. The only point to note here is that in a crisis, 
sukuk do not offer comparable protection because of their association with global 
conventional bond increases. 
 
Note: CORR denotes correlation. 
Figure 7.1: Estimated time variations of conditional correlations from the DCC-GARCH 
model (10/3/2005 to 2/2/2014) 
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7.2.2 Implications for Portfolio Diversification Analysis 
The foregoing results indicate that diversification benefits in terms of sukuk and 
conventional bonds could be achieved because of the lower association between the two 
assets. This subsection explores the diversification impact of introducing a sukuk 
allocation to a portfolio of conventional bonds. The analysis is conducted over three time-
series panels (the whole sample, pre-crisis, and post-crisis periods) and outlines the impact 
of introducing a sukuk allocation (first an arbitrary allocation, followed by an 
unconstrained allocation) to the risk–return trade-off of the portfolio. The actual weights 
of minimum variance portfolios are then computed using a standard Markowitz (1952) 
mean variance procedure. Specifically, let 𝑤 be 𝑛 × 1 vector of portfolio weights, 𝐻 be 
the conditional variance–covariance matrix of the DCC-GARCH model, and 𝑛 be the 
number of assets (two assets). The optimal weights can then be calculated by solving the 
optimization problem in equation 6.6. 
The results are reported in Table 7.2. In the first panel (the whole sample period), 
if the portfolio consists only of conventional bonds, the return is 0.19%, the standard 
deviation is 0.0265 and the Sharpe ratio (return/standard deviation; namely, the return per 
unit of risk assumed) is 0.0732. Introducing a 10% sukuk allocation increases the return 
(to 0.25%) and reduces the standard deviation (to 0.022); thus, the Sharpe ratio rises to 
0.1141. A 20% sukuk allocation leads to a further increase in the Sharpe ratio (to 0.1625). 
The optimal sukuk allocation from a risk–return trade-off (i.e., the allocation which 
maximizes the Sharpe ratio) is 35.63%. In this case, the Sharpe ratio is 0.2315, which is 
more than triple the ratio for the conventional bonds-only portfolio. 
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Table 7.2: Performance of minimum variance portfolios 
 Optimal Weights 
(%) 
Return Standard 
Deviation 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
VaR% 
1% 
 
5% 
 
10% 
Bond Sukuk 
Panel A: Total Period, 10/3/2005–2/2/2014 
Bond only 100 0.00 0.0019 0.0265 0.0732 6.174 4.365 3.401 
Sukuk only 0.00 100 0.0076 0.0478 0.1591 11.133 7.871 6.133 
Bond with Sukuk 
(unrestricted) 
64.37 35.63 0.0040 0.0171 0.2315 3.984 2.817 2.195 
Bond with Sukuk 
(min. 70% in Bond) 
70.00 30.00 0.0036 0.0174 0.2100 2.960 4.187 2.306 
Bond with Sukuk 
(max. 10% Sukuk) 
90.00 10.00 0.0025 0.0220 0.1141 5.117 3.618 2.819 
Bond with Sukuk 
(max. 20% in Sukuk) 
80.00 20.00 0.0031 0.0189 0.1625 4.406 3.115 2.427 
Panel B: Pre-crisis Period, 10/3/2005–9/15/ 2008 
Bond only 100 0.000 -0.004 0.0185 -0.244 4.303 3.042 2.370 
Sukuk only 0.00 100 0.006 0.0018 3.379 0.416 0.294 0.229 
Bond with Sukuk 
(unrestricted) 
6.96 93.04 0.005 0.0017 3.132 0.394 0.279 0.217 
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Table 7.2: Performance of minimum variance portfolios (Continued) 
 Optimal Weights 
(%) 
Return Standard 
Deviation 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
VaR% 
1% 
 
5% 
 
10% 
Bond Sukuk 
Bond with Sukuk 
(min. 70% in Bond) 
70.00 30.00 -0.001 0.0094 -0.143 2.189 1.547 1.206 
Bond with Sukuk 
(max. 10% Sukuk) 
90.00 10.00 -0.003 0.0151 -0.229 3.508 2.480 1.932 
Bond with Sukuk 
(max. 20% in Sukuk) 
80.00 20.00 -0.002 0.0120 -0.200 2.803 1.982 1.544 
Panel C: Post-crisis Period, 9/16/2008–2/2/2014 
Bond only 100 0.00 0.0055 0.0309 0.1765 7.185 5.080 3.958 
Sukuk only 0.00 100 0.0084 0.0729 0.1158 16.955 11.988 9.341 
Bond with Sukuk 
(unrestricted) 70.21 29.79 
0.0063 0.0217 0.2927 5.041 3.564 2.777 
Bond with Sukuk 
(min. 70% in Bond) 70.21 29.79 
0.0063 0.0217 0.2927 5.041 3.564 2.777 
Bond with Sukuk 
(max. 10% Sukuk) 
90.00 10.00 0.0058 0.0257 0.2235 5.987 4.233 3.298 
Bond with Sukuk 
(max. 20% in Sukuk) 
80.00 20.00 0.0060 0.0227 0.2669 5.272 3.728 2.904 
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In the pre-crisis panel, the optimal sukuk allocation is over 93%, driven mainly 
by the fact that a rising interest rate environment in that period means that the total 
bond return is negative (the interest received is more than offset by price depreciations 
caused by the higher rates). Post-crisis, the optimal sukuk allocation is over 70%; 
moreover, the Sharpe ratio rises from 0.1765 in the conventional bonds-only portfolio 
to 0.2927 in the optimal portfolio. In all cases, the introduction of sukuk increases 
returns and Sharpe ratios. This finding suggests that reallocating an unconstrained 
proportion of a conventional bond portfolio to sukuk improves the risk–return trade-
off significantly.  
Figure 7.2 shows the optimal portfolio weights over time. Given that the main 
driver of returns differs for conventional bonds (interest rates) and sukuk (performance 
of underlying assets), it is unsurprising that the optimal weight should vary over time. 
Specifically, a strong jump in the optimal sukuk allocation is observed in the period 
2009–2010. In 2009–2010, in the volatile markets post-Lehman Brothers, volatility 
rose much more sharply for conventional bonds (which were exposed to market 
variables only: reference interest rates and credit spreads) than for sukuk (whose 
values were linked to underlying real-world assets). While falling central bank rates 
over that time should, in isolation, push conventional bond prices up, this effect was 
more than offset by the rise in credit spreads, meaning that overall risky conventional 
bonds’ rates increased. Most importantly, volatility relating to rates and credit spreads 
rose sharply. As a result, the risk-adjusted return of sukuk was more attractive than 
that of conventional bonds. This period also coincided with greater variability of the 
DCC correlation (as evidenced in Figure 7.1); however, the conditional variance 
differential was the dominant factor and explains the high sukuk allocation. 
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Figure 7.2: Estimated time variations of optimal weights from the DCC-GARCH 
model (10/3/2005 to 2/2/2014) 
Figure 7.3 shows the greater variability of the returns of the optimal portfolio 
from the Lehman Brothers’ collapse onward. This variability is further evidenced by 
Figure 7.4, which shows the standard deviation of the optimal portfolio rise sharply in 
the fourth quarter of 2008. 
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Figure 7.3: Estimated time variations of returns in an optimal portfolio from the 
DCC-GARCH model (10/3/2005 to 2/2/2014) 
 
Figure 7.4: Estimated time variations of standard deviations in an optimal portfolio 
from the DCC-GARCH model (10/3/2005 to 2/2/2014) 
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One should note that introducing a sukuk allocation of 30% improves the risk–
return trade-off (as measured by the Sharpe ratio) in all cases. Overall, these findings 
imply that investors holding assets should have more sukuk than conventional bonds 
in their portfolios to minimize risk, while keeping the expected return unchanged. 
As aforementioned, conditional volatility estimates are used to construct hedge 
ratios. The average optimal hedge ratios are presented in Table 7.3. The table reports 
the amount of sukuk/conventional bonds that should be longed/shorted in order to 
hedge a US$1 portfolio. As can be seen, on average, a US$1 portfolio of conventional 
bonds can be hedged with a short position of 5.725 cents of sukuk. In the pre-crisis 
panel, the portfolio can be hedged with a short position of 8.793 cents compared with 
4.060 cents in the post-crisis panel. The main finding from the table is that we observe 
a drop in the hedge efficiency post-crisis (from 72.8% to 16%). This is unsurprising 
since sukuk have already been found to be good diversifiers in a bond portfolio because 
of the low correlation between conventional bond and sukuk returns. If conventional 
bond and sukuk returns are driven by different factors, we would not expect one to 
have a great hedge efficiency with respect to the other (the key to hedge efficiency is 
to find a hedge correlated to the position to be hedged). 
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Table 7.3: Optimal weights, hedge ratios, returns, standard deviations, and VaR of 
the optimal portfolio for a conventional bond–sukuk portfolio from the DCC-
GARCH model 
 
Total Period,  
10/3/2005–
2/02/2014 
Pre-crisis Period 
10/3/2005–
15/09/2008 
Post-crisis Period 
9/16/2008–
2/2/2014 
Optimal weight % 
(𝒘𝟏𝟐,𝒕) 
31.592 16.684 39.686 
Hedge ratio % 
(𝜷𝟏𝟐,𝒕) 
5.7250 8.7931 4.0602 
Return % 0.6336 0.4348 0.7415 
Standard Deviation 
% 
2.2994 0.5031 3.2753 
VaR    
1% 5.9336 1.2988 8.4503 
5% 4.5077 0.9863 6.4196 
10% 3.7832 0.8278 5.3879 
Hedging 
Effectiveness (HE) 
19.2135 72.7981 15.997 
The dynamic evolution of hedging ratios is presented in Figure 7.5. The figure 
shows considerable variability in optimal hedge ratios across the sample period, 
implying that hedging positions must be adjusted frequently. Notice that the hedge 
ratios of sukuk/conventional bonds experience stability and are close to zero during 
the period 2008–2010. This situation is likely due to the world financial crisis. 
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Figure 7.5: Estimated time variations of hedge ratios from the DCC-GARCH model 
(10/3/2005 to 2/2/2014) 
Overall, our findings for optimal hedge ratios suggest that sukuk should be an 
integral part of a diversified portfolio of bonds, thereby helping to increase the risk-
adjusted performance of the hedged portfolio. 
7.3 Conclusions 
The DCC analysis as applied to bonds and sukuk both before and after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers shows that correlation is very low, making sukuk a great 
diversifier in a fixed-income portfolio that hitherto contained only conventional bonds. 
Moreover, the diversification potential of sukuk remained intact throughout the 
financial crisis (there is evidence that correlation actually went down). In addition, we 
have shown that the introduction of a sukuk allocation to a fixed-income portfolio 
(unconstrained or specified ex ante) improves risk–return trade-off in all cases, both 
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before and after the crisis. We have also looked at the hedging efficiency of sukuk 
used in a bond portfolio and found a fall in the hedge efficiency post-crisis, a result 
explainable by the low correlation between conventional bond and sukuk returns. 
Cakir and Raei (2007) find that including sukuk in a bond portfolio reduces the 
portfolio’s VaR significantly because of the low correlation between sukuk and bond 
returns. However, in their study the reduced risk is not balanced against the lower 
sukuk returns. While confirming the low correlation with DCC-GARCH (and hence 
the diversification benefit), we have gone further by showing that introducing a sukuk 
allocation improves the risk–return trade-off, as measured by the Sharpe ratio.  
Our analysis has important consequences for asset allocation. Most 
importantly, conventional bond funds should be encouraged to introduce a sukuk 
allocation to their portfolios since doing so would improve the funds’ risk–return 
characteristics. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Discussion  
8.1 Introduction 
The sukuk market has experienced tremendous growth over the last few years. 
Transaction volumes increased from US$8 billion in 2003 to US$856 M globally 
(IIFM, 2016) because sovereign and corporate issuances aim to access the growing 
Islamic liquidity pool. However, despite this growth, relatively few studies have 
explored the market risks of sukuk relative to that of conventional bonds. 
Islamic law, or Shari’ah, prohibits the payment of interest. Islamic banks 
operate an interest-free system guided by the principle that the profits and losses of a 
financed asset are shared between fund providers (depositors) and fund users 
(entrepreneurs). Sukuk are traded securities consistent with this principle. Unlike 
conventional debt instruments, sukuk returns are linked directly to the performance of 
a financed asset, rather than the creditworthiness of a borrower. Sukuk holders are thus 
exposed to a financed asset’s value rather than interest rates and issuer credit spreads. 
This “buyer–seller” arrangement (rather than the “borrower–lender” arrangement of 
conventional bonds) leads to different agency characteristics. Further, the specificities 
of sukuk pose the question of their riskiness relative to conventional bonds. 
The focus of this thesis has been on the relative market risk of sukuk and 
conventional bonds. In this regard, market risk is measured by VaR. The thesis has 
three objectives. First, we look at whether, for a set of Middle Eastern issuers, sukuk 
are riskier than conventional bonds. Second, we investigate whether VaR is an 
adequate measure of market risk for sukuk. Third, we look at the risk–return impact of 
including a sukuk allocation in a bond portfolio. 
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In chapter 5, we considered seven companies that are conventional bond and 
sukuk issuers (BLME, MAF, Petronas, Rasmala, Tamweel, Dubai, and DP World). 
We examined the relative riskiness, as measured by VaR, of both issues. We also 
performed a similar analysis for two indices (the DJSI and the Dow Jones Corporate 
Bond Index). 
In order to explore the validity of VaR as a measure of market risk, we 
conducted unconditional (Kupiec) and conditional (Engle and Manganelli) backtesting 
tests. We also computed ES as an alternative market-risk measure for our data to 
compare results. 
In chapter 6, we considered the diversification impact of including sukuk in a 
bond portfolio. Using a DCC-GARCH approach, we first examined the time-varying 
features of the correlation between conventional bond and sukuk indices. We then 
investigated the impact of introducing sukuk to a conventional bond portfolio on the 
risk–return trade-off (as measured by the Sharpe ratio). 
8.2 Summary of Results 
We have found that, for a given issuer, conventional bond VaR is significantly 
higher than sukuk VaR in most cases, indicating that sukuk are less risky. This finding 
holds regardless of the time horizon over which VaR is computed, the confidence 
interval, and the methodology used (HS and VCV).  
We have also found evidence of persistent sukuk illiquidity, a consequence of 
which is that sukuk returns are non-normal (in a statistical sense). Specifically, sukuk 
returns exhibit heavier tails and are more clustered around the mean than predicted by 
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the normal distribution. The main consequence for VaR is that, for high confidence 
levels (95% and higher), HS VaR is higher than VCV VaR.  
The backtesting results for our data have shown mixed results with conditional 
and unconditional tests. It should be noted that this observation applies equally to 
conventional bonds and sukuk. In addition, rerunning the analysis using ES (an 
alternative, coherent measure of risk) has not altered the results. 
Using a DCC-GARCH approach, we have found that sukuk returns have a low 
correlation with conventional bond returns, making them a good diversifier. We have 
further shown that introducing a sukuk allocation to a conventional bond portfolio 
improves the risk–return trade-off, as measured by the Sharpe ratio, in all cases both 
before and after the 2008 crisis. 
Our results have expanded the literature. Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007) 
show that the DJIS has lower VaR than the Dow Jones Bond Index. Cakir and Raei 
(2007) find that introducing sukuk to a conventional bond portfolio decreases VaR 
because of the low correlation between sukuk and bond returns. Both studies focus on 
risk and do not compare the reduction in risk with the lower sukuk returns. We have 
confirmed these results but have gone further by showing that the risk–return tradeoff 
of sukuk is better than that of bonds and that it is always worthwhile to introduce a 
sukuk allocation to a conventional bond portfolio on a risk-adjusted basis. 
8.3 Implications 
Sukuk issuance should be encouraged by governments in Muslim countries for 
at least two reasons. 
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First, there is widespread evidence that efficient capital markets foster 
economic growth. A well-organized and liquid sukuk market can thus boost economic 
growth while being consistent with Shari’ah. Although the link between capital 
markets and economic growth can apply to all instruments (sukuk as well as 
conventional bonds), sukuk have added features that make them particularly attractive 
from a public policy perspective: Shari’ah compliance, economic system stability, 
reduced moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and greater conduciveness to 
poverty alleviation. 
Second, this study has shown that sukuk carry less market risk than 
conventional bonds. Thus, international investors who do not specifically pursue 
Shari’ah-compliant investment objectives can still benefit from allocating part of their 
resources to sukuk. This study has shown that sukuk are proving an excellent 
diversifier to a bond portfolio and improve the risk–return trade-off, as measured by 
the Sharpe ratio. 
8.4 Recommendations 
Governments should foster and encourage the growth of the sukuk sector in 
primary as well as secondary markets. 
Low secondary trading activity can make sukuk less attractive to international 
funds because of the lack of a wide spectrum of maturities. Low trading volumes will 
lead to investors demanding a liquidity premium, which would be detrimental to 
issuers. International bond funds would do well to include a sukuk allocation in their 
portfolios. 
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8.5 Limitations and Suggestions 
We have found that, for indices, the conventional bond VaR is higher than the 
sukuk VaR. While this finding could point to differences in the structures and natures 
of both instruments (our argument), it should be noted that the modified duration of 
the conventional bond index is higher than that of the sukuk index (7.5 compared with 
5.1), a situation that may have contributed to explaining our results. However, the 
index results were similar to individual companies’ results, for which no significant 
duration differences exist. In addition, given the smaller dependence upon interest 
rates of sukuk, the very concept of modified duration may be flawed when assessing 
sukuk risks.  
The superior risk–return trade-off offered by sukuk that we uncovered needs 
to be balanced against the persistent illiquidity of the secondary market for sukuk. 
Further work could be conducted to assess the extent to which the extra returns of 
sukuk can be explained by the “liquidity premium” frequently demanded by investors 
as compensation for illiquidity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
161 
 
 
 
References 
AAOIFI. (2008). Sukuk resolution. Retrieved from 
http://www.aaoifi.com/aaoifi_sb_Sukuk_Feb2008_Eng.pdf. 
Ab Majid, H., Shahimi, S., Hafizuddin, M., & Hafizuddin-Syah, M. (2010). Sukuk 
defaults and its implication: A case study of Malaysian capital market. 8th 
International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance. Retrieved from  
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265085046_Sukuk_Defaults_and_It
s_Implication_A_Case_Study_of_Malaysian_Capital_Market 
Abdel-Khaleq, A. H., & Richardson, C. F. (2006). New horizons for Islamic securities: 
Emerging trends in Sukuk offerings. Chicago Journal Of International Law, 7, 
409-416. 
Abedifar, P., Shahid, M., Ebrahim, P., Molyneux, P., & Amine, T. (2013). Islamic 
banking and finance: Recent empirical literature and directions for future 
research. Journal of Economic Survey, 29(4), 637–670. 
Abu-Bader, S., & Abu-Qarn, A. (2005). Financial development and economic growth: 
time series evidence from Egypt. 
Abduh, M., & Chowdhury, N. T. (2012). Does Islamic banking matter for economic 
growth in Bangladesh?. Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, 
8(3), 104-113. 
Abdullah, F., Hassan, T., & Mohamad, S. (2007). Investigation of performance of 
Malaysian Islamic unit trust funds: Comparison with conventional unit trust 
funds. Managerial Finance, 33(2), 142-153. 
Acerbi, C., & Tasche, D. (2002). On the coherence of expected shortfall. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 26(7), 1487–1503. 
Ahmad, N., Daud, S. N. M., & Kefeli, Z. (2012). Economic forces and the Sukuk 
market. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 65, 127-133. 
Al-Ajmi, J., Al-Saleh, N., & Hussain, H. A. (2011). Investment appraisal practices: A 
comparative study of conventional and Islamic financial institutions. Advances 
in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting, 27(1): 
111-124. 
Alam, N., Hassan, M. K., & Haque, M. A. (2013). Are Islamic bonds different from 
conventional bonds? International evidence from capital market tests. Borsa 
Istanbul Review, 13(3), 22-29. 
Albaity, M., & Ahmad, R. (2008). Performance of Syariah and composite indices: 
Evidence from Bursa Malaysia. Asian Academy of Management Journal of 
Accounting and Finance, 4(1), 23-43. 
162 
 
 
 
Al-Bashir, M., & Al-Amine, M. (2008). Sukuk market: Innovations and challenges. In 
Ali S. S. (Ed.), Islamic Capital Markets: Products, Regulation & Development, 
33-54. Jeddah: Islamic Research and Training Institute. 
Alexander, C. (1996): Handbook of risk management and analysis. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
Alexander, C. (2000). Risk management and analysis, Volume 1: Measuring and 
modelling financial risk. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Alexander, C. (2001). Market models: A guide to financial data analysis. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
Alexander, C. (2003). The present and future of financial risk management. ISMA 
Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2003-12, The University of Reading. 
Alhabshi, S. O. (1994). Development of capital market under Islamic principles. 
Conference on Managing & Implementing Interest Free Banking/Islamic 
Financial System. 
Aliyu, S., Hassan, M. K., Mohd Yusof, R., & Naiimi, N. (2017). Islamic banking 
sustainability: A review of literature and directions for future research. 
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 53(2), 440-470.  
Al-Omar, F., & Abdel Haq, M. K. (1996). Islamic banking: Theory, practice and 
challenges. London: Zed Books. 
Al-Suwailem, S. (1999). Towards an objective measure of gharar in exchange. Islamic 
Economic Studies, 7(1), 2-15. 
Al-Zoubi, H. A., & Maghyereh, A. I. (2007). The relative risk performance of Islamic 
finance: A new guide to less risky investments. International Journal of 
Theoretical and Applied Finance, 10(02), 235-249. 
Amihud, Y. (2002). Illiquidity and stock returns: Cross-section and time-series effects. 
Journal of Financial Markets, 5(1), 31-56. 
Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H., & Lauterbach, B. (1997). Market microstructure and 
securities values: Evidence from the Tel Aviv stock exchange. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 45(3), 365–390. 
Andersen, T. G., & Bollerslev, T. (1998). Answering the skeptics: Yes, standard 
volatility models do provide accurate forecasts. International Economic 
Review, 39, 885-905. 
Andjelić, G., Djaković, V., Radišić, S. (2010). Application of VaR in emerging 
markets: A case of selected central and eastern European countries. African 
Journal of Business Management, 4 (17), 3666-3680. 
163 
 
 
 
Angelovska, J. (2010). VaR based on SMA, EWMA and GARCH (1,1): Volatility 
models. Germany: VDM Verlag Dr.Muller. 
Angelovska, J. (2013). Managing market risk with VaR (Value At Risk). 
Management-Journal of Contemporary Management Issues, 2(18), 81-96. 
Askari, H. (2012). Islamic finance, risk sharing and international financial stability. 
Yale Journal of International Affairs 7, 1–8. 
Askari, H., & Rehman, S. S. (2010). How Islamic are Islamic countries? Global 
Economy Journal 10, 1–37. 
Asquith, P., & Mullins, D. (1986). Equity issues and offering dilution. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 15, 61-89. 
Ayman, H. A.-K., & Christopher, F. R. (2007). New horizons for Islamic securities: 
Emerging trends in Sukuk offerings. Chicago Journal of International Law, 
7(2), 409-417. 
Ayub, M. (2007). Understanding Islamic finance. West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Azmat, S., Skully, M., & Brown, K. (2014). Issuer's choice of Islamic bond type. 
Pacific-Basin finance journal, 28, 122-135. 
Azmat, S., Skully, M., & Brown, K. (2015). The (little) difference that makes all the 
difference between Islamic and conventional bonds. Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal, 42(C), 46-59. 
Bacha, O. (1996). Conventional versus Mudarabah financing: An agency cost 
perspective. International Journal of Economics, Management and 
Accounting, 4(2), 33-50.  
Baker, M. P., & Wurgler, J. (2002). Market timing and capital structure. The Journal 
of Finance 57, 1-32. 
Bams, D., & Wielhouwer, L. J. (2001). Empirical issues in value-at-risk. Astin 
Bulletin, 31(2), 299-317. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2014). Fundamental review of the trading 
book: A revised market risk framework. Retrieved from 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs265.pdf 
Bask, M. (2010). Measuring potential market risk. Journal of Financial Stability, 6(3), 
180-186. 
Bawa, V. S. (1978). Safety-first, stochastic dominance, and optimal portfolio choice. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 13(2), 255-271. 
164 
 
 
 
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Merrouche, O. (2013). Islamic vs. conventional 
banking: Business model, efficiency and stability. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 37, 433–447.  
Berkowitz, J., & O’Brien, J. (2002). How accurate are VaR models at commercial 
banks? The Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1093-1111. 
Bernstein, P. L. (1996). Against the gods: The remarkable story of risk. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Bharath, S. T., Paolo P., & Guojun, W. (2009). Does asymmetric information drive 
capital structure decisions? The Review of Financial Studies, 22(9), 3212-3243. 
Blume, M. E., Lim, F., & MacKinlay, C. A. (1998). The declining credit quality of 
U.S. corporate debt: Myth or reality? The Journal of Finance, 53, 1389–1413. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00057. 
Bolton, P., & Freixas, X. (2000). Equity, bonds and bank debt: Capital structure and 
23 financial market equilibrium under asymmetric information. Journal of 
Political Economy, 108(2), 324-351. 
Bolton, P., & Freixas, X. (2008). How can emerging market economies benefit from a 
corporate bond market? In K. Cowan, B. Eichengreen, & U. Panizza (Eds.), 
Bond markets in Latin America (pp. 29-49). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Boot, Arnoud W. A. (2000). Relationship banking: What do we know? Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 9(1), 7-25. 
Boudoukh, J., Richardson, M., & Whitelaw, F. R. (1998). The best of both worlds: A 
hybrid approach to calculating value at risk. Risk, 11(5), 64-67. 
Brooks, C., & Persand, G. (2003). Volatility forecasting for risk management. Journal 
of Forecasting, 22, 1-22. 
Brown, A. (2008). Private profits and socialized risk – Counterpoint capital 
inadequacy, global association of risk professionals, June/July.  
Brown, S. J., & Warner, J. B. (1985). Using daily stock returns: The case of event 
studies. Journal of Financial Economics, 14(1), 3-31. 
Bruinshoofd, A., & De Haan, L. (2007). Market timing and corporate capital structure: 
A transatlantic comparison. De Nederlandsche Bank Working Paper No. 144. 
Cakir, S., & Raei, F. (2007). Sukuk vs. Eurobonds: Is there a difference in value-at-
risk? IMF Working Papers: 1-20. 
165 
 
 
 
Campbell, J. Y., & Hentschel, L. (1992). No news is good news: An asymmetric model 
of changing volatility in stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 31, 
281-318. 
Caporin, M. (2003): The trade off between complexity and efficiency of VaR 
measures: A comparison of risk metric and GARCH-Type models. GRETA, 
working paper n.03.06. 
Chapra, M. U., & Khan, T. (2000). Regulation and supervision of Islamic banks, 
Islamic Development Bank, Islamic Research and Training Institute. Retrieved 
from http://www.sbp.org.pk/departments/ibd/Regulation_Supervision.pdf 
Chapra, U. M. (2008). The global financial crisis: Can Islamic finance help minimize 
the severity and frequency of such a crisis in the future? Presented at the Forum 
on the Global Financial Crisis, Islamic Development Bank, 25th October. 
Chen, J. (2013). Measuring market risk under the Basel accords: VaR, stressed VaR, 
and expected shortfall. Aestimatio, the IEB International Journal of Finance, 
8, 184-201. 
Chong, B. S., & Liu, M-H. (2009). Islamic banking: interest-free or interest-based? 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 17(1), 125-144. 
Christoffersen, P., Hahn, J., & Inoue, A. (2001). Testing and comparing Value-at-Risk 
measures, CIRANO, Paper 2001s-03. 
Christophe, J. G., Turk-Ariss, R., & Weill, L. (2013). Sukuk vs. conventional bonds: 
A stock market perspective. Journal of Comparative Economics, 41(3), 745-
755. 
Cole, H. L., & Kocherlakota, N. (1998). Zero nominal interest rates: Why they're good 
and how to get them. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Quarterly Review-
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 22(2), 2-11. 
Cooper, K. S., Groth, J. C., & Avera, W. E. (1985). Liquidity, exchange listing, and 
common stock performance. Journal of Economics and Business, 37(1), 19–
33. 
Dar, H. A., & Presley, R. (2000). Lack of profit and loss sharing in Islamic banking: 
Management and control imbalances. International Journal of Islamic 
Finance, 2(2), 3-18. 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited. (2002). Global risk management survey. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Docume
nts/us_fsi_aers_global_risk_management_survey_8thed_072913.pdf, 
Accessed January 28, 2010. 
166 
 
 
 
Denis, D. J., & Mihov, V. T. (2003). The choice among bank debt, non-bank private 
debt, and public debt: Evidence from new corporate borrowings. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 70, 3-28. 
Deželan, S. (2000). Efficiency of the Slovenian capital market. Economic and Business 
Review, 2, 61-83. 
Dias, A. (2013). Market capitalization and Value-at-Risk. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 37(12), 4675-5538. 
Dimson, E., & Marsh, P. (1990). Volatility forecasting without data snooping. Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 14, 399-421. 
DinarStandard. (2013). State of the global Islamic economy reports. Retrieved from  
http://www.dinarstandard.com/state-global-islamic-economy-report-2013/. 
Dittmar, A. K., & Thakor, A. V. (2007). Why do firms issue equity. The Journal of 
Finance, 62(1), 1-54. 
Donaldson, G. (1961). Corporate debt capacity: A study of corporate debt policy and 
the determination of corporate debt capacity. Harvard Business School, 
Division of Research, Harvard University, Boston, MA. 
Dong M., Loncarski, I., ter Horst, J., & Veld, C. (2012). What drives security issuance 
decisions: Market timing, pecking order, or both? Financial Management, 
41(3), 637-663. 
Dowd, K. (1999). A value at risk approach to risk-return analysis. The Journal of 
Portfolio Management, 25(4), 60-67. 
Dusuki, A. W. (2010). Do equity-based Sukuk structures in Islamic capital markets 
manifest the objectives of Shariah (? &quest)? Journal of Financial Services 
Marketing, 15(3), 203-214. 
Ebrahim, M., Shahid, A. J., Omar, F. A., & Salleh, M. O. (2016). Can Islamic 
injunctions indemnify the structural flaws of securitized debt? Journal of 
Corporate Finance, (37), 271–286. 
Engle, R. F., & Ng, V. K. (1993). Measuring and testing the impact of news on 
volatility. The journal of finance, 48(5), 1749-1778. 
El-Gamal, M. A. (2001). An economic explication of the prohibition of gharar in 
classical Islamic jurisprudence. Islamic Economic Studies, 8(2), 29-58. 
El-Gamal, M. (2009). Islamic finance: Law, economics and practice. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
167 
 
 
 
Elgari, M. A. (1997). Short term financial instruments based on salam contracts. 
Islamic Financial Instruments for Public Sector Resource Mobilization, 
Jeddah: Islamic Research and Training Institute: 249-266. 
El-Ghazali, M. (2002). Islam and Economic Conditions [in Arabic]. Cairo, Egypt: 
Nahdet Masr Publishing Co. 
El-Hawary, D., Grais, W., & Iqbal, Z. (2004). Regulating Islamic financial institutions: 
The nature of the regulated. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
(3227). 
El-Khamlichi, A., Sarkar, H., Arouri, M., & Teulon, F. (2014). Are Islamic equity 
indices more efficient than their conventional counterparts? Evidence from 
major global index families. The Journal of Applied Business Research, 30, 
1137-1150. 
Elyasiani. E., & Goldberg, L. G. (2004). Relationship lending: A survey of the 
literature. Journal of Economics and Business, 56(4), 315-330.Engle, F., & Ng, 
V. (1993). Measuring and testing the impact of news on volatility. The Journal 
of Finance, 48(5), 1749-1778. 
EYGM. (2015). World Islamic banking competitiveness report. EYGM Limited.  
Fallon, C. E., & Sabogal, S. J. (2004). Is historical VaR a reliable tool for relative risk 
measurement in the Columbian stock market?: An empirical analysis using the 
coefficient of variation. Retrieved from 
http://cuadernosadministracion.javeriana.edu.co/pdfs/6_27.pdf. Accessed 
January 28, 2010 
Fama, E. F. (1965). The behaviour of stock-market prices. Journal of Business, 381, 
34-105. 
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2005). Financing decisions: Who issues stock? Journal 
of Financial Economics, 76, 549-582. 
Fase, M. M. G., & Abma, R. C. N. (2003). Financial environment and economic 
growth in selected Asian countries. Journal of Asian Economics, 14, 11-21. 
Friedman, M. (1963). Inflation: Causes and consequences. Asia Publishing House. 
Furqani, H., & Mulyany, R. (2009). Islamic banking and economic growth: Empirical 
evidence from Malaysia. Journal of Economic Cooperation and Development, 
30(2), 59-74. 
Galal Abdullah Mouawad, S. (2009). The development of Islamic finance: Egypt as a 
case study. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 12(1), 74-87. 
168 
 
 
 
George, T. J., Kaul, G., & Nimalendran, M. (1991). Estimation of the bid-ask spread 
25 and its components: A new approach. Review of Financial Studies, 4(4), 
623-656. 
Giot, P., & Laurent, S. (2003). Market risk in commodity markets: A VaR approach. 
Energy Economics, 25(5), 435-457. 
Goaied, M., & Sassi, S. (2011). Financial development, Islamic banking and economic 
growth: Evidence from MENA region. International Journal of Business & 
Management Science 4(2), 105-128. 
Godlewski, C. J., & Weill, L. (2010). Are Sukuk really special? Evidence from the 
Malaysian stock exchange. University of Strasbourg, Strasbourg, France. 
Godlewski, C. J., Turk-Ariss, R., & Weill, L. (2011). Do markets perceive sukuk and 
conventional bonds as different financing instruments?. Institute for 
Economies in Transition, Finland. 
Godlewski, C. J., Turk-Ariss, R., & Weill, L. (2013). Sukuk vs. conventional bonds: 
A stock market perspective. Journal of Comparative Economics, 41(3), 745-
761. 
Godlewski, C. J., Turk-Ariss, R., & Weill, L. (2016). Do the type of Sukuk and choice 
of Shari’a scholar matter?. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 
132, 63-76. 
Goldsmith, R. (1969). Financial structure and economic growth in advanced 
countries. National Bureau Committee for Economic Research, Capital 
Formation and Economic Growth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Gomes, A., & Phillips, G. (2012). Why do public firms issue private and public 
securities?. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 21(4), 549-722. 
Graham, J. R., & Harvey, C. R. (2001). The theory and practice of corporate finance: 
Evidence from the field. Journal of Financial Economics, 60, 187-243. 
Grewal, B. K. (2007). Islamic capital market growth and trends. Islamic Finance News 
2007. 
Guermat, C., & Harris, D. F. R. (2002). Forecasting value at risk allowing for time 
variation in the variance and kurtosis of portfolio returns. International Journal 
of Forecasting, 18(3), 409-419. 
Gurley, J. G., & Shaw, E. S. (1955). Financial aspects of economic development. The 
American Economic Review, 45(4), 515-538. 
169 
 
 
 
Hakim, S., & Rashidian, M. (2002). Risk and return of Islamic stock market indexes. 
9th Economic Research Forum Annual Conference in Sharjah, UAE on 
October 26. 
Hale, G., & Santos, J. A. C. (2008). The decision to first enter the public bond market: 
The role of reputation, funding choices, and bank relationships. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 32(9), 1928-1940. 
Harmantzis, F. C., Miao, L., & Chien, Y. (2006). Empirical study of value-at risk and 
expected shortfall model with heavy tails. Journal of Risk Finance, 7(2), 117-
135. 
Hasan, M., & Dridi, J. (2010). The effects of the global crisis on Islamic and 
conventional banks: A comparative study. IMF Working Paper No., 
WP/10/201, September. 
Hassan, M. K., & Bashir, A. H. M. (2003). Determinants of Islamic banking 
profitability. In 10th ERF annual conference, Morocco (pp. 16-18). 
Hassan, M. K., & Sirajo, A. (2017). A review of empirical Islamic finance literature. 
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 53(2), 440-470. 
Hayat, R., & Kraeussl, R. (2011). Risk and return characteristics of Islamic equity 
funds. Emerging Markets Review, 12(2), 189-203. 
Henderson, B. J., Jegadeesh, N., & Weisbach, M. S. (2006). World markets for raising 
new capital. Journal of Financial Economics, 82, 63-101. 
Hesse, H., Jobst, A., & Sole, J. (2008). Trends and challenges in Islamic finance. World 
Economics, 9(2), 175-193. 
Hoshi, T., & Kashyap, A. K. (1990). Evidence on Q and investment for Japanese firms. 
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 4(4), 371-400. 
Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A., & Scharfstein, D. (1991). Corporate structure, liquidity, and 
investment: Evidence from Japanese industrial groups. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 106(1), 33-60. 
Hovakimian, A., Opler, T., & Titman, S. (2001). The debt-equity choice. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 36(1), 1-24. 
Huang, H., & Lin, S-C. (2009). Non-linear finance—growth nexus: A threshold with 
instrumental variable approach. Economics of Transition, 17(3), 439–466. 
Hull, J. C., & White, A. (1998). Incorporating volatility updating into the historical 
simulation method for value at risk. Journal of Risk, 1(1), 5-19. 
170 
 
 
 
Hussein, K., & Omran, M. (2005). Ethical investment revisited: evidence from Dow 
Jones Islamic indexes. The Journal of Investing, 14(3), 105-126. 
Iqbal, M., Aḥmad, A., & Khan, T. (1998). Challenges facing Islamic banking. Islamic 
Research and Training Institute. 
Iqbal, Z., & Mirakhor, A. (2011). An introduction to Islamic finance: Theory and 
practice (2nd ed.). Singapore: John Wiley and Sons (Asia). 
Islamic Financial Services Industry (IFSI). (2015). Islamic Financial Services Industry 
Stability Report 2015 (3rd ed.). Retrieved from  
http://www.ifsb.org/docs/IFSI%20Stability%20Report%202016%20%28final
%29.pdf 
Jawadi, F., Jawadi, N., & Louhichi, W. (2014). Conventional and Islamic stock price 
performance: An empirical investigation. International Economics, 137, 73-
87. 
Jin, C., & Ziobrowski, A. J. (2011). Using value-at-risk to estimate downside 
residential market risk. Journal of Real Estate Research, 33(3), 389-413. 
Jobst, A., Kunzel, P., Mills, P., & Sy, A. (2008). Islamic bond issuance: What 
sovereign debt managers need to know. International Journal of Islamic and 
Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 1(4), 330-344. 
Jorion, P. (1996). Value at risk: The new benchmark for controlling derivative risk. 
Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin Professional Pub. 
Jorion, P. (2001). Value at risk: The new benchmark for managing financial risk (2nd. 
ed.). New York: McGraw Hill. 
Jung, K., Yong-Cheol, K., & Stulz, R. (1996). Timing, investment opportunities, 
managerial discretion, and the security issue decision. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 42(2), 159–186. 
Kabir, H., & Mahlkrecht, M. (Eds.). (2011). Islamic capital markets: Products and 
strategies. West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons. 
Kader, J. M., Asarpota, A. K., & Al-Magaireh, A. (2007), Comparative financial 
performance of Islamic banks vis-à-vis conventional banks in the UAE, 
(Electronic Version), U.A.E. University, The first annual student research 
symposium, Al-Ain, May 23, 2007.Kahf, M. (1997). The use of assets ijara 
bonds for bridging the budget gap. Islamic Economic Studies, 4(2), 82.-114 
Karim, B. A., Lee, W. S., Karim, Z. A., & Jais, M. (2012). The impact of subprime 
mortgage crisis on Islamic banking and Islamic stock market. Procedia-Social 
and Behavioral Sciences, 65, 668-673. 
171 
 
 
 
Kaplan, S. N., & Zingales, L. (1997). Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide 
useful measures of financing constraints?. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
112(1), 169-215. 
Kenourgios, D., & Samitas, A. (2007). Financial development and economic growth 
in a transition economy: Evidence for Poland. Journal of Financial Decision 
Making, 3(1), 35-48. 
Khan, F. (2010). How ‘Islamic’ is Islamic Banking? Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization, 76(3), 805-820. 
Khan, T., & Ahmed, H. (2001). Risk management: An analysis of issues in Islamic 
financial industry. Islamic Development Bank, Islamic Research and Training 
Institute. Retrieved from 
http://www.cba.edu.kw/elsakka/Risk_Management_DrTariqullah_Khan.pdf. 
King, R. G., & Levine, R. (1993). Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be right. 
The quarterly journal of economics, 108(3), 717-737. 
Kroner, K. F., & Ng, V. (1998). Modeling asymmetric comovements of asset returns. 
The Review of Financial Studies, 11(4), 817-844. 
Kroner, K. F., & Sultan, J. (1993). Time-varying distributions and dynamic hedging 
with foreign currency futures. Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis, 
28, 535-551. 
Kupiec, P. H. (1995). Techniques for verifying the accuracy of risk measurement 
models. The Journal of Derivatives, 3, 73–84. 
Kuruc, A., & Lee, B. (1998). How to trim your hedge: How VAR can be applied to 
trading positions. Risk-London-Risk Magazine Limited, 11, 46-49. 
Kusuma, K. A., & Silva, A. C. (2014). Sukuk markets: a proposed approach for 
development. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7133. 
Lehar, A., Scheicher, M., & Schittenkopf, C. (2002). GARCH vs. stochastic volatility: 
Option pricing and risk management. Journal of Banking Finance, 26, 323-
345. 
Lemmon, M. L., & Zender, J. F. (2010). Debt capacity and tests of capital structure 
theories. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(5), 1161–1187. 
Levine, R. (1993). Financial development and economic growth: Views and agenda. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 35(2), 688-726. 
Levine, R., Loayza, N., & Beck, T. (2000). Financial intermediation and growth: 
Causality and causes. Journal of Monetary Economics, 46(1), 31-77. 
172 
 
 
 
Levine, R., & Zervos, S. (1998). Stock markets, banks, and economic growth. 
American Economic Review, 537-558. 
Linsmeier, T. J., & Pearson, N. D. (1996). Risk measurement: An introduction to value 
at risk. 1-44. Working paper 96-04, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. Retrieved from 
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/14796/1/aceo9604.pdf 
Linsmeier, T. J., & Pearson, N. D. (2000). Value at risk. Financial Analysts Journal, 
56(2), 47-67. 
Llorente, G., Saar, G., & Want, J. (2002). Dynamic volume-return relation of 
individual stocks. Review of Financial Studies, 15(4), 1005-1047. 
Lopez, J. (1999). Methods for evaluating value-at-risk estimates, Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco. Economic Review, 2, 3-15. 
Lucas A. (2000). A note on optimal estimation from a risk management perspective 
under possibly miss specified tail behavior. Journal of Business and Economic 
Statistics, (18), 31-39. 
Lucas, R. E. (1988). On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 22(1), 3-42. 
Lydon, G. (2009). A paper economy of faith without faith in paper: A reflection on 
Islamic institutional history. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 
71(3), 647-659. 
Maghrebi, N., Mirakhor, A., & Iqbal, Z. (2016). Intermediate Islamic Finance. 
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
Maghyereh, A. I., & Awartani, B. (2016). Dynamic transmissions between Sukuk and 
bond markets. Research in International Business and Finance, 38, 246-261. 
Mandelbrot, B., 1963. New methods of statistical economics. The Journal of Political 
Economy 71, 421-440. 
Manganelli, S., & Engle, R. F. (2001). Value at risk models in finance. ECB working 
paper series, No 75. Retrieved from 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=356220.  
Marinelli, C., d’Addona, S., & Rachev, S. T. (2007). A comparison of some univariate 
models for value-at-risk and expected shortfall. International Journal of 
Theoretical and Applied Finance (IJTAF), 10 (6), 1043-1075. 
Markowitz, H. (1952).: Portfolio Selection. The Journal of Finance, 7, pp. 77-91. 
173 
 
 
 
Masih, R., & Masih, A. M. (1996). Macroeconomic activity dynamics and Granger 
causality: New evidence from a small developing economy based on a vector 
error-correction modelling analysis. Economic Modelling, 13(3), 407-426. 
McKinnon, R. I. (1973). Money and capital in economic development. Washington, 
DC: The Brookings Institution. 
Mizen, P., & Tsoukas, S. (2013). What promotes greater use of the corporate bond 
market? A study of the issuance behavior of firms in Asia. Oxford Economic 
Papers, 66(1), 227-253. 
Mohamed, H. H., Masih, M., & Bacha, O. I. (2015). Why do issuers issue Sukuk or 
conventional bond? Evidence from Malaysian listed firms using partial 
adjustment models.Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 34, 233–252. 
Mohieldin, M. (2012). Realizing the potential of Islamic finance. Economic Premise, 
77, 1-7. Retrieved from 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/987991468171844534/pdf/67644
0BRI0econ00Box367885B00PUBLIC0.pdf 
Myers, S. C. (1984). The capital structure puzzle. The Journal of Finance, 39(3), 575-
592. 
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions 
when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 13, 187-221. 
Nagano, M. (2017). Sukuk issuance and information asymmetry: Why do firms issue 
Sukuk? Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 42, 142-157. 
Nylund, S. (2001): Value-at-Risk Analysis for Heavy-Tailed Financial Returns 
Helsinki University of Technology, Department of Engineering Physics and 
Mathematics. 
Odedokun, M. (1992). Supply-leading and demand-following relationships between 
economic activity and development banking in developing countries: An 
empirical analysis. Singapore Economic Review, 37, 46-58. 
Ongena, S., & Şendeniz-Yüncü, I. (2011). Which firms engage small, foreign, or state 
banks? And who goes Islamic? Evidence from Turkey. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 35(12), 3213–3324. 
Parrondo, M., & Juan, R. (1997). Calculation of the value at risk in emerging markets. 
Santander Investments report, (2), 38-51. 
Pastor, L., & Stambaugh, R. F. (2003). Liquidity risk and expected stock returns. 
Journal of Political Economy, 111(3), 642-685. 
174 
 
 
 
Patrick, H. T. (1966). Financial development and economic growth in developing 
countries. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 14(2), 174-89. 
Pérignon, C., & Smith, D. R. (2010). Diversification and value-at-risk. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 34(1), 55-66. 
Rajan, R. G. (1992). Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arm’s-
length debt. The Journal of Finance, 47(4), 1367-1423. 
Ramasamy, R., Yan, S. F., & Schmidt, A. M. (2011). Receptor for AGE (RAGE): 
Signaling mechanisms in the pathogenesis of diabetes and its complications. 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1243(1), 88-102. 
Risk Metrics – Technical Document 1995. J.P.Morgan/Reuters, Third Edition, New 
York. Retrieved from https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/5915b101-
4206-4ba0-aee2-3449d5c7e95a 
Robinson, J. (1952). The generalization of the general theory in the rate of interest 
and other essays. London: Macmillan. 
Roll, R. (1984). A simple implicit measure of the effective bid-ask spread in an 
efficient market. The Journal of Finance, 39(4), 1127-1139. 
Romeo, A. (2007). Finance and growth in the EU: New evidence from the 
harmonization of the banking industry. Journal of Banking and Finance, 31, 
1937-1954. 
Rusgianto, S., & Ahmad, N. (2013). Volatility behavior of Sukuk market: An 
empirical analysis of the Dow Jones Citigroup Sukuk Index. Middle East 
Journal of Scientific Research, 13, 1887-1895. 
Santoso, W. (2000). Value at risk: An approach to calculating market risk. Working 
paper, Banking Research and Regulation Directorate, Bank Indonesia. 
Schaeck, K., & Čihák, M. (2008). How does competition affect efficiency and 
soundness in banking? New empirical evidence. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1934). The theory of economic development. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Sharpe, S. A., (1990). Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: 
A stylized model of customer relations. The Journal of Finance, 45(4), 1069-
1087. 
Shaw, E. S. (1973). Financial deepening in economic development. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
175 
 
 
 
Shyam-Sunder, L., & Myers, S. C. (1999). Testing static tradeoff against pecking order 
models of capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 51, 219-244. 
Siddiqui, R. (2007). Shari’ah compliance, performance and conversion: The case of 
the Dow Jones Islamic Index. Chicago Journal of International Law, 7(2), 495-
519. 
Sinha T., & Chamu, F. (2000). Comparing different methods of calculating value at 
risk. Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico. Retrieved from 
http://www.gloriamundi.org/picsresources/tapens.pdf. Accessed January 
20,2010. 
Tabash, M. I., & Dhankar, R. S. (2014). The flow of Islamic finance and economic 
growth: An empirical evidence of Middle East. Journal of Finance and 
Accounting, 2(1), 11-19. 
Tang, D. (2006). The effect of financial development on economic growth: Evidence 
from the APEC countries. Applied Economics, 38(16), 1889-1904. 
Tariq, A. A. (2004). Managing financial risks of Sukuk structures. Loughborough 
University, UK, September (mimeo). 
Tariq, A. A., & Dar, H. (2007). Risks of Sukuk structures: Implications for resource 
mobilization. Thunderbird International Business Review, 49(2), 203-223. 
Turk Ariss, R. (2010). Competitive conditions in Islamic and conventional banking: A 
global perspective. Review of Financial Economics, 19(3), 101–108. 
Udell, G. F., & Berger, A. N. (1995). Relationship lending and lines of credit in small 
firm finance. Journal of Business, 68(3), 351-381. 
Usmani, M. T. (2008). Sukuk and their contemporary applications. Internet download: 
1-16. 
Valentinyi-Endrész, M. (2004). Structural breaks and financial risk management, 
MNB Working paper 2004/11, Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
Viceira, L. M. (2012). Bond risk, bond return volatility, and the term structure of 
interest rates. International Journal of Forecasting, 28(1), 97-117. 
Vishwanath, S., & Azmi, S. (2009). An overview of Islamic Sukuk bonds. The Journal 
of Structured Finance, 14(4), 58-67. 
Wang, P. (2010). A measuring approach of portfolio's VaR based on APGARCH-
EWMA model, information processing (ISIP): Third International Symposium 
on Information Processing, pp. 6-8. Doi:10.1109/ISIP.2010.118. 
176 
 
 
 
Wilson, C. (1979). An infinite horizon model with money. General equilibrium, 
growth, and trade: Essays in honor of Lionel McKenzie, 79-104. 
Wilson, R. (2002). Arab government responses to Islamic finance: the cases of Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia. Mediterranean Politics, 7(3), 143-163. 
Wilson, R. (2008). Innovation in the structuring of Islamic Sukuk securities. 
Humanomics, 24(3), 170-181. 
Wong, C. S. M., Cheng, Y. W., & Wong, Y. P. C. (2002). Market risk management of 
banks: Implications from the accuracy of VaR forecasts. Journal of 
Forecasting, 22, 22-33.Zakaria, N. B., Isa, M. A., & Abidin, R. A. Z. (2012). 
The construct of Sukuk, rating and default risk. Procedia-Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, 65, 662-667. 
Zarqa, M. A. (1997). Istisna’financing of infrastructure projects. Islamic Economic 
Studies, 4(2), 67-74. 
Žiković, S. (2006a). Applying hybrid approach to calculating VaR in Croatia. 
Proceedings of the International Conference “From transition to sustainable 
development: The path to European integration," Faculty of Economics, 
Sarajevo, Sarajevo, October 12-13, pp. 50-71. 
Žiković, S. (2006b). Implications of measuring VaR using historical simulation: An 
example of Zagreb Stock Exchange index – CROBEX. In J. Roufagalas (Ed.), 
Resource allocation and institutions: Explorations in economics finance and 
law (pp. 367-389). Athens: Athens Institute for Education and Research. 
Žiković, S. (2007). Measuring market risk in EU new member states. Proceedings of 
the 13th Dubrovnik Economic Conference, Dubrovnik, Croatia. 
Žikovic S., & Aktan, B. (2009). Global financial crisis and VaR performance in 
emerging markets: A case of EU candidate states – Turkey and Croatia. 
Proceedings of Faculty of Economics Rijeka, 27(1), 149 - 170. 
Žiković, S., & Bezić, H. (2006). Is historical simulation appropriate for measuring 
market risk? : A case of countries candidates for EU accession, CEDIMES 
conference paper, 23-27 March, 2006. 
 
 
 177 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Kupiec LR Test Results 
BLME 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.95000 0.97509 12.952 0.00031958 0.25681 1.6232 0.95000 0.97136 9.0548 0.0026201 0.080176 1.7932 
0.97500 0.98132 1.4401 0.23013 0.28640 1.5935 0.97500 0.97758 0.22777 0.63318 0.088688 1.7389 
0.99000 0.98630 0.99475 0.31859 0.32161 1.5807 0.99000 0.98007 6.2011 0.012767 0.093209 1.5964 
0.99500 0.99128 1.8234 0.17691 0.37026 1.7442 0.99500 0.98630 8.2641 0.0040436 0.10509 1.7029 
0.99750 0.99377 3.1517 0.075849 0.43968 1.9016 0.99750 0.98755 16.209 5.6726e-005 0.10443 1.6477 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.050000 0.043587 0.72548 0.39435 -0.14399 2.2129 0.050000 
 
0.046077 0.26685 0.60545 -0.046970 2.0871 
0.025000 
 
0.027397 0.18369 0.66822 -0.18063 2.0382 0.025000 
 
0.033624 2.2150 0.13668 -0.054463 1.8701 
0.010000 
 
0.013699 0.99475 0.31859 -0.26647 2.2163 0.010000 
 
0.018680 4.8673 0.027371 -0.071423 1.9650 
0.0050000 
 
0.012453 6.3259 0.011899 -0.27751 2.0134 0.0050000 
 
0.012453 6.3259 0.011899 -0.084327 2.1107 
0.0025000 
 
0.011208 13.082 0.00029811 -0.26887 1.8786 0.0025000 
 
0.0099626 10.181 0.0014191 -0.095344 2.1312 
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MAF 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.95000 0.95050 0.0026137 0.95923 0.23488 1.4285 0.95000 
 
0.96436 2.4247 0.11944 0.91398 -8.5469 
0.97500 0.97426 0.011316 0.91528 0.27602 1.5068 0.97500 0.96832 0.85430 0.35534 0.99711 3.4383 
0.99000 0.98218 2.5323 0.11153 0.26952 1.4707 0.99000 0.98218 2.5323 0.11153 1.6310 2.7936 
0.99500 0.98614 5.3653 0.020541 0.29462 1.4589 0.99500 0.98416 7.5611 0.0059642 1.8139 2.3468 
0.99750 0.98812 9.2737 0.0023247 0.31256 1.4148 0.99750 0.98416 16.157 5.8300e-005 1.8139 1.9673 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.050000 
 
0.047525 0.066182 0.79698 -0.28603 1.6082 0.050000 
 0.033663 
3.1902 0.074080 -1.0477 2.8473 
0.025000 
 
0.033663 1.4052 0.23586 -0.32833 1.5062 0.025000 
 0.025743 
0.011316 0.91528 -1.2819 2.8082 
0.010000 
 
0.019802 3.8131 0.050853 -0.39492 1.5168 0.010000 
 0.019802 
3.8131 0.050853 -1.5329 2.7880 
0.0050000 
 
0.011881 3.4603 0.062859 -0.49011 1.6425 0.0050000 
 0.017822 
10.012 0.0015557 -1.6930 2.6896 
0.0025000 
 
0.0099010 6.3162 0.011964 -0.54663 1.6126 
0.0025000 
0.015842 16.157 5.8300e-005 -1.8812 2.6575 
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Petronas 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.95000 0.92605 13.182 0.00028271 0.36032 1.5142 0.95000 0.93167 7.9331 0.0048539 0.25019 1.7838 
0.97500 0.95740 13.105 0.00029455 0.43569 1.4437 0.97500 0.95338 19.096 1.2428e-005 0.30004 1.6575 
0.99000 0.98071 8.5314 0.0034907 0.64769 1.5128 0.99000 0.96543 46.309 1.0100e-011 0.35864 1.4154 
0.99500 0.98633 12.719 0.00036191 0.80368 1.5070 0.99500 0.97347 57.160 4.0190e-014 0.34646 1.3252 
0.99750 0.99196 9.6176 0.0019272 1.1133 1.6581 0.99750 0.98071 56.658 5.1847e-014 0.39248 1.2807 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.050000 0.022508 24.684 6.7547e-007 -0.61372 1.7950 0.050000 0.018489 33.923 5.7351e-009 -0.53536 1.6558 
0.025000 
 
0.012862 9.1194 0.0025291 -0.76354 2.0120 0.025000 
 
0.014469 6.6549 0.0098884 -0.62347 1.8325 
0.010000 
 
0.0072347 1.0631 0.30250 -1.0635 2.3736 0.010000 
 
0.0088424 0.17520 0.67553 -0.76075 1.9070 
0.0050000 
 
0.0048232 0.0079138 0.92911 -1.3454 2.7833 0.0050000 
 
0.0064309 0.46931 0.49331 -0.93527 2.0481 
0.0025000 
 
0.0032154 0.23401 0.62857 -1.8025 3.3830 0.0025000 
 
0.0048232 2.1124 0.14611 -1.1358 2.2337 
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Rasmala 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.95000 0.97450 8.3913 0.0037703 0.32357 1.3028 0.95000 0.98543 19.890 8.2041e-006 0.22109 1.1859 
0.97500 0.98179 1.1432 0.28498 0.36277 1.2310 0.97500 0.99454 12.540 0.00039837 0.25263 1.2313 
0.99000 0.98907 0.046453 0.82935 0.38393 1.1850 0.99000 0.99818 5.6111 0.017847 0.32216 1.3978 
0.99500 0.99089 1.4959 0.22130 0.38889 1.1223 0.99500 0.99818 1.4760 0.22440 0.32216 1.2966 
0.99750 0.99636 0.25177 0.61583 0.50529 1.1745 0.99750 0.99818 0.11199 0.73789 0.32216 1.2150 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.050000 
 0.025501 
8.3913 0.0037703 -0.48903 4.9360 0.050000 
 0.038251 
1.7300 0.18841 -0.24008 3.3884 
0.025000 
 0.023679 
0.039971 0.84154 -0.48846 3.8198 0.025000 
 0.027322 
0.11798 0.73124 -0.30076 3.0601 
0.010000 
 0.021858 
5.8258 0.015793 -0.51662 3.0881 0.010000 
 0.021858 
5.8258 0.015793 -0.35681 2.6852 
0.0050000 
0.020036 14.154 0.00016845 -0.53585 2.8218 0.0050000 
 0.012750 
4.6290 0.031435 -0.46588 3.2913 
0.0025000 
0.018215 22.601 1.9942e-006 -0.56701 2.6567 0.0025000 
 
0.010929 8.4857 0.0035794 -0.51692 3.2265 
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Tamweel 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.95000 
 
0.95892 2.0332 0.15389 1.0240 -1.8426 
0.95000 
0.99126 61.541 4.3299e-
015 
3.2368 3.4575 
0.97500 
 
0.97028 0.98704 0.32047 1.3159 -0.37742 
0.97500 
0.99126 16.492 4.8855e-
005 
3.2368 3.0578 
0.99000 
 
0.97727 13.759 0.00020783 1.4893 -1.4881 
0.99000 
0.99126 0.19121 0.66191 3.2368 2.6963 
0.99500 0.97990 29.714 5.0076e-008 1.6036 2.5952 0.99500 0.99126 2.6284 0.10496 3.2368 2.4957 
0.99750 0.98339 39.907 2.6637e-010 1.7085 2.3276 0.99750 0.99126 10.800 0.0010150 3.2368 2.3349 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.050000 
0.029720 11.519 0.00068903 -0.89015 0.98364 
0.050000 
0.0096154 58.066 2.5313e-
014 
-1.6189 3.0104 
0.025000 
 0.020105 
1.2041 0.27251 -1.1154 1.1333 
0.025000 
0.0078671 18.731 1.5050e-
005 
-1.7546 2.6025 
0.010000 
 0.012238 
0.54015 0.46237 -1.3527 1.2804 0.010000 
 
0.0078671 0.56721 0.45137 -1.7546 2.0465 
0.0050000 
0.010490 
5.2572 0.021856 -1.5066 1.2323 0.0050000 
 
0.0078671 1.6081 0.20476 -1.7546 1.7900 
0.0025000 
 
0.0087413 10.800 0.0010150 -1.6440 1.2722 
0.0025000 
0.0061189 4.2663 0.038876 -1.9770 1.7943 
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Dubai 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.95000 
 
0.95892 2.0332 0.15389 1.0240 -1.8426 
0.95000 
0.99126 61.541 4.3299e-
015 
3.2368 3.4575 
0.97500 
 
0.97028 0.98704 0.32047 1.3159 -0.37742 
0.97500 
0.99126 16.492 4.8855e-
005 
3.2368 3.0578 
0.99000 
 
0.97727 13.759 0.00020783 1.4893 -1.4881 
0.99000 
0.99126 0.19121 0.66191 3.2368 2.6963 
0.99500 0.97990 29.714 5.0076e-008 1.6036 2.5952 0.99500 0.99126 2.6284 0.10496 3.2368 2.4957 
0.99750 0.98339 39.907 2.6637e-010 1.7085 2.3276 0.99750 0.99126 10.800 0.0010150 3.2368 2.3349 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.050000 
0.029720 11.519 0.00068903 -0.89015 0.98364 
0.050000 
0.0096154 58.066 2.5313e-
014 
-1.6189 3.0104 
0.025000 
 0.020105 
1.2041 0.27251 -1.1154 1.1333 
0.025000 
0.0078671 18.731 1.5050e-
005 
-1.7546 2.6025 
0.010000 
 0.012238 
0.54015 0.46237 -1.3527 1.2804 0.010000 
 
0.0078671 0.56721 0.45137 -1.7546 2.0465 
0.0050000 
 0.010490 
5.2572 0.021856 -1.5066 1.2323 0.0050000 
 
0.0078671 1.6081 0.20476 -1.7546 1.7900 
0.0025000 
 
0.0087413 10.800 0.0010150 -1.6440 1.2722 0.0025000 
 
0.0061189 4.2663 0.038876 -1.9770 1.7943 
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DP World 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.95000 0.95492 0.94762 0.33033 0.70562 2.3251 0.95000 0.96049 4.4718 0.034458 1.2509 1.7250 
0.97500 0.96828 3.0719 0.079657 0.86896 1.8950 0.97500 0.97329 0.21123 0.64580 1.4507 1.6753 
0.99000 0.98275 7.8432 0.0051011 1.2970 2.1194 0.99000 0.98219 8.9810 0.0027280 1.7088 1.6306 
0.99500 
0.98609 19.280 1.1289e-
005 
1.3631 1.7013 
0.99500 
0.98609 19.280 1.1289e-
005 
1.8684 1.6077 
0.99750 
0.98998 23.054 1.5754e-
006 
1.6774 1.6453 
0.99750 
0.98887 28.852 7.8106e-
008 
2.1150 1.6019 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.050000 
 0.046745 
0.40945 0.52225 -0.98078 2.0991 0.050000 
 
0.043406 1.7186 0.18988 -1.6317 2.1001 
0.025000 
 0.033945 
5.3152 0.021140 -1.2132 2.0432 0.025000 
 
0.032276 3.5799 0.058484 -1.9048 2.0370 
0.010000 
0.022816 21.879 2.9045e-
006 
-1.5759 2.0283 
0.010000 
0.024485 27.125 1.9067e-
007 
-2.1950 1.9625 
0.0050000 
0.017251 33.025 9.0987e-
009 
-1.8500 2.0895 
0.0050000 
0.020590 49.148 2.3737e-
012 
-2.4001 1.9258 
0.0025000 
0.013912 45.044 1.9267e-
011 
-2.1138 2.1308 0.0025000 
 
0.017807 71.062 0.00000 -2.5959 1.8906 
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Index 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.95000 0.94711 0.49839 0.48021 0.29057 1.4070 0.95000 0.95984 4.7706 0.028950 0.22387 1.4477 
0.97500 0.96647 7.8135 0.0051858 0.32136 1.3437 0.97500 0.96805 3.9954 0.045626 0.27239 1.1934 
0.99000 
0.97822 30.327 3.6499e-
008 
0.35930 1.2587 
0.99000 
0.97764 25.038 5.6220e-
007 
0.34476 1.7947 
0.99500 
0.98548 34.733 3.7817e-
009 
0.38109 1.2335 
0.99500 
0.98083 51.240 8.1757e-
013 
0.38181 1.0950 
0.99750 
0.98894 45.856 1.2728e-
011 
0.38915 1.1867 
0.99750 
0.98403 71.185 0.00000 0.44323 2.0965 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.050000 
0.067058 16.085 6.0547e-
005 
-0.27476 1.4138 0.050000 
 0.036057 
9.8908 0.0016611 -0.25435 2.7236 
0.025000 
0.039060 20.085 7.4089e-
006 
-0.32078 1.3703 0.025000 
 0.026016 
0.091500 0.76228 -0.33637 2.4939 
0.010000 
0.023159 36.903 1.2414e-
009 
-0.35117 1.3115 
0.010000 
0.020539 18.841 1.4205e-
005 
-0.41075 2.1192 
0.0050000 
0.016592 48.471 3.3517e-
012 
-0.37211 1.2728 
0.0050000 
0.016431 35.859 2.1214e-
009 
-0.49915 2.1955 
0.0025000 
0.011753 51.963 5.6566e-
013 
-0.40317 1.2502 
0.0025000 
0.014605 60.244 8.3267e-
015 
-0.54745 1.6949 
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Index Pre-crisis 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.95000 0.94265 1.1776 0.27785 0.23329 1.4210 0.95000 0.95460 0.35462 0.55151 0.063991 1.6906 
0.97500 0.96207 6.4145 0.011319 0.25482 1.3391 0.97500 0.96887 1.1035 0.29350 0.080205 1.6700 
0.99000 0.97687 13.729 0.00021115 0.29400 1.2690 0.99000 0.98314 3.0400 0.081238 0.11466 1.8409 
0.99500 0.98520 13.643 0.00022104 0.31538 1.2612 0.99500 0.98573 8.8443 0.0029401 0.12607 1.8023 
0.99750 
0.98705 23.580 1.1980e-006 0.30532 1.1870 
0.99750 
0.98573 20.279 6.6923e-
006 
0.12607 1.6595 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.050000 
 
0.073080 10.678 0.0010841 -0.22775 1.3816 0.050000 
 
0.029831 7.6706 0.0056129 -0.15614 3.0244 
0.025000 
0.049029 20.090 7.3897e-006 -0.25486 1.2808 0.025000 
 
0.023346 0.088423 0.76619 -0.18799 2.9578 
0.010000 
0.024052 15.473 8.3687e-005 -0.28079 1.2467 0.010000 
 
0.022049 8.4172 0.0037169 -0.19774 2.5614 
0.0050000 
0.014801 13.643 0.00022104 -0.30557 1.2275 
0.0050000 
0.019455 18.633 1.5845e-
005 
-0.21166 2.4833 
0.0025000 
0.012026 20.344 6.4705e-006 -0.31529 1.1600 
0.0025000 
0.019455 35.633 2.3819e-
009 
-0.21166 2.2721 
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Index Post-crisis 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.95000 0.94926 0.021064 0.88460 0.32665 1.3984 0.95000 0.96341 5.9050 0.015098 0.34196 1.5857 
0.97500 0.96691 4.4305 0.035303 0.35557 1.3263 0.97500 0.97396 0.061983 0.80339 0.46320 1.2098 
0.99000 
0.97904 16.722 4.3272e-
005 
0.39619 1.2496 
0.99000 
0.97959 11.950 0.00054638 0.53012 1.7142 
0.99500 
0.98566 21.081 4.4036e-
006 
0.42153 1.2143 
0.99500 
0.98311 24.841 6.2261e-007 0.60690 2.1086 
0.99750 
0.99117 17.500 2.8732e-
005 
0.43416 1.2119 
0.99750 
0.98874 23.373 1.3346e-006 0.89040 1.9447 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 Quantile Success 
rate 
Kupiec 
LRT 
P-value ESF1 ESF2 
0.050000 
 
0.062879 5.8739 0.015367 -0.31062 1.4406 0.050000 
 0.038705 
4.1245 0.042267 -0.34835 1.8821 
0.025000 
 
0.035852 7.7385 0.0054055 -0.36807 1.4126 0.025000 
 0.026742 
0.17298 0.67747 -0.42853 2.3967 
0.010000 
0.023718 24.879 6.1058e-
007 
-0.38896 1.3317 0.010000 
 0.019001 
9.1987 0.0024218 -0.57089 1.3427 
0.0050000 
0.016547 30.180 3.9365e-
008 
-0.41911 1.3114 
0.0050000 
0.013371 13.689 0.00021575 -0.79333 1.7892 
0.0025000 
0.012135 34.744 3.7602e-
009 
-0.44843 1.2882 
0.0025000 
0.009148
5 
14.898 0.00011349 -1.1316 2.5373 
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Appendix 2: Engle and Manganelli Test Results 
BLME 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.95000 50.535 3.6715e-009 0.95000 48.068 1.1451e-008 
0.97500 31.038 2.4925e-005 0.97500 19.829 0.0029707 
0.99000 6.3216 0.38815 0.99000 29.567 4.7505e-005 
0.99500 16.479 0.011402 0.99500 10.092 0.12082 
0.99750 1.9648 0.92291 0.99750 13.368 0.037554 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.050000 15.962 0.013961 0.050000 24.407 0.00043944 
0.025000 5.5650 0.47364 0.025000 17.448 0.0077703 
0.010000 31.382 2.1431e-005 0.010000 16.469 0.011446 
0.0050000 17.378 0.0079912 0.0050000 4.3053 0.63543 
0.0025000 14.186 0.027627 0.0025000 4.9610 0.54882 
 
 
MAF 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.95000 3.6375 0.72559 0.95000 8.5163 0.20266 
0.97500 3.8037 0.70321 0.97500 3.4156 0.75517 
0.99000 6.9035 0.32986 0.99000 6.9626 0.32432 
0.99500 12.025 0.061403 0.99500 10.591 0.10189 
0.99750 4.1733 0.65323 0.99750 12.577 0.050268 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.050000 21.871 0.0012777 0.050000 9.7315 0.13642 
0.025000 26.887 0.00015203 0.025000 2.8005 0.83343 
0.010000 25.055 0.00033348 0.010000 6.6717 0.35228 
0.0050000 14.982 0.020399 0.0050000 9.9741 0.12575 
0.0025000 22.378 0.0010338 0.0025000 12.577 0.050268 
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Petronas 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.95000 14.314 0.026315 0.95000 11.039 0.087174 
0.97500 13.812 0.031814 0.97500 19.057 0.0040679 
0.99000 8.2690 0.21905 0.99000 34.963 4.3804e-006 
0.99500 8.2053 0.22345 0.99500 26.699 0.00016484 
0.99750 5.2103 0.51714 0.99750 21.326 0.0016029 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.050000 58.272 1.0092e-010 0.050000 77.313 1.2768e-014 
0.025000 15.575 0.016226 0.025000 26.619 0.00017063 
0.010000 1.6674 0.94761 0.010000 9.3317 0.15576 
0.0050000 0.15787 0.99992 0.0050000 19.046 0.0040865 
0.0025000 0.26450 0.99965 0.0025000 36.611 2.0962e-006 
 
 
Rasmala 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.95000 61.536 2.1924e-011 0.95000 84.325 4.4409e-016 
0.97500 51.236 2.6554e-009 0.97500 38.648 8.3903e-007 
0.99000 14.196 0.027524 0.99000 20.207 0.0025439 
0.99500 22.352 0.0010452 0.99500 3.0601 0.80126 
0.99750 0.23514 0.99975 0.99750 0.14836 0.99994 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.050000 36.276 2.4362e-006 0.050000 25.992 0.00022343 
0.025000 11.044 0.087027 0.025000 25.071 0.00033132 
0.010000 16.884 0.0097199 0.010000 30.879 2.6730e-005 
0.0050000 22.605 0.00094002 0.0050000 12.627 0.049357 
0.0025000 27.916 9.7457e-005 0.0025000 17.833 0.0066622 
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Tamweel 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.95000 294.85 0.00000 0.95000 236.76 0.00000 
0.97500 296.53 0.00000 0.97500 45.274 4.1294e-008 
0.99000 227.14 0.00000 0.99000 10.289 0.11299 
0.99500 245.39 0.00000 0.99500 11.946 0.063178 
0.99750 211.45 0.00000 0.99750 15.272 0.018242 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.050000 148.68 0.00000 0.050000 205.66 0.00000 
0.025000 81.345 1.8874e-015 0.025000 43.415 9.6545e-008 
0.010000 178.08 0.00000 0.010000 1.0411 0.98401 
0.0050000 152.61 0.00000 0.0050000 1.5781 0.95414 
0.0025000 124.49 0.00000 0.0025000 2.6869 0.84699 
 
 
Dubai 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.95000 294.85 0.00000 0.95000 236.76 0.00000 
0.97500 296.53 0.00000 0.97500 45.274 4.1294e-008 
0.99000 227.14 0.00000 0.99000 10.289 0.11299 
0.99500 245.39 0.00000 0.99500 11.946 0.063178 
0.99750 211.45 0.00000 0.99750 15.272 0.018242 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.050000 148.68 0.00000 0.050000 205.66 0.00000 
0.025000 81.345 1.8874e-015 0.025000 43.415 9.6545e-008 
0.010000 178.08 0.00000 0.010000 1.0411 0.98401 
0.0050000 152.61 0.00000 0.0050000 1.5781 0.95414 
0.0025000 124.49 0.00000 0.0025000 2.6869 0.84699 
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DP World 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.95000 4.2058 0.64885 0.95000 66.801 1.8482e-012 
0.97500 6.2379 0.39708 0.97500 56.724 2.0779e-010 
0.99000 8.2392 0.22110 0.99000 42.076 1.7763e-007 
0.99500 13.070 0.041941 0.99500 61.743 1.9905e-011 
0.99750 14.750 0.022296 0.99750 55.185 4.2529e-010 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.050000 12.800 0.046318 0.050000 19.126 0.0039553 
0.025000 21.075 0.0017785 0.025000 17.917 0.0064419 
0.010000 29.940 4.0348e-005 0.010000 29.026 6.0164e-005 
0.0050000 41.874 1.9467e-007 0.0050000 24.963 0.00034681 
0.0025000 27.972 9.5129e-005 0.0025000 26.315 0.00019451 
 
 
Index 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.95000 6.3967 0.38025 0.95000 7.8350 0.25044 
0.97500 12.227 0.057087 0.97500 6.6951 0.34997 
0.99000 27.046 0.00014195 0.99000 17.644 0.0071869 
0.99500 24.117 0.00049709 0.99500 26.091 0.00021409 
0.99750 22.047 0.0011876 0.99750 27.843 0.00010059 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.050000 25.863 0.00023612 0.050000 17.960 0.0063327 
0.025000 21.718 0.0013619 0.025000 5.5543 0.47491 
0.010000 29.627 4.6279e-005 0.010000 20.786 0.0020043 
0.0050000 38.858 7.6314e-007 0.0050000 23.603 0.00061770 
0.0025000 30.157 3.6696e-005 0.0025000 25.111 0.00032570 
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Index Pre-crisis 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.95000 9.0870 0.16874 0.95000 31.920 1.6903e-005 
0.97500 12.577 0.050274 0.97500 10.409 0.10846 
0.99000 33.561 8.1776e-006 0.99000 3.4184 0.75479 
0.99500 10.670 0.099136 0.99500 5.5741 0.47255 
0.99750 13.868 0.031149 0.99750 8.4589 0.20637 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.050000 21.672 0.0013882 0.050000 15.367 0.017584 
0.025000 22.314 0.0010622 0.025000 3.1109 0.79480 
0.010000 21.679 0.0013841 0.010000 8.6402 0.19485 
0.0050000 22.892 0.00083353 0.0050000 13.199 0.039982 
0.0025000 33.936 6.9224e-006 0.0025000 16.393 0.011792 
 
 
Index Post-crisis 
Bond Sukuk 
Short Positions Short Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.95000 3.4059 0.75644 0.95000 14.836 0.021567 
0.97500 9.5238 0.14619 0.97500 4.3153 0.63409 
0.99000 12.448 0.052698 0.99000 10.477 0.10596 
0.99500 13.820 0.031713 0.99500 14.375 0.025714 
0.99750 9.0418 0.17124 0.99750 10.768 0.095827 
Long Positions Long Positions 
Quantile Statistics P-value Quantile Statistics P-value 
0.050000 12.515 0.051426 0.050000 6.3440 0.38577 
0.025000 13.685 0.033359 0.025000 3.2348 0.77886 
0.010000 18.824 0.0044710 0.010000 12.792 0.046465 
0.0050000 17.425 0.0078432 0.0050000 12.528 0.051166 
0.0025000 15.469 0.016907 0.0025000 7.5569 0.27239 
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Appendix 3: Engle and Ng Sign Test Results and the Associated P-values 
BLME 
Bond Sukuk 
  P-values   P-values 
Sign Bias t-Test 0.73766 0.46072 Sign Bias t-Test 1.07273 0.28339 
Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.07148 0.94302 Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.46534 0.64169 
Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.12839 0.89784 Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.13215 0.89486 
Joint Test for 
the Three 
Effects 
1.03824 0.79200 Joint Test for the 
Three Effects 
1.87426 0.59891 
 
 
MAF 
Bond Sukuk 
  P-values   P-values 
Sign Bias t-Test 0.39473 0.69304 Sign Bias t-Test 0.17510 0.86100 
Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.1.40423 0.16025 Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
1.87989 0.06012 
Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.31064 0.75607 Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.09985 0.92046 
Joint Test for 
the Three 
Effects 
2.09215 0.55350 Joint Test for 
the Three 
Effects 
4.12143 0.24865 
 
 
Petronas 
Bond Sukuk 
  P-values   P-values 
Sign Bias t-Test 0.71826 0.47260 Sign Bias t-Test 0.29579 0.76739 
Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.03852 0.96928 Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.23982 0.81047 
Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.68315 0.49451 Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.31519 0.75262 
Joint Test for 
the Three 
Effects 
0.85440 0.83642 Joint Test for the 
Three Effects 
1.25341 0.96854 
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Rasmala 
Bond Sukuk 
  P-values   P-values 
Sign Bias t-Test 0.79899 0.42430 Sign Bias t-Test 0.46611 0.64114 
Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.62098 0.53461 Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.14457 0.88505 
Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.11803 0.90605 Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.05364 0.95722 
Joint Test for 
the Three 
Effects 
1.69275 0.63855 Joint Test for the 
Three Effects 
0.50076 0.91872 
 
 
Tamweel 
Bond Sukuk 
  P-values   P-values 
Sign Bias t-Test 1.09790 0.27225 Sign Bias t-Test 0.15921 0.87351 
Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.81306 0.41618 Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.21917 0.82652 
Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.73015 0.46530 Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.08420 0.93289 
Joint Test for 
the Three 
Effects 
2.11775 0.54833 Joint Test for the 
Three Effects 
0.06457 0.99572 
 
 
Dubai 
Bond Sukuk 
  P-values   P-values 
Sign Bias t-Test 1.09790 0.27225 Sign Bias t-Test 0.15921 0.87351 
Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.81306 0.41618 Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.21917 0.82652 
Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.73015 0.46530 Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.08420 0.93289 
Joint Test for 
the Three 
Effects 
2.11775 0.54833 Joint Test for the 
Three Effects 
0.06457 0.99572 
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DP World 
Bond Sukuk 
  P-values   P-values 
Sign Bias t-Test 0.80164 0.42276 Sign Bias t-Test 1.27623 0.20187 
Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.46698 0.64051 Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.31564 0.75227 
Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.08815 0.92976 Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.40906 0.68250 
Joint Test for 
the Three 
Effects 
1.18057 0.75767 Joint Test for the 
Three Effects 
2.52539 0.47072 
 
 
Index 
Bond Sukuk 
  P-values   P-values 
Sign Bias t-Test 1.12720 0.25966 Sign Bias t-Test 1.23420 0.21713 
Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
1.81182 0.07001 Negative Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.63397 0.52610 
Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.69036 0.48997 Positive Size 
Bias t-Test 
0.48784 0.62567 
Joint Test for 
the Three 
Effects 
5.17941 0.15912 Joint Test for the 
Three Effects 
2.19690 0.53256 
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Appendix 4: Jarque-Bera Test Results 
  Bond Sukuk 
BLME Test statistic 6.1242 2.8685 
p-value 0.000000 0.000000 
DP World Test statistic 291510 391510 
p-value 0.000000 0.000000 
Dubai Test statistic 276890 603420 
p-value 0.000000 0.000000 
MAF Test statistic 8947 44031 
p-value 0.000000 0.000000 
Petronas Test statistic 393590 >1000000 
p-value 0.000000 0.000000 
Rasmala Test statistic 24221 240890 
p-value 0.000000 0.000000 
Tamweel Test statistic >1000000 603420 
p-value 0.000000 0.000000 
Index Test statistic 6413 14221 
p-value 0.000000 0.000000 
 
 
 
 
